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Chapter 1
Introduction
Residential real estate markets affect our daily lives and are important indicators of the
national economy, social coexistence and the demand for space. The market mechanisms
are simple: every one of us needs a place to live and therefore rents or buys property,
creating demand for living space. Developers react to this demand by supplying space
to the market at profitable conditions, either selling space or letting it out over time.
Property prices and rents are determined by demand and supply, which are driven by
factors such as expected population growth, income per capita and returns of alternative
investments (DiPasquale & Wheaton, 1996). Owning a house is considered one of the
biggest dreams of many households, promising financial independence and a stable long-
term investment. Due to its capital requirements, a house is usually the biggest household
asset and often (partly) financed by debt, directly relating the socio-economic situation
of households to the developments of real estate markets. Therefore, policy makers want
to monitor and understand residential real estate markets, ensuring price stability and
affordability.
To illustrate the important role of residential real estate within the economy, Figure
1.1a shows the Case-Shiller Home Price Index for the United States, including the two
example cities, Detroit and Los Angeles. Highlighted in grey are the periods of the two
biggest US recessions in recent years, the dot-com crisis and the global financial crisis
(GFC) of 2007 - 2008. During both crises, the S&P 500 stock market index, measuring
the performance of the 500 biggest, listed US companies fell 46% and 53%, respectively.
However, the housing market behaved quite differently between the crises. During the dot-
com crisis housing markets were stable, potentially preventing a severe economic crisis.
In contrast, housing prices stagnated and started falling before the GFC, leading to a
banking crisis and ultimately to a severe economic recession. Figure 1.1b shows these
different outcomes, indicating that quarterly US GDP growth became negative during
the GFC.
Within countries, housing markets shape the socio-economic characteristics of a so-
ciety, as home ownership leads to higher wealth accumulation over time while low-income
households face increasing housing costs (rents) (Piketty, 2014). Therefore, policy makers
want to understand the demographics in the housing market, ensuring that housing af-
fordability is equally distributed. However, examining demographics, Krivo and Kaufman
(2004) find significant racial gaps in US home ownership rates, showing that blacks and
Hispanics are less likely to own property compared to whites and Asians. Urbanization
disproportionately increases house prices in urban areas, leading to the migration of lower
income households (Gyourko et al., 2013). This trend particularly affects younger house-
holds – Choi et al. (2018) show that the home ownership rate among US millennials in
2015 was 8 percentage points lower than for Gen Xers and baby boomers at the same age.
As housing cost increase over time, unequal ownership rates increase inequality.
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Figure 1.1
US Housing Market & Economy
(a) S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index
(b) US GDP growth (quarterly)
Notes: Figure 1.1a: Index January 2000 = 100, seasonally adjusted. Data retrieved from:
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SPCS20RSA, August 2019. Criseses are defined by US
business cycles defintions: http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html.
Figure 1.1b: Data retrieved from https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GDP
Figure 1.2
Heatmap of Amsterdam House Prices 2013 and 2018
(a) Amsterdam house prices 2013 (b) Amsterdam house prices 2018
Notes: Source: Municipality of Amsterdam. Maps are for illustration of spatial heterogeneous price developments. 2013 is
considered as the trough of the housing crisis, showing the lowest prices. Detailed price information are not reported but
can be retrieved via: https://maps.amsterdam.nl/woningwaarde/?LANG=nl
Beyond providing insight into within-country trends, residential real estate markets
also give a micro-level perspective on the value of individual locations. After all, ac-
cording to a well-known saying, real estate prices are determined by “location, location,
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location”. However, neighborhoods changes constantly and so does their location values.
House price differences and changes in differences over time can provide valuable insights
into location demand, potentially affecting housing affordability and mobility. As an il-
lustration, Figure 1.2 shows two heatmaps of house prices in Amsterdam 5 years apart
(dark red = expensive, dark blue = cheap). We can see that prices have not increased
equally over time. Initially expensive areas, such as the center, became even more ex-
pensive, excluding low-income households and reducing labor mobility. In contrast, the
western outskirts, initially lower priced, experienced moderate price increases, increasing
inequality. Some price changes are intended by design, they are stimulated by location-
based policies such as gentrification. However, other changes are unintended, for example
caused by the addition or removal of local amenities.
This thesis aims to shed light on housing price differences at the micro level to better
understand what determines the value of “location”. Especially sites that cause strong
external effects, such as a manufacturing facility, shape surrounding location values in
complex ways: A factory offers employment, while it might also cause noise and air
pollution. Policy makers often struggle to understand the net-effects (combined effects)
of externalities on location values, leading to short-sighted decision making. Systematic
placements are not uncommon and can have significant effects on house price differences
and income inequality: e.g. factories may be located systematically near lower-valued
areas to stimulate employment, neglecting negative external effects. In this thesis, I
examine the external effects of different sources of externailites on property prices, trying
to better understand socio-economic effects. Due to potential systematic placements there
might be issues of reversed causality (endogeneity). I address these issues with different
methodologies used throughout the chapters of this thesis.
I focus on policy relevant topics, such as schooling, energy production and cannabis
legalization, in the context of residential real estate markets: How do nearby facilities
affect house prices? In the view of policy makers, house prices often play a secondary
role when it comes to placement decisions. However, house prices offer a measure for
the indirect costs and benefits of these amenities / disamenities. In contrast, estimating
indirect costs and benefits otherwise, usually requires several assumptions; e.g. how do
we quantify the cost of electricity production on society? As houses price data are usually
the biggest limitation in the approach, my last Chapter deals with the question, how we
can use modern technology to overcome data limitations.
The thesis is structured as following: Chapter 1 introduces the theoretical framework
and limitations of the applied approach. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 examine the external
effect of different sources, some heavily affected by policy interventions. I hereby improve
from Chapter to Chapter on the methodology, illustrating the importance of the research
design. Focusing on current limitations and looking ahead, Chapter 5 presents a new
methodology to overcome current limitations and improve future studies in this field.
1.1 Externalities in the Housing Market
Residential real estate prices can be used to measure peoples’ preferences, using the he-
donic property pricing framework (Rosen, 1974). As illustrated in equation 1.1 below,
property prices are determined by a function of structural s, neighborhood n, and envi-
ronmental e characteristics. Structural characteristics are property-specific while neigh-
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borhood and environmental characteristics are tied to location. By controlling for some
characteristics, such as structural and neighborhood, it is possible to measure the effect
of another characteristic - such as the environment - on housing prices.
pit = f(s, n, e) (1.1)
As this model suggests, location values are determined by neighborhood character-
istics, such as income, safety, and race, and by environmental characteristics, such as
amenities and disamenities. Unfortunately, amenities and disamenities can often not be
identified as such, as external effects on the neighborhood are often multilayered and hu-
man preferences are heterogeneous. For example, the presence of a playground might be
considered an amenity for some people, while others perceive it as a source of nuisance.
Since it is practically impossible to determine and measure all possible external effects,the
more common approach is to use distance to the potential externality source, providing
an unbiased view.
In Chapter 2, I examine the effect of proximity to primary schools on house prices,
whilst controlling for school quality. Young families would tend to benefit from a short
commute to schools. However, schools also can be a source of nuisance in their close
surrounding, causing additional traffic and playing kids. Previous studies have examined
school quality effects, showing that houses within school districts of high quality schools
sell at a premium (e.g. Black, 1999; Gibbons et al., 2013). Contrary to many other
countries there are no school districts in the Netherlands so parents are free to send their
children to any school, eliminating, to some extent, the positive external effect of school
districts on house prices.
The analysis shows that in the Netherlands high quality schools do not affect nearby
housing prices positively, implying that people are not willing to pay more for living in
proximity to better primary schools if they are free to choose. A very close proximity to
schools results in negative property price effects, potentially caused by noise and traffic.
The results suggest that people prefer not to live too close to schools, but are indifferent
about their locations with respect to schools thereafter.
Examining the price effects of external factors on the housing market may be even
more important for more controversial sources of externalities, such as power plants.
Policy makers often overlook the local external consequences of their interventions while
policy decisions, such as expanding on wind energy by building more wind turbines, might
affect location values and consequently real estate prices.
In Chapter 3 I delve into the negative perceptions of the Dutch population against
wind turbines, a classical NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) problem.1 Energy production
is unavoidable, and I compare the external effects of coal, gas, biomass and wind power
production facilities on residential property prices.
This chapter focuses on the response of adding or removing such controversial sources
of externalities. I can not use a hedonic pricing model since placement decisions can not
be assumed to be completely random and a hedonic pricing model cannot capture changes
1In a NIMBY problem, the population is generally supporting a policy decision as long as they are
not affected personally by it, such as building new telecommunication towers to improve mobile internet,
but not building them nearby to avoid radiation or a restraint view.
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over time. To capture the effect of changes and control for ex-ante price effects, I use a
difference-in-difference model for areas and a repeated sales model. I study the external
effects of large-scale power generation facilities on local house prices and analyze data of
all power plants and wind turbines in the Netherlands, combining it with house price data
from 2.3 million housing transactions over 30 years.
The results indicate negative external price effects for gas plants and wind turbines,
but positive effects for biomass plants, conditional on ex-ante lower priced locations. The
results underline the complexity of externalities: in contrast to most conventional power
plants, wind turbines are not necessarily placed in ex-ante lower priced areas, as the main
determined for production is wind. Furthermore, wind turbines do not share the same
positive local economic effects as conventional plants, such as job creation and infras-
tructure investments. Therefore, local residents do not gain from nearby wind turbines,
creating strong local opposition. A potential solution for overcoming local opposition
could be increased local project involvement (Loring, 2007).
Chapter 4 focuses on an even more controversial topic; “coffeeshops”, i.e. Dutch
cannabis sales facilities. I examine the external effect of proximity to these “coffeeshops”
on property values. The legalization of cannabis is a hotly contested policy topic world-
wide, and lacking reliable data on the societal costs. When examining this question, most
studies focus on the direct effects for users and sellers, but less on the indirect effects
on third parties. I examine the effect of cannabis dispensaries on local property prices,
focusing on the three biggest Dutch cities, Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague.
Due to the high probability of endogenous placement decisions, I employ a difference-
in-difference analysis around an exogenous closing shock to see the causal effect of the
closure of the coffeeshop over time. As of 2012, the Dutch government recommended to
close all coffeeshops within the vicinity of schools (within 250 m) as teenagers should not be
exposed to cannabis sales. The decision did not consider the previous relationship between
coffeeshops and their neighborhoods, neglecting potential affects on housing markets. As
different cities implemented the policy at different moments in time, the setup provides
an exogenous shock unaffected by confounding time effects.
The results are intuitively surprising but in line with the existing literature. Com-
pared to properties near to coffeeshops, I document negative price effects for properties
nearby closing coffeeshops. The negative closing effects increase with closeness to cof-
feeshops and are robust to various entertainment venues nearby, such as bars and night-
clubs. My findings show that contrary to the common perception, the closing of Dutch
cannabis sales facilities had a negative effect on property values nearby.
In summary, these chapters aim to contest common beliefs. It is shown that in the
absence of school boundaries, school quality is not priced in property values, energy pro-
duction is not equal in perception, and peoples’ attitudes towards living close to cannabis
sales are not necessarily detrimental to the value of their homes. For many of the analyzed
sources, pinning down and quantifying external effects is practically impossible using tra-
ditional data sources. However, as people “vote with their feet”, housing markets provide
a measure to quantify the combined external effects. Policy makers can learn from these
findings, as they reflect the price responses to policy interventions. Ultimately, the hidden
costs and benefits of policy interventions are revealed through real estate markets, helping
to understand the full consequences of future interventions.
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1.2 Overcoming Data Limitations
Examining external effects in the housing market seems a straight-forward task. However,
there is a key impediment for a proper understanding, namely: asymmetric information.
Residential property markets are characterized by information asymmetries. Since
every house is different, real estate is an heterogeneous asset, requiring valuation on
a case-by-case base. Additionally, markets are different (heterogeneous), requiring local
knowledge to understand local market dynamics. Therefore real estate agents exist as local
intermediaries, having a better feeling for property prices and evidentially reaching higher
prices (Levitt & Syverson, 2008). As a consequences of information asymmetries, Case and
Shiller (1989) show in a seminal paper in the field that real estate markets are less efficient
than other asset markets. Transactions are characterized by higher transaction costs
due to intermediaries and arbitrage opportunities exist, increasing the risk of mispricing
(Quigley, 2002).
Data limitations are an important driver of asymmetric information. Characteris-
tically, real estate is an asset that people tend not to transact in too frequently, hence
taking long times to observe repeated sales. People do not move frequently, further lim-
iting transactions. Additionally, property transactions are usually private, complicating
our ability to observe transaction prices even further. However, to cleanly analyze the ef-
fect of hedonic characteristics, such as externality effects, it would be necessary to control
properly for other characteristics, requiring sufficient information to be available. Data
limitations can therefore be considered as a major bottleneck when using hedonic property
pricing models.
Policy makers are similarly affected by limited information, especially on a micro-
level. Even though many governments publicly provide transaction prices via land reg-
istries, the information is often limited to a minimum, such as the transaction price, date,
and basic data on the structure of the dwelling. As a result, it is often not possible to
use hedonic property pricing models to understand property prices. Instead, price assess-
ments, such as for property tax purposes, are carried out by costly intermediaries, such as
tax assessors in the US. Avoiding intermediaries, German policy makers assess property
taxes based on historic valuations from 1964 and are currently uncertain how to update
valuations for an upcoming reform.2
To address these concerns, in Chapter 5 I present a new method to collect prop-
erty data, using machine learning. Recently, machine learning is entering research in
various disciplines. It can offer support in finding hidden data patterns or to automate
tedious tasks. A popular machine learning technique is computer vision, making com-
puters understand digital image content. Computer vision is already successfully used
in autonomous driving and to detect skin cancer based on images (Esteva et al., 2017).
With the increasing availability of urban images, computer vision could also be used to
overcome property data limitations, potentially reducing asymmetric information. Figure
1.3 illustrates the global coverage of Google Street View, a dataprovider for street scene
images.
Using such techniques, I present a new approach to collect structural real estate data
from property images. I develop a model using object detection, which is able to collect
2https://bit.ly/2KiTzqh
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property characteristics based on Google Street View images. At a preliminary stage the
model already shows a decent accuracy. The model is trained to detect simple property
characteristics on images, such as windows, facades and roofs and outperforms simpler
models in robustness to confounding factors. Through the relative location and size of
objects, researchers can approximate multiple property characteristics as I demonstrate
in two simple examples, in this chapter.
This study shows that property data can be collected based on location and im-
ages only, independently of institutional constraints. The approach could be used more
widespread to collect new property aspects in a cost-efficient manner, such as the share
of solar panels or exterior maintenance quality. Furthermore, the approach could also
help to complement structural databases, reducing estimation errors in hedonic property
pricing models. Lastly, the approach could be used to study property markets in foreign
countries, such as in developing countries, without the need to travel.
Figure 1.3
Google Street View Coverage (blue) 2018
Notes: Coverage of Google Street View mid 2018, including partial coverage. Map by Eugen
Simon, retrieved from: https://bit.ly/2N5rd4I.
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Chapter 2
Schools without boundaries:
Externalities of good and bad primary schools
in free school choice systems.∗
2.1 Introduction
There is strong evidence that schools have a substantial influence on peoples’ housing
choices. Schools usually only accept pupils living within a school’s predefined catchment
area, forcing parents to move into the boundaries of catchment areas if they want to send
their children to specific schools. Children living outside catchment areas are required to
attend different schools. This construct creates a demand for locations relative to schools,
potentially affecting housing prices. Empirical evidence shows that people are willing to
pay up to 7.2% more for homes in catchment areas of high quality schools (Bayer et al.,
2007; Clapp et al., 2008; Fack & Grenet, 2010).
The question arises, whether school proximity loses its value, once catchment areas
are non-existing and it is interesting to understand the effect of school proximity without
the need to have to control fro catchment area. It could be argued that parents still value
proximity to schools, as it limits daily commuting times. However, parents might not be
willing to pay as much for school proximity. People may even dislike living very close to a
school, due to potential negative externalities caused by noise and increased traffic during
peak hours.
In this study, we investigate peoples‘ willingness to pay for school proximity in a
free school choice system. Primary schools in the Netherlands do not have catchment
areas, giving parents the freedom to choose any school they want for their children, in-
dependent of their home location. Using a national dataset of Dutch residential property
transactions over a ten-year period, we examine house price differences in the vicinity to
primary schools, controlling for their relative location to the school. We employ a hedonic
property pricing framework and differentiate for school quality, using the annual results
of standardized educational tests.
We focus on the Netherlands due to the Dutch educational system, which enables
parents to send their children to any chosen school, and not necessarily the nearest. Due
to the availability of large-scale data, we can control for unobserved heterogeneity using
spatial fixed effects on neighborhood level (Kuminoff et al., 2010). The whole of the
Netherlands is centrally classified by the Central Statistics Bureau of the Netherlands
(CBS) into unique neighborhoods following the principle that neighborhoods are gener-
ally homogenous in income levels, employment, crime rates, age composition, and other
unobserved characteristics.
According to a recent report by the OECD, Dutch schools enjoy a high degree of
autonomy, and are granted “freedom of education” that gives any natural or legal person
∗This chapter is co-authored with Lex Borghans (Maastricht University), Olga Meshcheriakova (Maas-
tricht University) and Juan F. Palacios Temprano (Maastricht University).
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the right to set up a school and implement the appropriate teaching method (Nusche et
al., 2014).2 As stated earlier, parents are not legally bound to send their children to the
closest school and it is feasible not to do so, given the coverage of schools.
Our results show that in a free school choice setup there is no effect of distance to
schools on housing prices for an average or even for top performing schools. Our finding
suggests that distance to average and best performing schools does not affect local housing
prices. However, for worst performing schools we find a discount of up to 1.6 percent for
houses within 200 m, which means that negative externalities of worst performing schools
affect nearby housing prices.
The paper relates to the literature on effects of school quality on housing prices.
Treating schools as a local public good (Bayer et al., 2004; Tiebout, 1956) and using
housing prices to measure individuals’ willingness to pay for these goods, many papers
conclude that in catchment zones with a better school residential real estate prices are
higher (Bayer et al., 2007; Black, 1999; Fack & Grenet, 2010). At the same time analogous
to classical public goods, schools produce local externalities. Existing literature suggests
that these externalities are higher closer to schools and fade out with distance (Emerson,
1972; Sah et al., 2016). To our knowledge, all existing studies explore school catchment
area settings. This is the first paper exploring the willingness-to-pay for schooling without
school catchment areas. We show that in such a setting, negative local external effects
dominate.
2.2 Literature Review
School boundary systems divide spatial areas into different school districts. A prime
example is the U.S., where residents of a school district are only allowed to send their
children to public schools in the corresponding district. If parents want to send their
children to specific schools, they must move to the respective district. To examine the
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for schooling, Black (1999) first introduced a boundary dis-
continuity approach (BDA), comparing house prices on both sides of contiguous district
boundaries. Under the key assumption that houses only differ in school districts, the
price difference between houses should only be driven by school characteristics. (Bayer et
al., 2007; Fack & Grenet, 2010). Black (1999) finds that “parents are willing to pay 2.5
percent more for a 5 percent increase in school test scores.”
As the key assumption of Black (1999) is quite strong, different studies examine the
heterogeneity of the results. Fack and Grenet (2010) develop a matching framework for
neighborhood characteristics, documenting a 1.4 to 2.4 percent increase in prices for one
standard deviations increase in performance. Hwang et al. (2019) use a finite mixture
model to examine preference heterogeneity of households with different socio-economic
status, documenting that higher-income households value education more. Gabriel et al.
(2016) show that school quality effects differ throughout housing cycles, but that good
schools lead to a robust price premium on average. Kane et al. (2006) and Zahirovic-
Herbert and Turnbull (2009) examine the change of school district boundaries as the basis
of a natural experiment approach, documenting that school improvements are priced while
reassignments are not priced (Zahirovic-Herbert & Turnbull, 2009). Overall, empirical
2This freedom is complemented with a high-quality monitoring system that guarantees the schools
meet the standard of quality and provide the knowledge considered appropriate by the central government.
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findings show that there is a significant positive relationship between school quality and
housing prices increasing by below 4 percent for one-standard deviation increase in quality
(Nguyen-Hoang & Yinger, 2011).
Since BDA identification takes place at school district boundaries, most studies do
not address price differences as a function of distance to schools. While school benefits,
such as access to education, are the same for all houses in the district, costs are not
equally distributed. The presence of externalities such as noise, generate heterogeneity in
the (non-monetary) costs of schools over the district (Sah et al., 2016).3 Another factor
is commuting times, which are longer for parents living at the district boundaries. The
net benefits of schools should therefore not be equally distributed within districts.
Sah et al. (2016) adopted a theoretical framework set up by Li and Brown (1980) to
model four potential price net effect scenarios of schools over distance. All scenarios show
an inverted U-shaped curve for the net-effects of schools on housing prices over distance,
indicating that an optimal location is not too close nor too far from the school. However,
the different scenarios suggest different findings within close proximity of schools, where
potential local external effects are strongest, ranging from a smaller premium to a discount,
relative to the district boundary. Sah et al. (2016) document a significant proximity
discount of between 6.7 to 14.4 percent for homes within 500 feet (151 m) of public and
private elementary schools, respectively. However, the authors do not control for school
quality, which might explain the difference in findings. Other studies find evidence for a
positive net-effect scenario, indicating rather a schooling premium. However, these studies
use less sophisticated spatial fixed-effects or smaller datasets (Chin & Foong, 2006; Rosiers
et al., 2001; Owusu-Edusei et al., 2007).
We contribute to the current literature by focusing on the effect of school quality on
housing prices in a setting without the existence of school districts, theoretically allowing
parents to send their children to any school. We use an extensive, national dataset of
residential housing transactions and primary schools. Our data contain information on
almost all Dutch primary schools and around 950,000 housing transactions between 2007
– 2016, reflecting 75 percent of the Dutch market, including an abundance of control
variables. We consider school quality, using the results of the standardized test score
CITO, which is a national test and which all children are required to take, subsequently
affecting the available secondary education choice.
2.3 Economic Framework
Similar to previous studies, we assume that access to schools and the quality of schools
is part of the pricing function of houses. This process is modeled in equation 2.1, where
Z represents a vector of other, price-determining factors. We expect that, similarly as in
boundary settings, people in a free school choice setup value schools of different quality
differently. Schools grant access to education, and when deciding where to send their
children, parents value better schools more (Borghans et al., 2015).
p = f(Z, school, school quality) (2.1)
3This framework was firstly introduced by Li and Brown (1980) and has been widely use to value a
lot of public and non-marketed goods (e.g. air pollution/quality).
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To illustrate the process of valuing school access, we model a simple utility function
for parents. We assume a simple utility function for schooling of individual parent house-
hold i as shown in equation 2.2. The utility of schooling is modeled as a function of three
parts, the quality of school qij, the exposure to negative school externalities measured by
α, and the cost of commuting γ, where the latter two are dependent on school distance x
to school j.
ui = qij − αij 1
xj
− γixj (2.2)
In a school district setting, it can also be expected that utility ui is negatively affected
by the higher housing costs in the corresponding district of school j, as shown in equation
2.3. Black (1999) and others in the BDA setting focus on the magnitude of βi, the
willingness to pay for higher education.4 However, in a setting without school districts,
parent households have a larger choice set as they do not have to locate themselves in any
district. As illustrated in equation 2.2, the utility of schooling is therefore not affected
by districts, but only by the trade-off between commuting costs and negative external
effects.
ui = qij − αij 1
xj
− γixj − βidj(qj) (2.3)
It can be assumed that commuting costs are not dependent on school quality.5 School
choice is rather a tradeoff between school quality and commuting costs. However, the
question arises whether local external effects of schools are dependent on quality. Schools
produce negative externalities, such as noise or increased traffic during peak hours, and
it is assumed that exposure to those externalities decreases with distance. In addition,
low quality schools might produce even worse external effects, such as from troublesome
children, gathering in the evening. We therefore extend the utility model as illustrated
in equation 2.4, where schooling utility is dependent on some function, describing the
interaction of exposure to external effects and quality.
ui = qij − f(αijqj) 1
xj
− γixj (2.4)
In our analysis, we focus on the optimal school distance x for different levels of
school quality. We expect that commuting costs are linearly increasing with distance.
The closer parents live next schools, the less time they must spend bringing their children
or children have to walk / bike. If parents prefer to save traveling time or want to minimize
the commuting risk of their children, they will chose a house nearby a school. We do not
assume commuting cost to be varying with school quality.
To get an idea of how big the premium could be, we perform an back of the envelope
calculation using the average alternative costs of time parents would spend traveling to
school per year in the Netherlands. The estimation is based on the average salary and
4We do not specify a functional form for the willingness to pay for higher education in the BDA setup.
5Especially in the Netherlands where most children cycle to school. Hence, it is unlikely for distance
to play a major role. However, the closer families live to school, the less risky it is for children to cycle
safely to school.
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number of children per family in 2015, the latest available information from the StatLine
database of the CBS.6 Taking 4 minutes as an average time needed to bike 1 km as a
benchmark, we calculate total traveling time of 2 return trips to school per day (4 km *
4 minutes * 20 days *10 months) to be 3,200 minutes or 53.3 hours per year. Multiplying
it by the average hourly wage gives 949 Euros of alternative costs of traveling to school
1 km away per year. Taking into account that in the Netherlands parents bring their
children to school for approximately first 4 years of school and that average number
of children per family is 1.66, we get an upper bound (if children have at least 4 year
age gap) estimate of a best performing school premium of 6,299 Euros.7 This means
that, all other characteristics equal, an average house (see Table 2.1) 1 km closer to a best
performing school is expected to be 2.4% more expensive (3.2% for an average apartment).
Consequently, a rough estimate of the slope of the regression line from regressing house
price on distance to best performing school is approximately -0.026 (weighted average of
the price premiums calculated above).
2.4 Empirical Strategy
We use linear distances as a proxy to measure the exposure to nearby primary schools. To
calculate linear distances, we first use Bing Maps through an Application Programming
Interface (API) in order to determine geographical coordinates (longitude and latitude)
for addresses of each housing transaction and each school. Then, we calculate linear
distances between each house and each school. Employing a hedonic property pricing
model, we follow Rosen (1974) to decompose house price into the marginal willingness to
pay for available house characteristics and nearby amenities in the equilibrium. Here, we
are interested in the relationship between distance to the nearest school and residential
real estate prices.
It has been shown that linear specifications in hedonic pricing regressions outperform
other more flexible specifications in case of omitted variables (Cropper et al., 1988).
Therefore, in this paper we estimate simple log-linear specifications. However, this does
not per se solve an omitted variable bias, which is a widely-recognized problem with
hedonic analysis (Abbott & Klaiber, 2011; Black, 1999; Heintzelman & Tuttle, 2012a).
In our case it would arise because of unobserved neighborhood characteristics that are
likely to be correlated with school quality. For example, school quality can be correlated
with average income of the neighborhood, either because of sorting or higher available
resources. However, controlling only for an average income level is not enough, since there
could be more unobserved or difficult-to-measure neighborhood characteristics. A way to
deal with this problem is to employ spatial fixed effects model. The main challenge with
this method is that spatial fixed effects should be applied at the same geographical scale
as the suspected unobserved heterogeneity (Abbott & Klaiber, 2011).
As mentioned in the data section, in the Netherlands neighborhoods are defined at
the level of a small residential unit of a few streets with access to main amenities within its
borders. Therefore, we expect each neighborhood to be homogeneous in their unobserved
characteristics. Segregation is quite unlikely, since our sample is restricted to residential
areas, which are small and densely populated. Consequently, applying spatial fixed effects
6Statistics from CBS StatLine: http://statline.cbs.nl/
7Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, 2015: http://statline.cbs.nl.
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at the neighborhood level, we exploit variation in distances to school for houses within
one neighborhood, holding all other characteristics constant.
We start by assuming that the relationship between distance to school and prices is
linear, and later we relax this assumption to allow for nonlinear non-monotonic relation-
ship.
As a baseline model, we use the classic hedonic property pricing model by Rosen
(1974). It describes property prices as a function of structural, environmental, and neigh-
borhood aspects of the property and the surrounding area, reflected in equation 2.5:
yi = β0 + siβ1 + niβ2 + β31distSchooli + eiβ3 + Tβ4 + i (2.5)
where yi is the natural logarithm of the price of property i, si is a 1xK vector of structural
variables, ni is a 1xG vector of neighborhood variables (including spatial fixed effects at
neighborhood level), and ei is a 1xZ vector of environmental variables. T is the time fixed
effect, a t x1 vector of year dummies, and i is the standard error.
The element we are mostly interested in, distance to school distSchooli, is included
as the distance from property to the nearest school in kilometers. Here we calculate linear
distances between schools and houses using geographical coordinates of each school and
each housing transaction.
As mentioned in Section 3.2, we use the average CITO exit test score per school as
a proxy for school quality. The CITO test is taken by all students in the final year and
outcomes determine secondary school choices. We define ‘best’ (SQbi) and ‘worst’ (SQwi)
performing schools based on their position in the yearly average normalized CITO exit
test score distribution, considering the schools within the upper quartile as best and the
ones from the lower quartile as worst performing. To account for outliers (e.g. due to very
bad or very good years), we also use the three year average CITO exit test scores and its
distribution. We include school quality into our regression by interacting the dummies
with the distance to school variable as indicated in equation 2.6.
yi = β0 + siβ1 + niβ2 + eiβ3 + β31distSchooli + β32SQbi + β33SQwi+
β34(distSchooli ∗ SQbi) + β35(distSchooli ∗ SQwi) + Tβ4 + i
(2.6)
However, as mentioned before, we suspect that the relationship between house price
and distance to a worst performing school is nonlinear. To test this assumption and to
capture the form of the relationship more precisely for both best and worst performing
schools, we do not impose any requirements on the form of our regression and use distance
interval dummies instead. We form 20 intervals of 50 m length up to 1.1 km, while we
reserve the first 100 m as a reference group (for each transaction at most one dummy is
equal to one; e.g. if for a certain transaction distance to the nearest school is 460 m, then
the dummy “distance to nearest school between 450 m and 500 m” is equal to one). Based
on school distance, observations are sorted into the respective intervals. The underlying
model is shown in equation 2.7, where
∑20
x=1 Schoolxi represents the sum of the 20 school
proximity dummy variables, and
∑20
x=1(Schoolxi∗SQ∗i) represent the interactions of school
quality and distance intervals for both the best (SQbi) and the worst (SQwi) performing
schools:
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yi = β0 + siβ1 + niβ2 + eiβ3 +
20∑
x=1
βx1Schoolxi+
20∑
x=1
βx2(Schoolxi ∗ SQbi)+
20∑
x=1
βx3(Schoolxi ∗ SQwi) + Tβ4 + i
(2.7)
2.5 Data
We combine three datasets. First, we use a housing transactions dataset, containing
detailed information on the characteristics of houses and some neighborhood information.
Second, we obtained a complete neighborhood classification, which specifies for each house
in the Netherlands to which neighborhood it belongs. Third, we have locations of nearly
all Dutch primary schools, and average test scores per school per year, which is used as a
proxy for school quality.
2.5.1 Housing Data
The residential housing transaction database that we use has been provided by the Dutch
Association of Real Estate Agents NVM (Nederlandse Vereniging van Makelaars). Our
data consist of 950,000 housing transactions between 2007 – 2016, accounting for 75%
of all residential real estate sales in the Dutch market. We obtained information about
apartment and houses for residential use. The dataset contains addresses, transaction
prices, detailed information about characteristics of the house and some environmental
information.
We have information about the following characteristics: house size, number of rooms,
bathrooms, floors, availability of different amenities (parking lot, garden, roof terrace),
type of house/flat, condition of interior/exterior, type of heating, level of isolation, con-
struction periods and age of building, distance to highway, park, forest. To determine
longitude and latitude information per address we use Bing Maps through an Application
Programming Interface (API) to determine . We exclude repeated sales, outliers in terms
of price (bottom and top 2 percentile of price distribution) and land size (top 1 percentile),
and observations with incomplete information.
The transaction data are distributed evenly over space. Appendix Figure 2.3a shows
a population density map of the Netherlands for year 2009. As one of the most densely
populated metropolitan regions in central Europe, the three Randstad provinces of Noord-
Holland, Zuid-Holland and Utrecht account for 42% of all transactions in the database.
Appendix Table 2.5 provides the percentage of inhabitants per province and the number of
transactions per province for 2016, showing that house transactions are closely following
the population distribution, with only Limburg showing less frequent sales.
2.5.2 Neighborhood Controls
Information about neighborhood classification is provided by the Central Statistics Bu-
reau of the Netherlands CBS (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek). There are 13,141
neighborhoods at the end of 2017. Since neighborhoods borders are relatively stable over
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time, we assume that allocation of houses to neighborhoods is the same over the time
span of our analysis. An advantage of this classification is that a neighborhood is nar-
rowly defined as a complete geographical unit with its own infrastructure and including
all main amenities (schools, supermarkets, playgrounds, etc.). Typically, one neighbor-
hood includes a few streets, and therefore, its borders are defined territorially and not by
postcodes.
For example, there are 486 neighborhoods in Amsterdam, out of which 78% are
represented in our transaction data with up to 10 primary schools within 1.1 km from
their borders (257 schools in total).
2.5.3 School Data
We collect a complete profile for each primary school in the Netherlands. The data,
retrieved from the Dutch inspectorate of education (Onderwijsinspectie), include the exact
location based on actual address and the computed geographical coordinates of each
primary school.8 In our sample we have geographical and quality information on 7,770
school buildings between 2007 to 2016, allowing to calculate the linear distance between
properties and schools. We have the average CITO exit test scores of most primary schools
in the Netherlands between 2007 and 2016 and use it as a proxy for the output quality of
schools.
Student performance in the Netherlands is assessed at the end of primary education
(at the age of 11 or 12), by means of a compulsory standardized test, covering all subjects.
Even though there exist different exit tests, the CITO exit test is the major test taken,
adapted by approximately 80% of primary schools. The CITO exit test score therefore
captures unobserved school characteristics correlated with school quality, such as teacher
quality, peer quality and parental behavior (Black, 1999).9 The results of the test are a
major determinant for the level of eligible secondary education.10
CITO test scores rank from 500 to 550 and secondary school cut-off scores vary yearly.
On average, a score of 545 and higher will most likely allow students to enter the highest
form of secondary education (VWO), while a score of at least 535 should lead to the
second-highest form of secondary education (HAVO). The average CITO exit test score
per final year per school is publicly accessible and used by many parents as an indicator
of school performance. Based on their CITO score and the yearly national CITO average,
children receive a ranking, relating their score into a performance. There are between
4 and 5 letter-based ranks (e.g. ranging from A to E), with each rank representing 20
to 25% of the distribution. This rank is usually used as a reference in the secondary
education advise.11
We use the average CITO exit test scores per year per school and sort them into
quartiles. We consider the top 25 percent as best performing schools and the bottom 25
percent as worst performing schools. Translated in the ranking system, best performing
8See https://bit.ly/2KX0HYB
9Responsible organization: CITO Eindtoets Basisonderwijs until 2015, andCentrale Eindtoets since
2015.
10A second factor is the teacher’s advice. However, reports by the Dutch Inspectorate of Education
indicate that CITO exit test scores are among the best predictors for children’s secondary school level
(The Dutch Inspectorate of Education, 2014)
11https://wij-leren.nl/cito-score.php
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schools have a yearly average CITO score in the highest ranks, while worst performing
schools in the lowest ranks. Appendix Table 2.6 shows the average CITO exit test score
per year in our sample, as well as the cut-off levels for “worst performing” (below Q1
cut-off) and “best performing” (above Q3 cut-off) schools.
2.5.4 Descriptive Statistics
In the analysis, we restrict the sample to houses within urbanized areas to make them
comparable. By urbanized areas we mean houses with a nearest primary school within 1.1
km. It seems plausible that for houses with a nearest school further away, other potentially
unobserved characteristics affect price setting. Moreover, we only keep observations for
which the average CITO exit test score of the nearest school is available. According to
our data this is around 80% of all primary schools. Other schools use one of four other
available tests. Those results are not comparable to the CITO exit test score, and therefore
transactions for which the quality of the nearest school is unknown are excluded from the
analysis. As a result, our sample reduces from approximately 950,000 observations to
around 800,000.
Table 2.1 shows the average characteristics of transactions in our sample. Two thirds
of our sample consists of houses, which are on average larger than apartments, in terms
of square meters (m2), number of rooms and number of levels. In absolute prices, houses
are more expensive than apartments. However, in terms of price per squared meter,
apartments are more expensive. In terms of outside and inside quality, apartments and
houses are rather similar. Table 2.1 also compares our analyzed sample (only with school
of known quality) to the original sample. We argue that the used sample represents
the initial one well, mitigating concerns of sample selection biases. The only noticeable
difference is in apartment prices, with the ones in our sample being 0.6% more expensive
than average in the original sample.
Appendix Figure 2.3b shows the average distance to the nearest primary school per
municipality for 2009. The distance distribution is similar to the population distribution
in Appendix Figure 2.3a. Furthermore, distances are very short on average, having a
maximum average distance of 2.5 km in the most rural areas. In urban areas, the distance
is around 375 m on average. Appendix Figure 2.4 shows that the average distance between
houses and primary schools is rather constant over time, with a slight increase after 2013,
which can be explained by an increased number of schools (buildings).
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Table 2.1
Descriptive Statistics – Data Representativeness
Analyzed sample Original sample
Houses Apartments Houses Apartments
Observations 529,394 260,691 568,856 282,867
Size 131 85 131 85
(in m2 ) [41] [27] [41] [27]
Floors 2.8 1.3 2.8 1.3
(number) [0.6] [0.5] [0.6] [0.6]
Rooms 5 3.2 5 3.2
(number) [1.3] [1.0] [1.3] [1.0]
Price 264,845 199,762 265,010 198,647
(in Euro) [152,160] [116,785] [152,578] [115,740]
Price per m2 1,987 2,369 1,991 2,351
(in Euro) [699] [1,020] [701] [1,006]
Housing inside quality 3.1 2.9 3.1 2.9
(1 = worst, 9 = best) [1.1] [1.1] [1.1] [1.1]
Housing outside quality 3 2.8 3 2.8
(1 = worst, 9 = best) [1.0] [0.8] [1.0] [0.8]
Notes: Source: own analysis. Reported numbers are mean values, standard deviation in brackets. Com-
parison of the sample including only houses with nearest school of known quality (analyzed sample) and
the full original sample with all transactions in residential areas.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Baseline Hedonic Regression
In order to estimate the price effect of proximity to schools, we first run a baseline hedonic
regression with only control variables. Appendix Table 2.7 shows the estimation results
of our baseline hedonic regression without accounting for distance to school. Overall,
the results are in line with previous studies (e.g. see Brounen & Kok, 2011; Dro¨es &
Koster, 2016). An increase in size of the property with 1 m2 , leads to 0.7 percent price
increase, while an additional room increases the price by 1.6 percent and an additional
bathroom by 1.8 percent. The effects of different construction periods are heterogeneous,
with only relatively new houses (built after 1980) increasing the price. Different amenities
also increase the price, such as a 3.0 percent for a roof terrace, 6.2 percent for a parking
lot, and 7.2 percent for a good garden. Proximity to a park is also valued (-1.4% per km).
Using this regression estimate, we predict the property prices based on the controls
to see whether there are any differences in house prices over distance to the nearest school,
without estimating the effect of distance itself. Appendix Figure 2.5a shows the mean
predicted transaction price for each 50 m interval between 0 and 1.1 km of distance to
school. We see that houses farther away from schools are more expensive, and we need
to identify which characteristics can explain the difference in prices. We look at the
relationship between different house characteristics from the baseline hedonic regression
and distance to school. Appendix Figure 2.5b is constructed the same way as Appendix
Figure 2.5a and shows that size of the property exhibits the same pattern as the predicted
price, which means that houses farther away from schools are bigger on average. We
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also notice that they on average have more bathrooms and are more likely to be (semi-
) detached. Consequently, we conclude that buildings differ significantly in observed
characteristics over distance to school, and therefore it is important that we control for
them in our analysis.
2.6.2 Estimation Results
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show the results of the hedonic model estimation including school in-
formation. In Table 2.2 we report results of estimating different specifications of equation
(1). Here the variable of interest is linear distance to school. We start by having only
basic control variables, construction periods, time and spatial fixed effects in column (1)
and add more controls, such as type of house/apartment, maintenance condition, type
of heating and isolation, and environmental controls (more detail in Appendix Table 2.7.
The distance to school effect is 1.5% per km in the initial specification in column (1), but
falls to 1.1% once we add more controls and stays constant up to the final specification
(column 4).
The magnitude of the effect (taking 1 km distance as an example) is approximately
similar to having an additional room or a bathroom, while having a roof terrace or a
parking lot seems more attractive (3.0 and 6.2 percent respectively). In other words,
there is a discount for living next to a school building, with real estate prices increasing
with distance to school. For an average house next to a school building it will imply a
2,913 Euro discount and for an average apartment a 2,197 Euro discount compared to the
same house at 1 km distance from a school.
Next, we add school quality to the model and report the results of estimating different
specifications of the regression (2) in Table 2.3 . The coefficients of the control variables
are barely affected, while the effect of distance to school decreases to 0.6 percent in the full
specification (column 4). This occurs because here we look at effects of different school
qualities separately, while in Table 2.2 the coefficient of distance to school is picking up
an average effect of all school qualities.
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Table 2.2
Regression Outputs I – Distance to School and House Price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Distance to school 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011***
(km) [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Size 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(m2) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Garden size 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(m2) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Rooms 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.016***
(n) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Bathrooms 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.018*** 0.018***
(n) [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
D: Parking lot 0.084*** 0.069*** 0.062*** 0.062***
(1 = yes) [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
D: Apartment -0.287*** -0.278*** -0.292*** -0.291***
(1 = yes) [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
D: Roof terrace 0.033*** 0.036*** 0.030*** 0.030***
(1 = yes) [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Observations 790,085 790,085 790,085 790,085
R-squared 0.75 0.76 0.78 0.79
Time fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Construction periods Yes Yes Yes Yes
House/apart. type controls No Yes Yes Yes
Extended quality controls No No Yes Yes
Environmental controls No No No Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: ln(price). Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
D = dummy. Basic controls include house and total land size, number of rooms, bathrooms, dum-
mies for number of floors, new house, farm, parking, garden (incl. quality), roof terrace. Construc-
tion periods reported in Appendix Table 2.7. Extended quality controls include dummies for type of
heating, isolation, and condition of property interior and exterior. Environmental controls include
distance to highway, forest, park, and a dummy for busy street. Time FE by sales year. Spatial FE
by neighborhood level. Base values: Number of floors: 1, Construction = Construction before 1944,
House and Apart. type = ground floor apt, Apart. quality = average, Garden quality: bad, Heating
= no heating.
Regarding our hypothesis concerning additional proximity effects of the best perform-
ing schools, we find a small additional premium. This slightly increases with distance and
goes from almost 0 up to 0.5 percentage points for houses at 1 km distance. The magni-
tude of this result is similar to the effect of the distance to school variable and is negligibly
small. Comparing to our rough estimate from Section 2.4, this premium is much smaller
(around 13% of the hypothetical compensation for traveling time), and the line is almost
flat leading to the conclusion that our first hypothesis is not supported. Our documented
effects are significantly smaller compared to those of studies using catchment areas (Clapp
et al., 2008). We therefore argue that people do not value living next to a high-quality
schools in a free school choice system. Later we remove the linearity restriction to examine
the effect more precisely.
For low performing schools the relationship with distance is significant, and houses
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closer to a school building have an additional discount of 1.0 percentage point. For an
average house next to a worst performing school it translates into a total discount of
4,237 Euros, and for an average apartment 3,196 Euros. The discount disappears after
650 meters, which is farther away than we expected. We examine this distance cut off in
more detail, relax the linearity assumption below.
Since there could be changes in the average CITO exit test score distribution in
consequent years, we use three years’ averages instead of yearly CITO exit test score to
get a more stable ranking (Table 2.3 , column 5). We document that the coefficient of the
distance to school is barely affected, while the total effect of quality for worst performing
schools become stronger, as the magnitude of the discount increases, showing a long-term
effect of 1.5 percentage points. Although we notice that the sample size decreases by
30 percent, since this information is not available for all school years, the distribution of
distances to schools of different qualities stays the same.
Table 2.3
Regression Outputs II – School Quality and House Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Distance to school 0.011*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.004**
(km) [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
D: Best school 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
(1 = Yes) [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
D: Worst school -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.015***
(1 = Yes) [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Distance * Best school 0.003 0.004* 0.005** 0.005** 0.006**
(km) [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
Distance * Worst school 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.025***
(km) [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
Observations 790,085 790,085 790,085 790,085 557,998
R-squared 0.75 0.76 0.78 0.79 0.78
Time fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Construction periods Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
House/apart. controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quality controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Environmental controls No No No Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: ln(price). Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. D =
dummy. Dummies for best and worst performing schools correspond to upper amd lower quartiles of annual
CITO end test score distribution. Column (5) reports uses 3 year average CITO end test score instead. Basic
controls include house and total land size (up to the second power), number of rooms, bathrooms, dummies for
number of floors, new house, farm, parking, garden (incl. quality), roof terrace. Construction periods reported
in Appendix Table 2.7. Extended quality controls include dummies for type of heating, isolation, and condi-
tion of property interior and exterior. Environmental controls include distance to highway, forest, park, and a
dummy for busy street. Time FE by sales year. Spatial FE by neighborhood level. Base values: Number of
floors: 1, Construction = Construction before 1944, House and Apart. type = ground floor apt, Apart. quality
= average, Garden quality: bad, Heating = no heating.
We relax the assumption of a linear relationship between distance to school and
housing prices to examine changes in the slope over distance. Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show
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the results of the interval dummies specification from the estimation of equation 2.7. We
use houses with the nearest school of average quality within first 100 m as a reference
group. We see in Figure 2.1 that for average schools the distance does not make any
difference for house prices, so people are indifferent as to how far the school is as long as
there is a school within biking distance. Since the confidence interval is very small, we
conclude that there is no effect of distance to school on house prices. Interestingly, there
is no prominent evidence of positive or negative externalities for houses very close to a
school building.
Figure 2.1
Nonlinear school proximity effect over distance
Notes: The graph represents exact relationship between house
price and distance to school within each of 20 intervals of 50
m long between 0.1 and 1.1 km, with first 0.1 km is a reference
group.
Accounting for school quality, 2.2a shows the additional effect of interacting dummies
for best performing schools with the distance dummies. We do not see any effect at any
distance in this case, which implies that there is no additional effect of best performing
schools. Figure 2.2b shows results of the estimation of the additional effect for worst
performing schools. Similarly to the linear case, we find an additional discount for houses
in the immediate proximity of worst performing schools, which ranges from 1.6 percentage
points for houses next to the school building to 1 percentage point for houses 200 m away.
For houses farther away the additional discount drops to zero, which supports our second
hypothesis, since exposure to negative externalities is limited to houses within the first
few hundred meters only.
Consequently, we reject our first hypothesis and conclude that people do not value
living in the immediate proximity of best performing schools more than average ones. At
the same time our second hypothesis is mildly supported, since we find a discount for
houses within the first 200 m of worst performing schools, which must imply that those
schools create bigger negative externalities (for example, loitering children or adverse
parental behavior).
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Figure 2.2
Additional quality effects for best and worst performing schools
(a) Top 25 %
(b) Bottom 25 %
Notes: The graph represents an additional proximity effect
for best and worst performing school compared to an average
school.
2.6.3 Robustness Checks
One potential concern could be that schools are not randomly placed and we might be
estimating distance to some other amenity instead of capturing the effect of distance to
school. To check this, we use a supermarket as a proxy of a local center. We use informa-
tion about locations of all the supermarkets, grocery, and drug stores in the Netherlands
from the telefoonboek.nl database. As a robustness check we calculate distances between
7,972 local centers and our housing transactions and add distance to the closest local cen-
ter in our full specification. Reported in Table 2.4, we see that the coefficient of distance
to school slightly decreases from 0.6 to 0.5 percentage points, and it is the only coeffi-
cient affected. We also calculate the correlation coefficient between distance to school
and distance to supermarket, and it is 0.11. Even though distance to school and distance
to supermarket seem to be weakly correlated, the distance to school coefficient is still
significant and its magnitude does not change.
Another potential concern is that in our framework we only look at one closest school
23
ignoring all others that are farther away. However, one can argue that people might care
only about having a good school in the area, but it does not matter to them whether it is
the closest to their house. To account for that, we add distance to next best performing
school in the regression. Also in Table 2.4, we document that none of the coefficients are
affected and the effect of distance to the next best performing school is zero, implying
that people do not care about distance to the nearest best performing school, conditional
on having one in the neighborhood.
Table 2.4
Robustness checks – Adding distance to a local center and second best
performing school
(1) (2) (3)
Basic regression Local center Second best school
Distance to school 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006***
(km) [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
D: Best performing school 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1 = Yes) [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
D: Worst performing school -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010***
(1 = Yes) [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Distance * Best school 0.005** 0.005** 0.005**
(km) [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Distance * Worst school 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015***
(km) [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Distance to local center 0.003***
(km) [0.001]
Distance to 2nd best school -0.000***
(km) [0.000]
Observations 790,085 790,085 790,085
R-squared 0.79 0.79 0.79
Quality house characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Time and location fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Construction periods Yes Yes Yes
Environmental controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Dependent variable: ln(price). Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. D = dummy.
Distance to nearest supermarket is used as proxy for distance to local center. Basic controls include house and
total land size, number of rooms, bathrooms, dummies for number of floors, new house, farm, parking, garden
(incl. quality), roof terrace. Construction periods reported in Appendix Table 2.7. Extended quality controls
include dummies for type of heating, isolation, and condition of property interior and exterior. Environmental
controls include distance to highway, forest, park, and a dummy for busy street. Time FE by sales year. Spatial
FE by neighborhood level. Base values: Number of floors: 1, Construction = Construction before 1944, House
and Apart. type = ground floor apt, Apart. quality = average, Garden quality: bad, Heating = no heating.
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2.7 Discussion & Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze people’s willingness to pay for school quality in a market without
school boundaries. We apply a hedonic pricing method to represent house prices as a func-
tion of characteristics of the property itself and the surrounding amenities. We use data
from the Netherlands, where parents are not restricted in their choice of primary schools.
We use the linear distance to school as a proxy for access to education and exposure to
negative externalities and estimate interval regression with dummies for each 50 m in our
final specification. To control for unobserved heterogeneity, we use spatial fixed effects at
the neighborhood level, as the Netherlands is divided into unique neighborhoods.
For a country with no catchment areas policy for schooling, we find that there is no
price premium of high school quality on housing prices. However, we find a small discount
for general school proximity and an additional discount of worst performing schools. Since
people can freely choose a primary school for their children, they are not willing to pay
extra to live close to a good school compared to an average school. In contrast, proximity
to worst performing schools leads to a discount in house prices. These results are in line
with previous findings, showing that schools are a source of externalities in the housing
market and therefore affecting prices (Sah et al., 2016). At the same time, comparing
our results to studies that exploit catchment areas (up to 7.2%,(Clapp et al., 2008; Fack
& Grenet, 2010), we see that the effect of school quality in a setting without catchment
areas is negligible for high quality, but to be considered for low quality.
To check that we are measuring distance to the nearest school and not some other
amenities, we estimate a regression with a linear distance to school and add distance to
a local center, proxied by a distance to the nearest supermarket. We find that these two
distances are weakly correlated (0.11) but the magnitude of the coefficient of distance
to school does not change, and the point estimate decreases from 0.6 to 0.5 percentage
points. Our results are also robust to altered quality measures (3 year average CITO exit
test score) and controlling for next nearest school. In both cases magnitudes of the results
do not change.
The findings of this paper have implications for policy makers concerning the indirect
costs of education. First, our results suggest that there is no evidence of good schools
affecting the local housing market. Consequentially, placing a school of high quality
should not be used as a tool to increase neighborhood attractiveness if access to the
school is not limited to the nearby area. Second, we show that in close proximity of
worst performing schools any negative externalities significantly outweigh any positive
externalities of proximity and consequently decrease residential housing prices. Those
negative externalities should be considered for optimal placement of primary schools. To
provide an indication of the costs on the housing market generated by primary schools,
we estimate the discount on an average house. With a discount of 1.6 percent for an
average house price of e264,845 and an average apartment price e199,762 next to a
worst performing school building, this translates into a discount of e3,973 for houses and
e2,996 for apartments respectively.
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2.8 Appendix
Table 2.5
Population Share and Housing Transactions
per Province (2016, in %)
Province Population
Housing
Transactions
Groningen 3.4 3.4
Friesland 3.8 3.7
Drenthe 2.9 3.5
Overijssel 6.7 6.5
Flevoland 2.4 2.5
Gelderland 12 12.5
Utrecht 7.5 9.4
Noord-Holland 16.4 18.9
Zuid-Holland 21.3 21.6
Zeeland 2.2 1.6
Noord-Brabant 14.7 13.2
Limburg 6.6 3.2
Total 100 100
Notes: Source: CBS. The number of housing transactions
per province for 2016 is closely following the population dis-
tribution, with only Limburg being underrepresented.
Table 2.6
School Quality Data (2007 – 2016)
Year CITO Average
Worst schools
Cut-off
Best schools
Cut-off
2007 534.5 532 537.6
2008 534.7 532 537.7
2009 534.8 532.3 537.7
2010 535.1 532.8 537.9
2011 535.2 532.9 537.9
2012 535.1 532.8 537.7
2013 534.7 532.2 537.6
2014 534.5 531.9 537.3
2015 534.8 532.5 537.6
2016 534.4 532.1 537.2
Notes: Source: Own analysis. The range for CITO end test score is
between 500 and 550.
26
Table 2.7
Hedonic Regression – Control Variables
VARIABLES
House size (m2) 0.007*** Garden size (m2) 0.001***
[0.000] [0.000]
House size squared -0.000*** Garden size squared -0.000***
[0.000] [0.000]
Number of rooms 0.016*** Number of bathrooms 0.018***
[0.000] [0.000]
D: 2 floor property -0.023*** D: New house 0.017***
[0.001] [0.002]
D: 3 floor property -0.021*** D: Roof terrace 0.030***
[0.001] (1 = yes) [0.001]
D: 4 floor property 0.016*** D: Parking lot 0.062***
[0.002] (1 = yes) [0.001]
D: 5 floor property 0.080*** D: Garden 0.001
[0.004] (1 = yes) [0.003]
D: Garden quality average 0.029***
Construction period (dummy): (1 = yes) [0.002]
Construction 1945 –1959 -0.052*** D: Garden quality good 0.072***
(1 = yes) [0.001] (1 = yes) [0.003]
Construction 1960 –1970 -0.071***
(1 = yes) [0.001] Isolation (dummy):
Construction 1971 –1980 -0.043*** One level of isolation -0.005***
(1 = yes) [0.001] (1 = yes) [0.001]
Construction 1981 –1990 0.007*** Two levels of isolation 0.021***
(1 = yes) [0.001] (1 = yes) [0.001]
Construction 1991 – 2000 0.087*** Three levels of isolation 0.021***
(1 = yes) [0.001] (1 = yes) [0.001]
Construction 2001 & later 0.131*** Four levels of isolation 0.018***
(1 = yes) [0.001] (1 = yes) [0.001]
Five or more levels isolation 0.022***
House type (dummy): (1 = yes) [0.001]
Row house 0.077***
(1 = yes) [0.001] Apart. quality luxurious 0.068***
Corner house 0.019*** (1 = yes) [0.001]
(1 = yes) [0.001]
Semi-detached house 0.091*** Apartment type (dummy):
(1 = yes) [0.001] Upstairs apartment -0.072***
Detached house 0.167*** (1 = yes) [0.001]
(1 = yes) [0.001] Gallery apartment -0.044***
(1 = yes) [0.001]
Heating (dummy): Maisonette apartment -0.082***
D: Heating: coal or oven -0.081*** (1 = yes) [0.002]
(1 = yes) [0.001] Environmental:
D: Heating: central or tele-heating 0.010*** Distance to highway (km) 0.009***
(1 = yes) [0.001] [0.001]
D: Heating: AC or solar 0.01 Distance to forest (km) -0.001
(1 = yes) [0.008] [0.001]
Distance to park (km) -0.014***
Quality & Location controls Yes [0.001]
Construction periods controls Yes Observations 790,085
Time fixed-effects Yes Adj. R-squared 0.79
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 D = dummy, Base val-
ues: Number of floors: 1, Construction = Construction before 1944, House and Apart. type =
ground floor apt, Apart. quality = average, Garden quality: bad, Heating = no heating. Time
FE by sales year. Spatial FE by neighborhood level.
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Table 2.8
Houses in proximity of worst performing schools and total housing stock
Observations within 200m
of worst schools
Total sample
Total housing stock
(CBS Statline)
Year Houses Apartments Total
2012 2,327 2,242 4,569 87,117 5,116,860
2013 1,996 1,822 3,818 73,508 5,172,052
2014 2,294 1,934 4,228 88,135 5,259,926
2015 2,413 2,045 4,458 94,943 5,283,459
2016 1,873 1,590 3,463 83,156 5,359,581
Notes: Source: own analysis and CBS Statline. The total housing stock does not include public housing
(Woningcorporatie). The NVM sample contains on average 1.63% of total housing stock.
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Figure 2.3
Population Density and School Distance (2009)
(a) Population density
(b) Average school distance
Notes: The population density distribution is representative for all years throughout the sample
period. In addition, the density distribution is representative for the sample distribution. For
school distance, data per municipality are provided by the Central Statistics Office (CBS the
average distance to the nearest primary school per municipality for 2009, provided by CBS.
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Figure 2.4
School Distance over Time
Notes: The average distance between houses and primary
schools is rather consistent over time, with a slight increase
after 2013, which can be explained by increased prevalence of
closing existing schools (buildings) over opening new ones.
Figure 2.5
Relationship - Distance to school
(a) Predicted price vs. distance to closest
primary school
(b) Property size vs. distance to closest
primary school
Notes: Figure 2.5a shows that houses further away from school building are more expensive. Price is predicted
based on Appendix Table 2.7, so not controlling for distance to school.
Figure 2.5b shows that houses further away from schools building are bigger, which explains Appendix Figure
2.5a.
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Chapter 3
Clean Electricity, Dirty Electricity:
The Effect on Local House Prices∗
3.1 Introduction
Electricity consumption in the European Union is expected to increase by between 0.5
and 1 percent per year until 2030 (European Commission, 2013). To reliably handle this
energy demand, a large fraction of electricity is currently generated by coal and gas-fired
power plants. Such an increase will lead to significant environmental externalities. To
combat this, there is a strong desire among policy makers to become less dependent on
fossil fuels, and to decrease carbon emissions from power generation, mostly through the
increasing use of renewable energy sources.
In Europe, the European Commission passed its Europe 2020 strategy, which binds
all EU member states to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 20 percent and to increase the
share of renewable electricity production to 20 percent by the year 2020. Over recent years,
the share of renewable electricity production in the EU-28 increased from 12.6 percent in
2003 to 22.4 percent in 2014 (European Commission, 2015, 2016; Eurostat, 2015b, 2015a).
But, this average comes with significant variation across individual member states, putting
pressure on some countries to more rapidly increase their share of renewables.
The question of whether renewable (or “green”) electricity generation is a superior
solution to conventional generation is a multi-dimensional question that involves a com-
prehensive cost-benefit analysis regarding electricity prices and production costs, available
capacity, and environmental aspects. In order to compare the total costs of different types
of electricity production, their external costs to the environment should also be incorpo-
rated in the calculations, in addition to direct costs (Ayres & Kneese, 1969; Roth &
Ambs, 2004). Besides global environmental externalities, local effects of power genera-
tion on public health, as well as the effects of noise and sight for the nearby population
are important to consider. Externalities on the local environment often lead to popular
opposition when governments plan to expand on renewable energy generation (Breukers
& Wolsink, 2007; Wolsink, 2000, 2007; Wu¨stenhagen et al., 2007). However, EU member
states have initiated a multitude of national policies to increase the share of renewable
energy, often ignoring these local externalities.
This paper fills the research lacuna by analyzing the external effect of conventional
power plants (coal and gas) and renewable power plants (wind and biomass) on local
housing prices, determining the costs of different types of electricity generation for local
home owners. We employ a comparable analytical framework within similar housing
markets, using an extensive, longitudinal dataset of actual transaction prices. We focus
on opening and closing effects of different energy generation types due to the importance
of ex-ante location controls.
We address a comparability problem, since the current literature is mostly limited on
∗This chapter is co-authored with Piet Eichholtz (Maastricht University), Nils Kok (Maastricht Uni-
versity) and Daan van Vuulpen.
31
the external effects of a single type of electricity generation or the general effect of power
plants, not distinguishing between types. Furthermore, existing studies often analyze
just a few power plants at the time, use different and non-comparable analytical tools,
or employ asking prices rather than transaction prices to assess effects on local house
prices (Blomquist, 1974; Clark et al., 1997; Davis, 2011; Dro¨es & Koster, 2016; Gamble
& Downing, 1982; Gibbons, 2015; Heintzelman & Tuttle, 2012b; Lang & Opaluch, 2013;
Sunak & Madlener, 2016). It is therefore difficult to draw a coherent conclusion about
the relative effects of different types of electricity generation on local housing markets.
In any study of externalities and house prices, endogeneity is a critical issue in prop-
erly identifying effects. In our analysis, an endogeneity problem arises from the fact that
placement decisions of power plants and wind turbines depend on factors like available
infrastructure and local politics, but also on land values. Since electricity production
requires significant space, land prices are a considerable factor in setup costs. Land value
is also a determinant of house prices, so it could be argued that land values and house
prices in affected areas are likely to already be lower before the placement of a power
plant or wind turbine. This leads to an identification problem that is often neglected in
the existing literature, when using hedonic models (Sunak & Madlener, 2016).
This study focuses on the Netherlands, which is lagging behind other European
countries, such as Sweden and Denmark, in renewable electricity generation. The share
of Dutch renewable electricity production was 6 percent in 2014. Among renewables,
biomass/renewable waste (5.3 percent) and wind (0.7 percent) are the dominant energy
sources (Eurostat, 2015b). A critical goal of Dutch energy policy is to rapidly increase the
share of renewable electricity sources. As wind is abundant along the Dutch coast, the plan
is to have 6,000 megawatt (MW) of onshore wind capacity installed by 2020, increasing
the number of wind turbines and partly replacing older, less efficient wind turbines (Londo
& Boot, 2013). Since the Netherlands is one of the most densely populated countries in
Europe, electricity generation and urban areas are likely to further converge, raising the
question of how external effects of different electricity generation types affect the housing
market?
To address this question, we employ an extensive dataset of 2.3 million Dutch housing
transactions between 1985 and 2015. In addition, we have data on all wind turbines,
biomass plants and conventional power plants in the Netherlands. We focus on coal, gas,
biomass and wind electricity generation facilities, since these are most significant for the
Dutch electricity market.2 We match these information sources in order to measure the
effects of proximity to electricity generation facilities on house prices, calculating distance
measures for each individual transaction, using a variety of models to control for individual
housing characteristics.
We document different external effects on nearby house prices for different energy
types. We find negative external effects for gas plants and wind turbines. In contrast, we
find positive price effects for biomass plants, conditionally on placement in ex-ante lower
priced areas. We do not find any significant price effects for coal plants.3 All external
2Nuclear power contributes to the Dutch electricity market, but there is only one power plant in the
Netherlands (the Borssele nuclear power plant). Due to its singularity, observations within externality
distance would be limited and potential results hardly generalizable. We therefore exclude the nuclear
plant from our analysis.
3Due to limited openings, we are only able to examine coal plant closings with sufficient observations.
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effects are generally negative in urban areas. Most effects are robust over time and do
not vary with plant size. As plant size plays no role, the general negative effect might at
least partially come from perception.
The remainder of this paper starts with a short discussion of the literature regarding
the external effects of electricity generation on local housing markets. Section three
presents a theoretical framework and the underlying methodology, which is followed by
section four, providing the data and descriptive statistics. Sections five describe the results
and section six of the paper offers a short conclusion.
3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 External effects of electricity generation
Defining and pricing externalities of electricity generation facilities is a challenging task.
Roth and Ambs (2004) provide a meta-study to quantify the externality costs of 14 dif-
ferent electricity generation types, focusing on air pollutants. They find a wide range of
damage cost estimations of individual air pollutants, such as for carbon dioxide (CO2),
ranging from $9.90 to $41.60 per ton, with coal power plants having the highest exter-
nal costs, followed by gas and combined cycle power plants. In contrast, biomass and
wind appear to have only limited external costs. These results are in line with a study
conducted by the European Commission (2003). However, despite a common agreement
over the rank of air pollution emission among electricity generation types, cost estimates
of different emissions vary widely, showing the difficulty of pricing the externalities of
electricity generation.
Despite the lack of air pollution stemming from wind turbines, there are significant
noise and visual effects. Reported health effects such as sleep disturbance, headache,
anger fatigue and loss of motivation are acknowledged as factors that can be caused by
the noise from wind turbines (Farboud et al., 2013).4 Visual effects seem to have an
even stronger impact than noise (Bakker et al., 2012). Even though there is no scientific
evidence about causal effects, people located near wind turbines have reported health
effects, claiming those effects were due to photo-induced seizures (photosensitive epilepsy)
and wind turbine blade flicker (Harding et al., 2008). In addition, households located
nearby report a decrease in life-satisfaction after the installation of wind turbines (Krekel
& Zerrahn, 2017).
The increased number of self-reported health effects by people living near wind tur-
bines merely seems to be caused by the annoyance over the presence of wind turbines
itself, rather than originating from one aspect in particular, highlighting the difficulty to
identify individual externalities (Pedersen & Waye, 2007).5 People generally support wind
energy, but oppose it if facilities are installed close to their homes (Breukers & Wolsink,
2007; Wolsink, 2000, 2007; Wu¨stenhagen et al., 2007). Wolsink (2007) states that local
residents are willing to accept wind turbines in their vicinity as long as they perceive the
4Other health effects mentioned in the study are: visceral, vibratory and/or vestibular dysfunction,
dizziness, vertigo, unsteadiness, tinnitus, ear pressure or pain, external auditory canal sensation, memory
and concentration deficits, and irritability.
5In the Netherlands, the noise and shadow effects of wind parks on nearby neighborhoods are assessed
before opening, protecting nearby residents from increased exposure https://bit.ly/2X0yQfC. It is
therefore difficult to pinpoint specific negative effects of wind turbines.
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general distribution of wind turbines as “fair”. However, in the Netherlands local residents
do not have the perception that they can influence the distribution of new wind turbine
sites (Wu¨stenhagen et al., 2007).6 Similar results are found in the United Kingdom (Bell
et al., 2005), the United States (Pasqualetti, 2011b), and Mexico (Pasqualetti, 2011a).
3.2.2 Power plants and external effects on housing
Since residential real estate is fixed in location, prices are highly sensitive to factors dis-
rupting location quality (Hilber, 2005), making real estate a good identifier of local utility
or disutility from externalities. As people choose locations according to their preferences
and aversions (Tiebout, 1956), external factors, that arise from power plants and wind
turbines, are incorporated in house prices (Rosen, 1974), allowing to assign monetary
values to the external effects.7 However, since it is practically impossible determine and
measure all external effects of different electricity generation facilities, we use distance
(proximity) to properties as a measure in the Rosen (1974) framework. Using distance
should theoretically reflect the net-external effects (Nelson, 2008).
Research focusing on local housing market effects of power plants dates back more
than 40 years. However, most studies focus on the effects of individual power plants
in small regional markets (Blomquist, 1974; Clark et al., 1997; Gamble & Downing,
1982; Sunak & Madlener, 2016). Large-scale studies tend to investigate just one type of
electricity production, using different measures of property prices, such as transaction-
based (Dro¨es & Koster, 2016) or survey-based (Davis, 2011). Additionally, studies use
different control variables, leading to varying empirical models. Due to the heterogeneous
characteristics of housing markets, changes in electricity generation technology over time,
and the focus on a single type of electricity generation, it is hard to draw a coherent
conclusion about the relative effects of different electricity generation types on local house
prices.
In most studies,the observed external effects for conventional power plants and wind
turbines are either negative or insignificant. Blomquist (1974) finds a price decrease of 0.9
percent per 500 feet, within a 2-mile distance of a coal power plant. Davis (2011) finds a
discount of 3 to 7 percent within 2 miles of plants, increasing with proximity and capacity.
For wind turbines, negative external effects range between 5 percent within 0.5 miles (Lang
& Opaluch, 2013), 2 to 16 percent within 3 miles (Heintzelman & Tuttle, 2012b), 1.2 to 2.6
percent within 2 kilometers (Dro¨es & Koster, 2016) and 5 to 6 percent within 2 kilometers
(Gibbons, 2015). Other studies find no evidence of significant effects (Carter, 2011; Hoen,
2014; Sims et al., 2008). Since the methodology, number of observations, research area
and control variables differ widely between studies, it is not possible to directly compare
these findings and to draw firm conclusions regarding the relative externality costs of
different forms of electricity generation.
Overall, there is no study that simultaneously includes different types of electricity
generation technology, uses a large number of observations, measures transaction-based
house prices, and accounts for sufficient control variables to quantify external effects in a
comparable manner. Furthermore, in any study addressing the effect of locally desirable or
6This perception is confirmed by the fact that the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Envi-
ronment centrally determined eleven areas for the construction of new wind parks in 2014. The official
selection criteria were population density and wind speed (Feld et al., 2014).
7The main assumption is that people are free in their location choice.
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undesirable externalities on house prices, the main challenge is identification. In the case
of power plants, both renewable and conventional, the locational choice is often driven by
factors such as land values and (local) politics, rather than being fully random or based
on exogenous factors such as proximity to waterways or exposure to a stiff breeze. Only
a few, recent studies address this issue (Davis, 2011; Dro¨es & Koster, 2016).
3.3 Method
3.3.1 Theory & sample construction
We study the effects of different electricity generation methods on house prices within
one market: The Netherlands. Our focus is on coal, gas, biomass, and wind energy, due
to their significance for the local electricity market. Since the findings of previous stud-
ies differ widely, we are interested in the variation of external effects between different
electricity generation facility types and the variation of findings due to different model
specifications. We therefore test two specifications: a difference-in-difference (DID) ap-
proach using average area price changes (e.g. see Muehlenbachs et al., 2015; Pope & Pope,
2015), and a DID repeated sales model.
For both approaches, we use a similar measure of externality exposure. Since we
cannot determine and measure all potential externalities of the different electricity gener-
ation facilities, we assume that externalities spread over distance (Nelson, 2008). As we
focus on local external effects of electricity generation facilities and neglect global effects,
such as CO2 emissions, we focus on areas directly surrounding electricity generation facil-
ities. However, it might be that different externalities spread differently over distance. In
contrast to physical externalities such as noise and sight disturbance, economic external-
ities, such as employment effects, could reach further, leading to potentially unbalanced
external effects over distance.
Assuming external effects spread over distance, we determine exposure to externali-
ties by the linear distance to the closest electricity generation facility of every energy type,
using longitude and latitude information.8 Based on a cut-off distance, we consider obser-
vations as either affected by externalities (d=1 ) or not affected (d=0 ). Based on empirical
findings on conventional plants (Davis, 2011) and wind turbines (Dro¨es & Koster, 2016),
we use a cut-off distance of 2.5 km for all energy types. However, we further examine
different cut-off distances and interval measures.
To avoid interference among affected and control observations, we omit observations
in a ring-shaped area beyond the cut-off distance as illustrated in Figure 3.1. Using the
externality cut-off distance of 2.5 km, we consider observations within 2.5 km distance
as affected (d=1 ), comparing them with control observations beyond 2.5+z km, where
z is the width of the omitted area. We begin with z = 1 km, but test different lengths
for robustness. Due to the heterogeneity of local residential markets, observations at
externality distances do not necessarily share the same locational characteristics with
observations far away. We therefore control for location fixed-effects and limit our control
group to a maximum distance of 10 km (y = 6.5 km), omitting observations beyond 10
8Distances are calculated using the haversine formula, a common way to calculate the great-circle
distance of two points on a sphere using longitude and latitude information.
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km distance from the analysis.9
We account for confounding factors from other electricity generation facilities. Ob-
servations within a 2.5 km distance of a nuclear power plant are omitted, since there
is only one active plant in the Netherlands and we argue that the external effects from
nuclear power plants differ from those of conventional plants (Gawande & Jenkins-Smith,
2001). Furthermore, we exclude observations within a 2.5 km distance from the German
and Belgium border, since we cannot fully account for power plants across the border.10
Figure 3.1
Sample Construction Method
Notes: We cluster observations into affected, omitted and control groups
depending on their location relative to a power plant or wind turbine. Obser-
vations located in the inner circle around a wind turbine or power plant are
considered “affected”. We use different radii, ranging from 2.5 km to 4 km.
For the omitted group, we use a radius extension of z = 1.5 km. We consider
all other observations as the control group, limiting the maximum distance
to 20 km (y = 16km).
3.3.2 Difference-in-difference approach
Since the placement of power plants and wind turbines is not random, a static model
might be biased by an economic endogeneity problem of the price-effect relationship.
Besides infrastructure factors, such as grid infrastructure or the closeness to gas pipelines
and harbors, and political factors, such as local voter opposition, land value may also
determine placement decisions. Low land values make it cheaper to build a power plant
or to erect a wind turbine. Since land values strongly correlate with house prices, too,
observed house price discounts nearby power plants or wind turbines might be the result
of low ex-ante land prices instead (Kok et al., 2014).
Beside limiting the reach of our control group, we address this potential problem by
using a difference-in-difference (DID) model, investigating the effects of facility openings
and closings. Although our dataset is large, it contains just a limited number of repeated
sales pairs. Due to more placements of power plants and wind turbines in remote locations
9We also test other maximum distances between 10 and 20 km for the control group, not markedly
affecting the results.
10There are several wind turbines along the German side of the border and some conventional and
nuclear power plants in Belgium, not far from the Dutch border.
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and imbalances in the number of facility openings and closings (e.g. few coal and biomass
plant openings and wind turbine closings), we are not able to perform a DID analysis
based on repeated sales for all facility types. Instead, we use a difference-in-difference
model for geographic areas similar to Muehlenbachs et al. (2015), comparing the change
in house prices of areas that experience facility openings / closings, with areas nearby
(control areas), as illustrated in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2
DID for areas - Setup
Notes: We investigate the average price change of homes in
area A comparing it with area B between time t and t+x.
Observations in area A experience the opening / closing of
a electricity generation facility of type k and whereas obser-
vations in area B do not. We control for individual housing
characteristics to avoid capturing systematic changes in hous-
ing characteristics of specifc areas.
Equation (3.1) shows the employed model, testing the effect of facility openings
on average property prices, where FACki measures if observation i is in proximity to
an electricity generating facility of type k, either before or after opening, postkit (d =
1 ) measures transactions after opening of the closest facility of type k, and Treatkit =
FACkit ∗ postkit equals 1 for transactions in close proximity to a facility, after opening.
Therefore, the coefficient of interest is γ3k, measuring the effect of facility type k openings.
ln(pit) = α +
K∑
k=1
γ1k(FACkit) +
K∑
k=1
γ2k(postkit) +
K∑
k=1
γ3k(Treatkit) +Xitγ4 + it (3.1)
We control for unobserved differences in price-determining factors between areas
over time and general time-trends, using Xit, consisting of structural, environmental and
neighborhood characteristics, as well as time fixed-effects (Rosen, 1974). Control variables
are listed in Appendix Table 3.7. We further test for the assumption of common pre-
treatment trends (Kuminoff & Pope, 2014). We account for potential spatial dependence
and omitted variables by including neighborhood-fixed effects in Xit, hereafter referred
to as location FE (Anselin & Bera, 1998; Kuminoff et al., 2010).11 As time-fixed effects
11We test location fixed effects at 4-digit, 5-digit and 6-digit postcode level, ranging from slightly over
4,000 postcode areas with on average 7,000 households per postcode area to 450,000 postcode areas with
17 households per postcode area. As the results do not change in signs and 6-digit postcode forces us
to exclude a large number of observations to avoid individual fixed-effects, we focus on 4-digit postcode
level fixed-effects.
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we use year dummies, measuring general house price dynamics over time (see e.g. Hoen,
2010, 2014).12 Standard errors are clustered by municipality and year.
The analysis is limited to facilities that open during the sample period. We exclude
observations around plants that opened before. We only consider observations up to 10
years before and after facility openings, as it can be assumed that long-term price effects
settle over time.13 To eliminate anticipation effects and effects from construction work, we
omit transactions one to two years before openings, as well as the opening year, depending
on facility types.14 We do not consider observations that experience a replacement, being
within externality distance of another facility prior to opening of a new plant. Since the
number of affected houses decreases through this filtering process, we also test a 3-km
cut-off distance throughout the analysis.
To examine the spatial heterogeneity of external effects, we test the external effects
of different electricity generation types at different distance bands. As shown in equation
(3.2), we form J distance intervals of 1 km length up to a distance of 4 km for every
energy type K. We use 1 km length to have sufficient observations in every interval. To
reduce complexity, we do not use a holdout distance, meaning we distinguish between
treated observations up to 4 km and control observations between 4 - 10 km distance.
ln(pit) = α +
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
γ1jk(FACjkit) +
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
γ2jk(postjkit) +
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
γ3jk(Treatjkit)
+Xitγ4 + it
(3.2)
As property prices differ between urban and rural areas (DiPasquale & Wheaton,
1996), the perception of external effects might differ due to the presence of confounding
negative or positive externalities, such as from road noise in cities. We therefore inves-
tigate the urban-rural heterogeneity effect, by explicitly controlling for facility openings
in urban areas. As shown in equation (3.3), we add an urban location control dummy
in the control matrix Xit and add an urban-treatment interaction term represented by
(Treatkit ∗ urbanit), where β1k represents the additional effect of facility type k opening
in urban areas.15
Due to technical improvements and government regulation, conventional electricity
generation facilities typically get cleaner, less noisy, and more efficient over time.16 We
therefore examine the heterogeneity of opening effects over time, testing subsets of 10-
12Additionally, we adjust house prices for inflation, using the CPI from the Dutch Central Statistics
Office (CBS)
13We test an extension to 15 years, but do not find a significant difference in results.
14The average construction period for conventional plants is two years, whereas the construction period
for wind turbines is much shorter, on average. We therefore use one year for wind turbines. Even though
projects might be announced earlier, residents in the Netherlands have strong legal power to prolong or
abort large projects. We try anticipation periods up to 4 years and adjustment periods up to 3 years,
but do not find different results.
15As mentioned in Appendix Table 3.7, we also test alternative time fixed-effects, using year-
municipality interaction terms. We use municipality as a location as urban-rural assignments are based
on municipality, too. (see Section 3.4.3)
16See Buhre et al. (2005); Franco and Russo (2002); Meij and te Winkel (2006); Senior and Johnson
(2005).
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year periods, moving in 5-year steps, as shown in equation (3.1). We use 10-year periods
instead of individual years to have sufficient observations for every period, leading to the
following, overlapping periods: 1985 - 1995, 1990 - 2000, 1995 - 2005, 2000 - 2010, and
2005 - 2015.
ln(pit) = α +
K∑
k=1
γ1k(FACkit) +
K∑
k=1
γ2k(postkit) +
K∑
k=1
γ3k(Treatkit)
+
K∑
k=1
β1k(Treatkit ∗ urbanit) +Xitγ4 + it
(3.3)
Another potential source of heterogeneity is power plant size (Davis, 2011) or the
number of wind turbines in a wind park (Dro¨es & Koster, 2016). Davis (2011) argues
to focus on power plants above 100 MW, since disamenities are likely to be stronger for
these plants. We therefore differentiate for size, using capacity for conventional plants
and the number of contiguous wind turbines within a wind park, as capacity differences
for individual wind turbines are relatively small compared to power plants. Due to con-
straints in size variation, we are only able to examine size effects for gas plants and
wind turbines. Based on the available variation, we distinguish three size categories for
gas plants (<100MW, 100 - 400 MW, >400MW), and four categories for wind turbines
(single turbine, 2 to 9 turbines, 10 to 29 turbines, 30+ turbines).17
Similar to openings, we investigate the effect of facility closings, examining the effect
of externality removals. We focus on areas initially nearby electricity generation facilities,
experiencing a closing and being outside externality distance thereafter. We compare the
average price change with areas remaining in externality distance of facilities. Equation
(3.4) shows the model, where Closekit (=1 ) indicates observation i being close to a clos-
ing facility of type k, postkit (=1 ) indicates observation i is transacted after the closing
of facility type k, and Treatkit = Closekit ∗ postkit, identifies observations nearby closing
facilities after closing. Similar as in equation 3.1, we control for structural and environ-
mental characteristics by Xit. We further control for remaining facility types.
18 Finally,
we investigate heterogeneity in the effects, testing for facility size in a similar manner as
before.
ln(pit) = α +
K∑
k=1
γ1k(Closekit) +
K∑
k=1
γ2k(postkit) +
K∑
k=1
γ3k(Treatkit) +Xitγ4 + it (3.4)
3.3.3 Repeat sales analysis
One problem of the regional difference-in-difference approach presented Section 3.3.2 is
that it relies on the assumption of similar housing characteristics over time. However,
even though we control for housing characteristics, we cannot rule out that transactions
in affected or control areas systematically differ over time. To overcome this issue, we
use repeated sales of the same property. Within our sample, there are 457,547 obser-
vations with at least one repeated sale throughout the sample period, of which 109,692
observations are sold three times, 23,959 sold four times, and 4,749 sold five times. Using
17We use size intervals since external effects do not necessarily increase linearly with capacity.
18It is necessary to control for nearby facility type k due to unbalanced closings among types.
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the same setup, cut-off distances and time restrictions as before, we use repeated sales to
measure the change in price on the same house after facility openings and closings.
We follow the approach of Aydin et al. (2016) as shown in equation (3.5). As a
dependent variable, we use the percentage change in price ∆pi(t+n) of property i between
period t and n. Based on the previously defined cut-off distances, we measure whether
a facility of type k opened (closed) between the two sales within externality distance,
indicated by ∆FACki(t+n) = 1. We control for changes in house quality and amenities
around, using vectors of control variables. We distinguish for positive changes ∆Q′+i(t+n),
such as added amenities or improvements in quality, and negative changes ∆Q′−i(t+n). We
control for sales year Y ′it and time between two sales (n-t) interacted with sales year,
indicated by control vector Θ′it.
∆pi(t+n) = α+∆Q
′+
i(t+n)γ1+∆Q
′−
i(t+n)γ2+Y
′
itγ3+Θ
′
itγ4+
K∑
k=1
βk∆FACki(t+n)+i(t+n) (3.5)
It can be assumed that the housing market adjusts to openings / closings over time.
In order to investigate the adjustment of the market to the opening / closing of facilities
nearby, we control for the time difference between property sales and facility opening /
closing years. We measure the year difference of observation i at t+n and the opening
(closing) year of the nearest facility of all types K, indicated by z(k). Since we are
interested in time difference effects of treated observations (∆FACki(t+n) = 1), we interact
the time difference with ∆FACki(t+n), indicated by Λ(t+n)−z(k). The final model is shown
in equation (3.6).
∆pi(t+n) = α +∆Q
′+
i(t+n)γ1 +∆Q
′−
i(t+n)γ2 + Y
′
itγ3 +Θ
′
itγ4 +
K∑
k=1
βk∆FACki(t+n)
+
K∑
k=1
β2kΛ(t+n)−z(k) + i(t+n)
(3.6)
3.4 Data
3.4.1 Power plants
From various sources we collect detailed information on all major Dutch power plants,
present between 1985 and 2015 and using coal, gas, biomass or a combination thereof.19
We subsequently verified and completed our data with the help of all major electricity
suppliers in the Netherlands. Our data contains the number of electricity generation
units, fuel types per unit, capacity per unit, year of operational start, year of closing (if
applicable), and geocoded location.20 We exclude all cogeneration plants on industrial
19These sources include:
Bijvoet, N., (n.d.), Centrale Info, http://centraleinfo.net/Europa/Nederland/index.html
Enipedia, (2010), Netherlands/Powerplants, http://enipedia.tudelft.nl/wiki/Netherlands/Powerplants
ECN, (2005), Monitoring Nederlandse elektriciteitscentrales 2000-2004, retrieved 2015 from:
https://www.ecn.nl/docs/library/report/2005/c05090.pdf
20A power plant has usually two or more electricity generation units (e.g. turbines), allowing to adjust
or maintain supply. Units can be of different size (e.g. to regulate peak supply) and / or different fuel
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sites, cogeneration plants focusing primarily on heat generation and plants that do not
produce electricity for the public grid (e.g. industrial plants).21
The final sample includes 119 power generation units located on 45 different plant
sites. Figure 3.3 shows the geographical distribution of the power plants in our sample.
Power plants are not systematically located in low population density regions (so as to
reduce possible negative externalities), but are placed rather close to urban areas, to
keep supply distances in the grid short and to ensure supply stability to urban centers.
Another important factor for coal and gas plants is the closeness to fuel transportation
infrastructure, such as harbors or pipelines. It is therefore not surprising that a large
number of plants are located in the Rotterdam harbor area, assuring direct access to
overseas supply of gas and coal.
Panel A of Table 3.1 shows an overview of the number of power plants sorted by
primary fuel type. Gas and coal plants are the most prevalent by number of plants and
capacity, with coal providing more than ten times as much power as biomass, and gas
almost three times as much as coal. However, the range of minimum and maximum
capacity shows that capacity differences across power plants, for given fuel types, are
quite large. For example, the smallest gas plant in our sample has a capacity of 13 MW,
while the largest is almost 100 times larger. However, capacity distributions do not differ
very much between fuel types.22
type (e.g. coal / biomass).
21Cogeneration plants on industrial sites use the byproduct hot steam to generate electricity. However,
these plants are usually small and not visually recognizable within the industry complex, potentially
distorting our results.
22While there are some plants that can use two fuel types, we classify plants by primary fuel type. To
determine primary fuel type, electricity generation units must run at least 50 percent on that fuel type.
Most plants were renovated and upgraded over time, to allow for a secondary fuel type. We argue that
the perception and knowledge in the surrounding area is anchored to the primary fuel type (e.g. a local
resident would not necessarily notice when a coal plant partly switches to biomass fuel).
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Figure 3.3
Distribution of Wind Turbines, Power Plants and Population Density
Notes: The map shows the sample area (The Netherlands). Population density per munici-
pality is illustrated by 2006 data, retrieved from the Central Statistics Office (CBS). Offshore
wind parks are illustrated on the map, but not considered in the analysis.
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Table 3.1
Conventional Power Plants and Wind Turbines
Characteristics by Primarily Fuel Type
Panel A: Power plant typesa (capacity in MW)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Type
Number
of units
Total
capacity
Min.
capacity
Mean capacity
[SD]
Max.
capacity
Gas 95 22,318 13 235 1,275
[203]
Coal 19 8,313 120 438 1,100
[288]
Biomass 5 936 25 187 800
[343]
Panel B: Wind turbine characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Characteristics
Number
of units
Total
capacity
Minimum
Mean
[SD]
Maximum
Capacity 2,117 2,946,321 15 1,393 7,500
(in kW) [1,066]
Height 18 61.53 136
(in meter) [22.24]
Rotor diameter 9 59.18 127
(in meter) [24.07]
Operational yearsb 2 13 20
Notes: Standard deviation in brackets. 1 MW = 1,000 kW
a Sorted by primary fuel type. b Based on 61 wind turbines that went out of operation.
Panel A of Figure 3.4 shows the installed capacity and the respective number of
electricity generation units per fuel type per year. The majority of installed units during
the sample period are gas units. The first plant primarily running on biomass was installed
in 2000. The popularity of coal energy decreased over the same period, with no new
facilities added for nearly 20 years between 1994 and 2014. Only in 2015 did the utility
company Essent start operating the newly built Eemshavencentrale, the Netherlands’
biggest and most modern coal plant.
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Figure 3.4
Yearly Installations of Power Generation Facilities
Panel A: Conventional Installed Capacity (Number of Units in
Label) per Type
Panel B: Wind Turbine Placements and Average Capacity per
Wind Turbine
Notes: Panel A shows the total yearly installed capacity for biomass, coal and gas plants.
In addition, the respective number of electricity generation units are shown to illustrate
capacity magnitudes. Since there are years without power plant openings, there are gaps in
the timeline.Panel B illustrates the average capacity per wind turbine, per year installed over
the respective number of units.
3.4.2 Wind turbines
Information on wind turbines in the Netherlands is well-documented, including location,
capacity, height, rotor diameter, setup year, dismantling year, and park affiliation. Using
data from Windstats (2015), we consider all wind turbines that were operational at some
point between 1985 and 2015. Our sample consist of 2,117 individual wind turbines,
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clustered in 217 wind parks. Figure 3.3 shows the geographical distribution of all wind
turbines in the sample, compared to the distribution of conventional power plants and
related to population density. Most wind turbines are located in the north-western coastal
area, where wind speed is highest. Furthermore, wind turbines tend to be placed in
relatively low-density areas, sometimes located close to densely populated areas.
As shown in Panel B of Table 3.1, the average wind turbine in the Netherlands has a
capacity of 1.4 MW and the largest Dutch wind turbine has a capacity of 7.5 MW, which
is less than the smallest power plant in our sample. The capacity distribution of wind
turbines is widely spread compared to power plants, with the largest turbine having 500
times more capacity than the smallest. Panel B of Figure 3.4 shows the development of
wind turbines installed in the Netherlands and the technological development over time.
The average capacity per wind turbine increases over time, from 15 kW in 1982 to an
average capacity of 3 MW. Modern wind turbines have not only more efficient generators
but are also higher with larger rotor diameters. The average sample height is 61.5 meters
and the average rotor diameter is 59 meter. During the sample period, 61 wind turbines
were dismantled after an average life span of 13 years.
3.4.3 Housing transactions
We employ a detailed dataset of housing transactions, consisting initially of nearly 3 mil-
lion observations between 1985 and the first quarter of 2015. The dataset is provided by
the Dutch realtors’ association (NVM), which covers around 70 percent of Dutch housing
transactions. The dataset contains address, transaction price, structural and environ-
mental information, as well as sales information, such as initial asking price and time on
the market. We use Bing Maps through an Application Programming Interface (API) to
determine longitude and latitude information per address. After excluding double entries,
outliers, and observations with incomplete information, we end up with approximately 2.3
million transactions.
We match data on power plants, wind turbines and housing transactions based on
longitude and latitude, using GIS. To control for systematic differences between locations,
we add additional information on the municipal level to the dataset. The Dutch Statistics
Office (CBS) provides information about population density and land use per municipality,
which we use to identify urban centers and rural areas.23
At a cut-off distance of 2.5 km, there are 339,931 houses within externality distance
of electricity generation facilities, distributed by facility type as follows: 1,772 biomass,
10,779 coal, 152,093 gas, and 185,598 wind.24 We notice that the number of observations
within “external effect” distance is limited for biomass and coal plants. Appendix Figure
3.5 shows the percentage of affected observations over time. The number of observations
close to coal, gas and biomass plants does not change significantly over time, whereas the
23We use zoning and land use data, which are available for the years between 1996 and 2015. For
older years, we estimate data based on averages and time trends as land use stays relatively constant over
time. Population density data are provided on the municipality level and provide a ranking from “very
urbanized” to “rural”. We use the first two levels (“very urbanized” and “urbanized”) to define urban
areas.
24Some observations are within externality distance of different electricity generation facility types
(e.g. coal and wind), thus the sum of individual electricity generation facility exposures does not match
the overall number of affected observations. We test for the interaction effect of being in external distance
of different electricity generation facilities, but we do not find a significant effect.
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number of observations close to wind turbines changes markedly. Since the spatial distri-
bution of houses is relatively stable over time, this implies that more wind turbines get
positioned close to housing over time, confirming the convergence of renewable electricity
generation and urban space.
Table 3.2 shows the average characteristics of houses and apartments in close prox-
imity to power plants, as well as the characteristics of homes in the control sample (4
km <d <10 km). There are relatively more apartments in the affected group. While
apartments in both groups have roughly the same size, houses in the affected group are
smaller than houses in the control group, on average. Apartments and houses tend to
be lower priced in the affected group, both in absolute terms and on a per square meter
basis. However, this is not necessarily due to quality characteristics or urban location, as
both characteristics show that properties in affected areas are on average of better quality
and in higher urbanized areas.25
Table 3.2
Descriptive Statistics: Housing Sample 1985 – 2015
Generation facility
(<2.5 km)
Generation facility
(>4 km)
Variable Houses Apartments Houses Apartments
No. of Observations 222,399 117,532 739,818 343,926
Size 126 86 133 86
(in m2) [42] [27] [43] [27]
Price 248,018 174,943 276,319 204,879
(in Euro) [145,761] [83,094] [181,513] [122,548]
Price per m2 1,946 2,058 2,035 2,404
(in Euro) [727] [717] [841] [1,032]
Housing inside quality 3.04 2.96 2.98 2.85
(1 = worst, 9 = best) [1.18] [1.20] [1.16] [1.15]
Housing outside quality 3.01 2.91 2.95 2.80
(1 = worst, 9 = best) [1.09] [0.93] [1.08] [0.88]
Highway within 200m 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.12
(1 = yes) [0.27] [0.31] [0.26] [0.32]
Urbanization 2.58 1.38 2.98 1.87
(1 = highest, 5 = lowest) [1.38] [0.72] [1.15] [0.88]
Notes: Standard deviation in brackets. All property type mean differences between groups are significant us-
ing Welch’s t-test. Inside and outside quality are ratings performed by NVM on the overall condition of the
property. Both variables are measured on a scale from 1 = best, to 9 = worst. Highway measures whether
there is a highway within 200 meters of the observation. A higher average value, shows a higher likelihood of
having a highway close to the observation. Urbanization measure the level of urbanization of the respective
municipality on a scale from 1 (highest) to 5 (lowest). The externality group is defined by 2.5 km cut-off dis-
tance for all electricity generation types. The omission corridor is of 1.5 km length and the control group is
included up to a distance of 10 km.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Difference-in-difference results
Appendix Table 3.8 shows the groupings of observations based on the described method
in Section 3.3.2. We note a small number of observations for some facility types and
25Using Welch’s t-test, all differences are statistically significant.
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times, forcing us to exclude coal plants from the opening analysis.26 Due to long lifespans
of coal plants and the novelty of biomass and wind, we document less observations for
facility closings than for openings. Appendix Figure 3.6 plots the average price per square
meter per year over time, examining the simultaneous trend assumption, and we notice
that pre-opening and pre-closing trends follow a quite similar trend.27
As shown in Table 3.3, we document a significant positive price effect for homes
around gas plants, ranging from 4.0 to 4.6 percent and a negative price effect of 6.0
percent for homes around biomass plants, at a 3 km cut-off distance only. Homes in wind
turbine areas show no significant price effect per se, meaning there is no ex-ante price
difference. For openings, we document a negative price effect of 4.9 percent to 5.9 percent
for gas plants and a negative price effect of 1.8 percent to 2.1 percent for wind turbines.
In contrast, biomass plant openings lead to a positive price effect of 4.2 percent to 9.8
percent.
Examining the heterogeneity over distance, Table 3.4 shows the external effect results
for different distance intervals. For gas plant openings, we document a positive opening
effect at a distance of up to 1 km distance and significant negative opening effects there-
after. We do not observe enough observations within 1 km distance of biomass plants.
Beyond this distance we document a positive opening effect thereafter. Wind turbine
openings show a constant negative effect up to a distance of 4 km. Overall, we document
constant effects for wind turbines, decreasing effects for biomass plants and mixed effects
for gas plants.
Differentiating urban and rural areas, we document significant location discounts for
homes in biomass plant areas and wind turbine areas.28 In rural areas, we document
a significant positive opening effect between 7.8 to 6.0 percent for gas plants, and 9.3
percent for biomass plant openings, while documenting a negative opening effect between
0.7 to 1.4 percent for wind turbine openings. In contrast, we document significant negative
opening effects for all plant types in urban areas, ranging from an additive -14.1 to -10.7
percent for gas plants, -9.7 percent for biomass plants, and -1.2 percent for wind turbines.
Our results show that electricity generation facilities are generally perceived negatively in
urban areas.
Examining the interaction between plant openings and size, columns five and six
differentiating for gas plant size (in capacity) and wind turbine park size (in number of
turbines). We document a positive significant opening effect of 4.5 percent for small gas
plants (<100 MW) and an opening discount of 5.1 percent for large gas plants (>400MW).
We do not document a significant opening effect for plans in the range of 100 - 400 MW.
For wind turbine areas, we document negative opening effect of 2.4 percent for single
turbines, 1.9 percent for parks up to 10 turbines, and 2.8 percent for parks with more than
30 turbines. Our results show that the negative external effects of electricity generation
facility openings do not necessarily increase with facility size.
26The small number of observations for coal plant openings can be explained by three facts: the
remote location of coal plants in general, the combined location with other facility types, such as gas
plants, leading to an exclusion of observations from the pre-opening group, and the dearth of new coal
plant openings over our sample period.
27Coal plants are excluded from the analysis since we do not have enough observations per year.
28We find that 92 percent of gas plants are located in urban areas, compared to 55 percent of wind
turbines and 25 percent of biomass plants, suggesting that differentiating for urban locations is important.
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Table 3.3
Results Area DID opening
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Opening effect Urban interaction Size effects
Gas plant area 0.039** 0.045*** -0.022 -0.013 0.027 0.041**
(1 = yes) [0.017] [0.017] [0.014] [0.019] [0.018] [0.018]
Biomass plant area 0.005 -0.058*** -0.022 -0.072*** 0.005 0.013
(1 = yes) [0.026] [0.016] [0.032] [0.016] [0.026] [0.026]
Wind turbine area -0.004 -0.004 -0.012*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.002
(1 = yes) [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
Gas plant opening -0.048** -0.057*** 0.075*** 0.058*** -0.044**
(1 = yes) [0.021] [0.021] [0.017] [0.022] [0.022]
Biomass plant opening 0.041* 0.094*** 0.021 0.089*** 0.041* 0.033
(1 = yes) [0.023] [0.014] [0.033] [0.015] [0.023] [0.023]
Wind turbine opening -0.018*** -0.021*** -0.007* -0.014*** -0.017***
(1 = yes) [0.005] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005]
Urban openings:
Gas plant urban -0.132*** -0.102***
(1 = yes) [0.022] [0.020]
Biomass plant urban -0.095 -0.093***
(1 = yes) [0.078] [0.025]
Wind turbine urban -0.012** -0.003
(1 = yes) [0.006] [0.006]
Facility size effect:
Gas plant (<100 MW) 0.044*
(1 = yes) [0.024]
Gas plant (100 - 400 MW) -0.028
(1 = yes) [0.024]
Gas plant (>400 MW) -0.050**
(1 = yes) [0.023]
Wind turbine single (n = 1) -0.024***
(1 = yes) [0.005]
Wind turbines small (1 <n <10) -0.019***
(1 = yes) [0.006]
Wind turbines medium (10 <= n <30) -0.012
(1 = yes) [0.008]
Wind turbines large (n >= 30) -0.028***
(1 = yes) [0.008]
Observations 1,173,979 1,087,964 1,173,979 1,087,964 1,173,979 1,173,979
Adj. R-squared 0.938 0.939 0.876 0.876 0.938 0.938
Quality controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent Var. lnPrice lnPrice lnPrice lnPrice lnPrice lnPrice
Cut-off distance 2.5 3 2.5 3 2.5 2.5
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All distances in km. The maximum distance
considered is 10 km, the holdout distance is 1 km. The opening effect dummy for coal plants is omitted, due to the small
group size. Urban effects are estimated by additional urban-treatment interaction terms. Urban area is defined by the
level of urbanization of the respective municipality: scale from 1 (highest) to 5 (lowest). We define municipalities above a
scale of 3 as urbanized. Column (5) distinguished for different gas plant sizes, using capacity as a size indicator. Column
(6) uses the number of wind turbines per park. The results of column (5) and (6) are robust for a 3 km cut-off distance,
but not reported due to space limitations.
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Table 3.4
Results Area DID opening
(1)
Opening effect
Gas plant opening (0-1 km) 0.034**
(1 = yes) [0.014]
Gas plant opening (1-2 km) -0.045*
(1 = yes) [0.027]
Gas plant opening (2-3 km) -0.059***
(1 = yes) [0.019]
Gas plant opening (3-4 km) -0.047**
(1 = yes) [0.018]
Biomass plant opening (1-2 km) -0.058
(1 = yes) [0.062]
Biomass plant opening (2-3 km) 0.094***
(1 = yes) [0.014]
Biomass plant opening (3-4 km) 0.036**
(1 = yes) [0.016]
Wind turbine opening (0-1 km) -0.020***
(1 = yes) [0.007]
Wind turbine opening (1-2 km) -0.021***
(1 = yes) [0.005]
Wind turbine opening (2-3 km) -0.020***
(1 = yes) [0.004]
Wind turbine opening (3-4 km) -0.014***
(1 = yes) [0.003]
Observations 1,196,458
Adj. R-squared 0.938
Quality controls Yes
Location FE Yes
Time FE Yes
Dependent Var. lnPrice
Max. distance considered 10
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. All distances in km. The maximum dis-
tance considered is 10 km. For space reasons, we only report
the coefficients of opening effects. Due a limited number of ob-
servations, there is no estimation for biomass plant openings
within 0 - 1 km. We do not use a holdout group in this setup.
Examining the heterogeneity of openings over time, we estimate our model for dif-
ferent sub-periods of 10 years length as shown in Appendix Table 3.9. We miss sufficient
number of observations for some facility types and time periods. The results are mostly
in line with previous findings or insignificant. We document significant negative open-
ing effects for gas plants in the periods 1990 - 2000 (-9.5 percent) and 2005 - 2015 (-5.1
percent). Biomass openings result in significant positive effects between 2.4 to 4.2 per-
cent throughout all available periods. Wind turbine openings result in significant negative
effects of -2.4 percent for the period 1995 to 2005, the first boom periods of wind turbines.
Table 3.5 presents the results for facility closings, comparing to areas with remaining
facilities.29 We document no significant closing effect for coal plants. Gas plant closings,
29We do not document significant facility area price effects and do therefore not report estimates for
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show significant negative effects of -3.9 percent at a 3 km cut-off distance. For biomass
plants, we document a significant negative closing effects between -7.7 and -6.0 percent.
Wind turbine removals (closings) result in positive effect of 6.7 percent at a 2.5 km cut-off
distance. Differentiating for gas plant size, we document that negative closing effects of
gas plants are higher for plants above 100 MW, ranging from -6.6 to -5.4 percent. For
gas plants below 100 MW, we document a negative closing effect at 3 km cut-off distance,
significant at 10% level.30 Overall, we document positive closing effects for wind turbines
and negative closing effects for biomass and gas plants, compared to areas remaining in
proximity to these facilities.
Table 3.5
Results Area DID closing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Closing effect Size effects
Coal plant closing -0.047 -0.020 -0.047 -0.017
(1 = yes) [0.045] [0.033] [0.043] [0.032]
Gas plant closing -0.028 -0.038***
(1 = yes) [0.018] [0.014]
Biomass plant closing -0.074*** -0.058*** -0.066*** -0.051**
(1 = yes) [0.021] [0.021] [0.020] [0.020]
Wind turbine closing 0.065** 0.024 0.057* 0.017
(1 = yes) [0.032] [0.024] [0.032] [0.023]
Facility size interaction:
Gas plant (<100 MW) -0.012 -0.023*
(1 = yes) [0.017] [0.013]
Gas plant (>100 MW) -0.053** -0.064***
(1 = yes) [0.022] [0.019]
Observations 93,478 123,476 93,478 123,476
R-squared 0.884 0.884 0.884 0.884
Quality controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent Var. lnPrice lnPrice lnPrice lnPrice
Cut-off distance 2.5 3 2.5 3
N affected by closing:
Coal 134 132 134 132
Gas 18,814 23,688 18,814 23,688
Biomass 463 585 463 585
Wind 416 339 416 339
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All distances in
km. The maximum distance considered is 20 km, the holdout distance is 1.5 km. The clos-
ing effect dummy for coal plants was omitted, due to the small group size. Urban effects
are estimated by additional urban-treatment interaction terms. Urban area is defined by
the level of urbanization of the respective municipality: scale from 1 (highest) to 5 (low-
est). We define municipalities above a scale of 3 as urbanized. Due to limited variation in
size (only 30 observations with >400 MW), we sort gas plants around the 100 MW cut-
off. For wind turbines, we do not observe closings for parks with more than 10 turbines.
space reasons. As for all tables, complete estimation tables are available upon request.
30Unfortunately, we do not have enough variation in the sample to differentiate for urban and rural
areas, as most closings occur in rural areas. Similarly, most closings occur in the years between 2005 and
2015, not allowing to explore heterogeneity over time.
50
3.5.2 Repeated sales results
Since the repeated sale model analysis differs slightly from the previous specifications, we
examine the fit of our model in Appendix Table 3.10. We document that the explana-
tory power is slightly lower than of our previous model specifications. The coefficients
make intuitive sense and are in line with former results. In general, adding amenities or
increasing quality increases property value, whereas the removal of amenities, such as a
terrace, diminishes property value.
Table 3.6 shows the estimation results for openings and closings. We document
significant negative facility opening effects for gas plants and wind turbines. Gas plant
openings in the area lead to a 9.5 percentage points lower price between sales, whereas
wind turbine openings result in a 2.7 percentage points lower price. The effect is robust
at 3 km cut-off distance, as shown in Appendix Table 3.11. Controlling for the time
between facility openings and property sales, the negative opening effect of gas plants
and wind turbines remains. However, the effect diminishes over time. For wind turbines,
one year difference results in an increase of 0.4 percentage points. We also document a
positive effect for biomass plants (1.1 percentage points) even though we do not document
a general opening effect. We do not document a significant time difference-effect for gas
plants.
Since we do not observe enough transactions to investigate other closings, we focus
on gas plants only. In contrast to the DID closing analysis in section 3.5.1, we document
positive closing effects of gas plants, ranging from 5.3 to 6 percentage points, not dimin-
ishing over time. However, the underlying sample of the closing analysis is small and the
effects become nearly insignificant at 3 km cut-off distance (see Appendix Table 3.11) and
should therefore be taken with caution.
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Table 3.6
Results Repeated Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Opening Opening Closing Closing
Gas plant opening -0.095*** -0.107***
(1 = yes) [0.026] [0.028]
Biomass plant opening 0.021 -0.012
(1 = yes) [0.024] [0.024]
Wind turbine opening -0.027*** -0.036***
(1 = yes) [0.006] [0.006]
Gas plant opening time difference 0.008
(no. years) [0.010]
Biomass plant opening time difference 0.011**
(no. years) [0.004]
Wind turbine opening time difference 0.004**
(no. years) [0.002]
Closing analysis:
Gas plant closing 0.053** 0.060**
(1 = yes) [0.024] [0.027]
Gas plant closing time difference 0.004
(no. years) [0.004]
Observations 228,632 228,632 15,318 15,318
Adj. R-squared 0.726 0.726 0.715 0.715
Location FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent Var. ∆Price ∆Price ∆Price ∆Price
Cut-off distance 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Holdout distance 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Max. distance 20 20 20 20
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is the
percentage change in price between sales. The time difference accounts for the time between the open-
ing / closing and a sale, if an observation was affected by an opening / closing. We only have enough
observations to examine gas plant closings. The results are robust for a 3 km cut-off distance, as in-
dicated in the Appendix.
3.6 Discussion and conclusion
This is the first study analyzing the effects of different electricity generation types on
house prices, using an extensive dataset and testing different model specifications for
plant openings and closings. Our results are in line with the literature (e.g. Davis,
2011; Dro¨es & Koster, 2016; Gibbons, 2015). Wind turbines proximity and openings
result in negative property price effect, whereas removals of wind turbines can result in
positive effects. Coal plant proximity and closings do not result in significant price effects.
Gas plant proximity results in positive price effects, however decomposing the effect for
openings and closings, we find that gas plant areas are higher priced compared to other
electricity generation facility areas, with openings resulting in negative effects. Biomass
plant proximity and openings result in positive price effects, whereas closings result in
negative price effects.
Whereas the external effects differ in general, we document solely negative price ef-
fects for all facility types in urban areas. We further document that size does not play a
big role, except for very small conventional plants, which seem to cause fewer external ef-
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fects. Combining these two findings, we argue the external effects of electricity generation
facilities do not depend on the size of the facility and negative effects outweigh potential
positive effects in urban areas. We further document that some external effects, such as
for coal plants, change over time, which could be due to technological developments.
The documented differences in external effects can have different reasons, such as
environmental externalities (e.g. air pollution), perception, and economic effects. How-
ever, especially the latter play a big role in plant locations, since power plants generally
create employment and infrastructure, such as streets (e.g. see Tourkolias et al., 2009). In
contrast, wind turbines create limited local employment and infrastructure investments.
Economic external effects are generally weaker in urban areas and constant per plant,
which could explain constant effects by size and negative effects for urban areas, where
other external effects, such as perception, dominate.31
The documented results have strong implications for the composition of local elec-
tricity supply and placement decisions. Not only do wind turbines create less local em-
ployment, their presence also results in value losses for local home owners. Considering
the average house price in our sample and average opening effects, wind turbine place-
ments result in value losses of e3,680 to e4,732 on local houses, on average. In contrast,
the opening of conventional power plants, which could run on sustainable biomass fuel,
lead to positive price effects of e16,562, on average. A potential idea to compensate the
negative effects from wind turbines, is to offer local residents the opportunity to co-invest
in nearby wind parks. This would create local financial benefits and affect the attitude
towards nearby wind turbines (Warren & McFadyen, 2010).
31Back-of-the-envelope estimations from our contacts at the biggest energy suppliers in the Netherlands
result in 600 - 800 jobs being created from one conventional power plant. However, we cannot confirm
these statistics, since we have no access to micro-level employment data.
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3.7 Appendix
Figure 3.5
Percentage of Observations Affected by Externalities (per Year)
Notes: This figure shows the installation of new power plants and wind tur-
bines, analyzing the convergence of energy generation and urban space. The
yearly percentage of observations within externality distance (2.5 km) is il-
lustrated.
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Figure 3.6
Simultaneous Trend Analysis
Average price per m2 around facility openings & closings
Notes: We compare the average price per m2 in the plant/turbine areas, prior to facility opening, with the average price
per m2 in respective control areas nearby. Due to the limited number of observations, we exclude coal plant areas from the
analysis. We do not have observations for all years around openings and closings, e.g. we only have observations two years
after wind turbine closings. The opening / closing year is excluded from the analysis.
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Table 3.7
Control Variables
Structural Apartment type (dummy)
Size (m2) Upstairs apartment
Number of floors Two-floor apartment
Number of rooms Maisonette apartment
Number of bathrooms Old block apartment
D: Roof terrace New block apartment (suburb)
D: Parking lot
D: Garden Apart. quality normal
D: Garden quality bad Apart. quality luxurious
Construction period (dummy) Heating type
Construction 1906 - 1930 D: Heating: coal or oven
Construction 1931 - 1945 D: Heating: central or tele-heating
Construction 1945 - 1959 D: Heating: AC or solar
Construction 1960 - 1970
Construction 1971 - 1980 Insulation (dummy)
Construction 1981 - 1990 One level of insulation
Construction 1991 - 2000 Two levels of insulation
Construction 2001 and later Three levels of insulation
Four levels of insulation
House type I (dummy) Five or more levels of insulation
Caravan
Living boat House type II (dummy)
Recreational home Terraced house
Single home Corner house
Grachtenpand (old house at canal) Semi-detached house
Manor house (without land) Detached house
Manor house (with land)
Old farm house D: Close to highway (<200 m)
Bungalow D: Close to forest (<500 m)
Villa D: Close to park (<100 m)
Landhouse
Other
Maintenance quality ratings (inside & outside)
Property age (based on construction-sales year interaction)
Time fixed-effects (year)
Alternative: Time fixed-effects (year-municipality)
Notes: Base values: Construction = Construction before 1906, House type
I = row house, House type II = simple house, Apart. type = ground floor,
Apart. quality = bad, Garden quality: normal, Heating = no heating, Insu-
lation = no insulation. We test two time fixed-effects, using year and year-
municipality interaction. Additionally, we use location fixed-effects as men-
tioned in Section 3.3.2.
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Table 3.8
Time Clustering – Difference-in-Difference Approach
Number of Observations (2.5 km cut-off)
Electricity
generation type
Before opening
(-10y to -1y)
Affected
(facility present)
After closing
(+1y to +10y)
Coal 10 371 118
Gas 3,739 4,458 21,303
Bio 1,316 1,772 463
Wind 86,523 108,413 687
Number of Observations (3 km cut-off)
Coal 25 560 164
Gas 5,992 6,229 30,100
Bio 2,411 2,678 585
Wind 118,483 151,551 827
Notes: Observations are considered up to a proximity cut-off distance of 3 km for all
energy types. We consider 10 years before opening up to 6 years after closing.
a Some observations are affected by several facilities of different electricity generation
types and therefore counted more than once. Furthermore, some observations are si-
multaneously in the affected group of one energy type and in the omitted group of
another type. Excluding double entries and observations that are simultaneously in an
omitted group, 159,009 unique observations are affected.
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Table 3.10
Repeated Sales
Control Variables
(1)
VARIABLES Controls
∆ size 0.002***
(m2) [0.000]
∆ rooms 0.013***
(no. rooms) [0.001]
Roof terrace removed -0.022***
(1 = yes) [0.003]
Roof terrace added 0.029***
(1 = yes) [0.003]
Parking removed -0.006***
(1 = yes) [0.002]
Parking added 0.032***
(1 = yes) [0.003]
Garden removed 0.001
(1 = yes) [0.006]
Garden added 0.040***
(1 = yes) [0.005]
∆ layer of isolation (added) 0.012***
(no. layers) [0.001]
∆ layer of isolation (removed) -0.009***
(no. layers) [0.000]
Observations 228,623
Adj. R-squared 0.725
Location FE Yes
Sales Year FE Yes
Time difference * sales year Yes
Quality change Yes
Dependent Var. ∆Price
Cut-off distance 2.5
Holdout distance 1.5
Max. distance 20
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is the per-
centage change in price between sales. We mea-
sure the changes in housing characteristics over time.
Some houses expand in living area or the number of
rooms due to e.g. renovations. We also control for
changes in the interior and exterior maintenance qual-
ity.
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Table 3.11
Repeated Sales - 3 km cut-off distance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Opening Opening Closing Closing
Gas plant opening -0.106*** -0.111***
[0.025] [0.028]
Biomass plant opening 0.015 -0.035
[0.024] [0.025]
Wind turbine opening -0.024*** -0.033***
[0.005] [0.006]
Gas plant opening time differnce 0.003
[0.009]
Biomass plant opening time differnce 0.015***
[0.004]
Wind turbine opening time differnce 0.005***
[0.002]
Gas plant closing 0.043 0.048*
[0.026] [0.028]
Gas plant closing time differnce 0.003
[0.004]
Observations 213,698 213,698 19,307 19,307
Adj. R-squared 0.730 0.730 0.716 0.716
Location FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent Var. ∆Price ∆Price ∆Price ∆Price
Cut-off distance 3 3 3 3
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable is the
percentage change in price between sales. The time difference accounts for the time between the
opening / closing and a sale, if an observation was affected by an opening / closing. We only have
enough observations to examine gas plant closings.
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Chapter 4
Getting High or Getting Low?
The External Effects of Coffeeshops on House
Prices∗
4.1 Introduction
Policy makers around the globe are changing their attitudes towards cannabis consump-
tion, resulting in decriminalization, toleration, and even legalization policies. The World
Health Organization (WHO) recently recommended to remove cannabis from the UN list
of ‘particularly harmful’ substances.2 Countries like Canada, Uruguay, as well as several
U.S. states have recently legalized recreational cannabis.3 In some other countries, includ-
ing Portugal and the Netherlands, cannabis is decriminalized, meaning it remains illegal,
but charges are usually not enforced.4
The motives for these changes in policies are manifold, including lack of evidence for
cannabis-related crimes, fighting organized crime, and negative cost-benefit relationships
of prosecution (Charilaou et al., 2017). However, little scientific evidence exists about
the potential effects of toleration and legalization on society. Legalization produces new
industries, providing employment opportunities and tax income. On the other hand,
cannabis consumption might increase (Jacobi & Sovinsky, 2016), potentially affecting
long-run health care costs and/or productivity (Marie & Zo¨litz, 2017).5 Since the number
of cannabis dispensaries and related businesses increases, local residents are exposed to
cannabis consumption, whether they share a liberal view on cannabis or not. In a recent
court case, a Coloradan couple argued that their property lost value due to the opening
of a nearby cannabis growing site, creating “pungent, foul odors”.6
Empirical evidence on the external effects of local cannabis facilities is mixed, but
mostly focused on crime. Hunt et al. (2018) document a slight increase in “driving under
the influence” (DUI) arrests after dispensaries’ openings, in addition to reduced crime
rates. Focusing on the effect of dispensary closings on local crime, Chang and Jacobson
(2017) document higher crime rates nearby in the short run. As the authors document
similar effects for restaurant closings, they argue that retail activities are generally better
than vacancy.
So far, only Conklin et al. (2017) and Cheng et al. (2018) examine the effect of
legal cannabis dispensaries on property prices. Using the same research area and period,
these sister studies examine the change of medical to recreational cannabis dispensaries
∗This chapter is co-authored with Erdal Aydin (Sabanci University), Piet Eichholtz (Maastricht
University) and Nils Kok (Maastricht University).
2Retrieved March 2018 from: https://bit.ly/2Ul40w8
3In example: https://reut.rs/2TlbMZF
4Cannabis remains illegal under EU law, which has primacy over national laws.
5Some studies show significantly positive effects on usage after cannabis decriminalization (Cerda´ et
al., 2012; Pacula et al., 2010; Wall et al., 2011), while others find no significant effects (Anderson & Rees,
2014; Chu, 2015; Harper et al., 2012; Lynne-Landsman et al., 2013; Morris et al., 2014).
6https://dpo.st/2AxB5NG
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in Denver, Colorado.7 Both studies find a 6 to 8 percent increase in housing values for
properties nearby dispensaries that switch from medical to recreational cannabis sales.
These findings are contrary to previous studies examining the external effects of illegal
drug sites, which found negative local house price effects.8
This paper adds to the ongoing debate regarding the societal effects of a less stringent
cannabis policies, examining the implications of Dutch cannabis dispensaries, so-called
“coffeeshops”, on nearby property prices. Our study is the first to examine coffeeshop
closings, following a recent exogenous regulatory change, in combination with a large
micro-level database on house transaction prices. Studying exogenous closing events al-
leviates methodological concerns that hamper studies of the opening or presence of cof-
feeshops, such as endogenous location choice or anticipation effects. We build on the
study of Chang and Jacobson (2017), who also look at cannabis dispensary closings, but
only consider crime rates, one potential external effect.
To examine the effect of exogenous coffeeshop closings on nearby property prices,
we employ a policy change. Closings were carried out in different waves between 2009
and 2017, providing substantial variation over time.9 This empirical setting provides an
exogenous closing shock, independent of neighborhood perception and time-confounding
factors, allowing for clean identification of the effects of cannabis dispensaries on local
house prices.
We employ a sample of 115,248 housing transactions between 2000 and 2017 for the
three biggest Dutch cities, Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague, reflecting approxi-
mately 75 percent of all transactions in these cities. Besides transaction price, the dataset
contains extensive information on dwelling characteristics, such as address, type, size,
state of repair and time on the market. Furthermore, we have location and status in-
formation on all coffeeshops that operated in the Netherlands since 1999, 44 percent of
which are located in the three major Dutch cities. We also have information on all school
distance-related closings for each of these cities.
Compared to properties in the vicinity of coffeeshops that remain open, our difference-
in-difference results show a closing discount of 1.6 to 7.8 percent for homes nearby closing
coffeeshops, with the effect getting larger when homes are nearer. This result is robust
while controlling for the presence of potential nuisance-generators like local bars and
nightclubs, and the effect remains after we include different holdout periods to control
for potentially sticky prices in local housing markets. The results for the repeat sales
analysis, in which we compare prices of the same dwellings before and after coffeeshop
closings, have the same direction and magnitude. We find a price decrease of 10.8 percent.
If we control for time after closing, the initial effect becomes bigger, but it subsequently
decreases over time.
The remainder of the paper will first outline Dutch government policies with respect
to cannabis sales, including a detailed discussion of the coffeeshop closing rules related
to school proximity that have been introduced in the last decade. Section 4.3 provides
7Cheng et al. (2018) consider a bigger research area but measure municipality level data, whereas
Conklin et al. (2017) focus on a more homogeneous sample using property transactions.
8Dealy et al. (2017) and Congdon-Hohman (2013) examine property prices nearby revealed meth
labs, documenting property price discounts of 6.5 to 19 percent.
9The municipalities of The Hague and Rotterdam were the first to implement the school distance
criterion, inspiring other municipalities and the national government.
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information regarding our dataset of housing transactions and the coffeeshop locations
in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague. The difference-in-difference and repeat sales
methodologies, as well as the main results are presented in Section 4.4, and section 4.5
will explore potential causation channels. The paper ends with a short concluding section.
4.2 Coffeeshops in the Netherlands
4.2.1 Government Policy on Coffeeshops
In 1976, the Netherlands was the first country in Europe that made cannabis usage,
possession and sale effectively legal.10 The intention of the policy was to “reduce the risk
of cannabis users being exposed to hard drugs”, such as cocaine and heroin (Wouters et
al., 2012). In addition, the government wanted to reduce punishment of soft drug users.
Even though cannabis possession is still officially illegal today, possession violations up
to 5 grams are not enforced (MacCoun & Reuter, 1997). In order to officially control the
sale of cannabis, the government legally tolerated selling facilities, so called ”coffeeshops”.
Since 1991, coffeeshops have to fulfil five criteria to stay open: no sales to minors, no sale
of hard drugs, no advertising, no public nuisance, and restricted sales per person per day
(Bieleman et al., 2015a; MacCoun & Reuter, 1997; Tops et al., 2001).11
Coffeeshops were opened all over the Netherlands, reaching their peak between 1991
and 1995 with around 1,500 coffeeshops in the country (Bieleman et al., 1996). Neighbor-
ing countries complained about the supply opportunities just across the border and local
politicians equally complained about nuisance from coffeeshops and their customers. In or-
der to manage the situation, the Opium Act, the Dutch law regarding drugs, was changed
in 1999, providing local politicians with more legislative power against coffeeshops. Mu-
nicipalities could reduce tolerance of coffeeshops if they saw fit, allowing them to add
operating criteria, to withdraw licenses, and to ultimately close coffeeshops (Bieleman et
al., 2015a).
The law change resulted in a reduction in the number of coffeeshops (Tops et al., 2001)
even as the number of municipalities with active coffeeshops hardly changed. By 2015,
582 coffeeshops remained. While many cities aimed to close coffeeshops, others added
additional operating restrictions. One example of a restriction is the ban on simultaneous
sales of alcohol and cannabis, leading to the closing of hasjcafe´s, a facility similar to
a coffeeshop, but more focused on hospitality aspects. The criterion was later adapted
nationally (Municipality of Amsterdam, 2007). Especially cities along the German and
Belgium border attempted to reduce drug tourism, by restricting the sale of cannabis to
local citizens only. However, local coffeeshops legally opposed the restrictions, arguing
that they involve discrimination, and won the case (Marie & Zo¨litz, 2017; van Ooyen-
Houben et al., 2016).
In recent years, policies on coffeeshops became stricter, trying to tackle the so called
“backdoor problem”. In contrast to the strictly regulated retail trade of cannabis by
coffeeshops (the “front door”), the cannabis supply chain (“the backdoor”) is not regulated
10Officially, cannabis usage is just tolerated as it remains illegal under EU law.
11The criteria were tightened over time, increasing the minimum age from 16 to 18, lowering the
maximum amount per person per day and setting the maximum amount of supply per shop to 500 grams
(Bieleman et al., 2015a).
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and still mostly illegal. Private cannabis cultivation is illegal in the Netherlands and
legally provided cannabis does not match the sales amounts of coffeeshops. Therefore,
nearly all coffeeshops source their cannabis from illegal dealers, from within or outside
the country, supporting (organized) crime (Bieleman et al., 2015a; Leydon, 2014).
In 2003, a new law was implemented, aiming to halt coffeeshops’ illegal activities.
Among others, it gives local politicians the power to perform random screens and raids
on coffeeshops in the case of suspicion. However, the law is contentious, since it might
have been used as a pretence to close coffeeshops for other reasons (e.g. in gentrification
projects). Additionally, the “backdoor problem” is still prevalent (Leydon, 2014).
4.2.2 Effects on the Community
The main reason for the liberal policy on coffeeshops is to protect soft drugs users from
hard drugs by controlling cannabis sales. Although there is no direct empirical evidence
for the effect of this policy on hard drug usage rates, there are some studies showing
that coffeeshop availability decreases the likelihood of illegal cannabis sourcing, thereby
decreasing the risk of hard drugs exposure. Conducting a survey among 773 cannabis
users, Wouters and Korf (2009) document that, in cities with fewer coffeeshops, cannabis
users, especially males and minors, are more likely to buy from illegal dealers.
On the other hand, the presence of coffeeshops might increase soft drug usage, po-
tentially causing negative externalities on society. Investigating the effect of nearby cof-
feeshops on soft drug usage, Wouters et al. (2012) find no evidence of more cannabis users
in coffeeshop proximity. However, users buying in coffeeshops consume cannabis more
frequently and in higher amounts. Studying long-term usage effects of the Dutch policy
on drugs, Tops et al. (2001) notice that the lifetime prevalence of cannabis use increased
by 13.1 percent between 1987 and 1997, which corresponds with the timing of the growth
in the number of coffeeshops. These results are in line with MacCoun and Reuter (1997),
who compare countries’ policies on drugs and show that the commercialization of cannabis
access correlates with growth in the drug-using population.
Coffeeshops are disputed in Dutch society, as they seem to be a source of negative
external effects, such as from drug consumers and tourists, crowding and creating noise, as
well as traffic and odor-related nuisance. Illegal drug dealers sometimes loiter in the area,
acting as competition or circumventing daily sales limits. And as discussed, the cannabis
wholesale business remains illegal, making supply chains partly illegal and therefore relat-
ing coffeeshops to organized crime. Appendix Figure 4.6 presents street-scene impressions
of coffeeshops.
Surveying the neighbors of coffeeshops in Rotterdam regarding specific nuisance ex-
ternalities, Bieleman et al. (2010) identify smell, noise, traffic, and groups of loitering
teenagers as the main problems. They report that nuisance from soft and hard drug users
are higher around coffeeshops compared to other neighborhoods of Rotterdam. Based on
survey participants perception, theft and vandalism-related crimes are higher as well.
Local coffeeshop associations claim that coffeeshops operate according to national
businesses standards, contributing equally to the local economy and creating positive
economic spillover effects. Coffeeshops are profitable businesses with an estimated total
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revenue of e1 billion, or e1.7 million per shop on average, in 2008.12 Based on these
estimates, coffeeshops pay more than e200 million in annual taxes. Additionally, accord-
ing to the Maastricht association of coffeeshops, local drug tourists in 2008 spent e140
million in other local businesses, such as restaurants.13
4.2.3 The Distance Criterion
In the early 2000s, several municipalities contemplated to restrict the presence of cof-
feeshops around schools to protect children and teenagers from drug usage. The city
of The Hague proposed a distance criterion (afstandscriterium) already in 2007, forc-
ing coffeeshops within a linear distance of 500 meters from secondary schools to close
(Municipality of Amsterdam, 2007).14 However, due to opposition it took time for imple-
mentation and the effective distance was reduced to 250 meters, leading to the closure of
one coffeeshop in January 2009.
The national government proposed to implement the distance criterion all over the
country as of January 2014. However, municipalities were free to adapt the distance
criterion and to change its specifications, such as distance. The government proposed
to close coffeeshops within 250 meters of secondary schools and coffeeshops with visible
shopfronts around primary schools (Bieleman et al., 2015a). Among 103 municipalities
that tolerate coffeeshops, 78 implemented the criterion formally, of which 43 used the
proposed criteria. By the beginning of 2015, 44 coffeeshops were affected by the criteria,
mostly located in Amsterdam and Rotterdam (Bieleman et al., 2015a, 2010).
Amsterdam and Rotterdam handled the situation quite differently. The city of Rot-
terdam can be considered as a forerunner regarding the policy, advocating for it since the
beginning and closing coffeeshops as of June 2009, shortly after The Hague.15 In contrast,
the city of Amsterdam was rather critical towards the criterion and instead considered a
new access control system to prevent minors from entering.16 The city hesitated to close
the 27 coffeeshops affected by the school distance criterion, but implemented the criterion
slowly in four stages, stepping up restrictions at every stage.17
Stage one was implemented as of January 1st, 2014 and restricted the opening hours
of all 27 coffeeshops nearby schools, allowing them to only open after schools´ closings (6
pm on weekdays). In July 2014, stage two became effective, closing eight coffeeshops that
were in visibility of schools. In January 2015, stage three became effective, closing three
coffeeshops that were located within 150 meters walking distance of schools. One shop had
to close in April 2015 and one shop was eventually closed due to law violations, instead.
After a forced break due to resistance of the local coffeeshop lobby, stage four became
12There are no official numbers, these were estimated by a national newspaper:
https://bit.ly/2T9fGpe. Other estimations range from e800 million to e1.2 billion, as men-
tioned in the article.
13Retrieved 2017 from: https://bit.ly/2SDoD4I. Nevertheless, the city of Maastricht banned tourists
from coffeeshops permanently, by permitting access only to local residents.
14There are two types of schools in the Netherlands: Primary (basis) schools and secondary (VO)
schools. Secondary education starts at the age of 12 and lasts until age 16 to 18.
15One of the key advocates during this time was Ivo Opstelten, mayor of Rotterdam (1999 - 2009) and
later Minister of Security and Justice (2010 - 2015), among others responsible for the national policy on
coffeeshops.
16This so called “weed pass” was not implemented at the end.
17https://bit.ly/2NACEiM
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effective in January 2017, resulting in the closing of eight additionally coffeeshops within
250 meters of schools. Due to moving plans of a local school, six shops were reassessed
and given time until July 2017, when one shop had to close and five were allowed to stay
open.
4.3 Data
4.3.1 Data Sources
Our initial dataset consists of all open and closed coffeeshops in the Netherlands. We
retrieve information on all coffeeshops from the Amsterdam Coffeeshop Directory in July
2017. Despite its name, this directory provides information on all coffeeshops in the
Netherlands.18 The database goes back to 1997 and is maintained and used mainly by
cannabis users. It contains information on coffeeshop address and opening status, but does
not contain information on closing reasons and dates. Since closed shops are removed after
a while, we only observe recently closed coffeeshops.
Table 4.1 provides an overview of the number of coffeeshops in our sample, showing
that Amsterdam does not only have the most coffeeshops, but also the most school dis-
tance related closings. The table also shows that Dutch coffeeshops are concentrated in
the three biggest cities: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague.
Since our data source does not provide information on closing dates, we contacted
municipalities individually. As described in section 4.2.3, different municipalities imple-
mented the distance criterion differently. To verify our data, we contact the ten biggest
cities to get information on coffeeshops and closing dates. We confirm that only the
three major cities Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague experienced closings due to
the distance criterion, and we therefore concentrate our analysis on these three cities.
Table 4.1
Coffeeshop Sample Overview (2000 - 2017)
Number of Coffeeshops
City Open Closed
Closed due to
distance criterion
Total
Amsterdam 171 166 21* 337
The Hague 55 24 1** 79
Rotterdam 38 30 17 68
Others 345 144 - 489
Total: 609 364 39 973
Notes: Number of coffeeshops in our sample, including opening status per July 2017
(after last closing wave). Shown are the three biggest cities in terms of number of cof-
feeshops, focus of our analysis. * Initially, 27 shops were affected, but one closed due to
law-violations and five did not have to close as the nearby school moved away. ** One
coffeeshop was affected by the 250 meters criteria. However instead of closing, it was
moved to a different location, which became available due to the law-related closing of
another shop. We still consider the closing location in our analysis.
The underlying housing dataset consist of transactions across the Netherlands and
18http://www.coffeeshopdirect.com/index.htm
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comes from the Dutch Realtors Association (NVM), representing a market share of around
75 percent. The Dutch Realtors Association is a network of realtors, storing an extensive
data set on Dutch housing transactions. In our analysis, we use transactions from 2000
up to and including 2017, covering the full period of school distance related coffeeshop
closings.19 Our final data set consists of 115,248 housing transactions in Amsterdam,
Rotterdam and The Hague, representing 44 percent of the national dataset. For each
transaction, we have detailed information on location, transaction price, time-on-the-
market, housing type, structural characteristics, and quality assessments from realtors,
leading to a large set of control variables.
4.3.2 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
To account for potential external effects of coffeeshops on the neighborhood, we use the
linear distance between the coffeeshops and transacted homes as a proxy for the net
effect of externalities. We geocode all housing transactions and coffeeshop locations to
obtain information on latitude and longitude. Figure 4.1 shows the distance distribution of
observations and nearest coffeeshop in our three cities (up to 1,000 meters). We document
a high density of coffeeshops in these cities, with average housing-coffeeshop distances
lying between 250 meters and 400 meters.
Figure 4.1
Property-Coffeeshop Distance Distribution
Notes: This graph shows the distance distribution of sample observations in quantiles (dashed lines),
considering properties up to 1,000 meters coffeeshop distance.
Since the determination of an externality cut-off distance is rather arbitrary, we
choose different distances supported by three sources. First, Conklin et al. (2017) find
significant external effects for cannabis dispensaries up to a cut-off distance of 0.1 miles
or 161 meters. Second, as discussed in section 4.2.3, all municipalities that enforced the
distance criterion to coffeeshops used at least 150 meters as a cut-off distance (Bieleman
et al., 2015a). Third, Figure 4.1 shows the first quartile of the house-coffeeshop distance
distribution at a distance of 160 meters to 250 meters. Based on these three observations,
we choose 150 meters as an externality cut-off distance.
19To exclude potential outliers, we remove the highest and lowest 1% of observations based on trans-
action price.
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Due to the high density of coffeeshops, we can also employ smaller cut-off distances:
100 meters, 50 meters, as well as the 6-digit postcode level. For the 6-digit postcode level,
we consider a transaction to be within externality distance if it shares the postcode with
a coffeeshop. In urban areas in the Netherlands, a 6-digit postcode is usually shared by
half-a-street (around 17 households), ensuring direct visibility. Figure 4.2 illustrates the
distance definitions, using a sample of observations over a land registry map of Amsterdam
and showing a 50 meters radius around a coffeeshop (star), as well as the reach of the
postcode matching (white squares). A detailed breakdown per cut-off distance per city is
shown in Table 4.2, documenting how the number of observations becomes smaller with
proximity.
Appendix Figure 4.8 illustrates the location of coffeeshops within the three biggest
cities, Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague. We document that coffeeshops are gener-
ally located in the city center. In order to examine the distribution with respect to income
and social status, we use the share of social benefit (“welfare”) recipients as provided by
the Dutch Statistics Office as a proxy, as local income statistics are not available at a
granular level. We document that coffeeshops in Rotterdam and The Hague are likely
to be located in neighborhoods with a high share of social benefit recipients, whereas
coffeeshops in Amsterdam tend to be located in the city center, which is rather affluent,
and has a lower share of social benefit recipients. Outside of Amsterdam’s city center,
however, coffeeshops are mostly located in poorer neighborhoods.
Figure 4.2
Illustration of Clustering
Notes: This graph illustrates the cut-off distance relations. In the illustrated
case, we consider all observations (black) within the 50 m radius of a cof-
feeshop (star) as affected by external effects. Observations in white, share
the same 6-digit postal code as the coffeeshop, ensuring direct visibility.
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Table 4.2
Observations per distance, area and property type
within
150 m
within
100 m
within
50 m
same
postcode
Amsterdam
Apartments 23,838 13,656 4,725 1,075
Houses 880 553 220 63
The Hague
Apartments 4,660 2,387 628 150
Houses 985 504 167 46
Rotterdam
Apartments 2,929 1,244 283 108
Houses 342 196 67 8
Notes: This table documents the number of property transactions
within the different cut-off distances. Due to additional filters, such
as time-periods, the number of homes in the analysis might decrease.
To get a general overview of the characteristics of properties in our sample, Table
4.3 summarizes property characteristics of single-family houses and apartments nearby
coffeeshops (d < 150m), compared to observations further away (up to 500 meters).
There are relatively more apartments than houses nearby coffeeshops, potentially due
to the central locations. Homes and apartments do not differ significantly in size and
maintenance quality (inside and outside) from observations further away. Homes and
apartments nearby coffeeshops are more expensive than homes and apartments further
away, both in price and price per square meter.
Table 4.3
Descriptive Statistics Housing Transactions
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague (2000 – 2017)
Externality group Further away
(<150m) (150 m - 500 m)
Apartments Houses Apartments Houses
No. of observations: 31,427 2,207 75,317 6,297
Size 79 159 82 151
(in m2) [32] [71] [31] [70]
Price 286,556 445,898 259,352 381,670
(in Euro) [138,075] [217,094] [138,412] [209,778]
Price per m2 3,755 3,003 3,256 2,608
(in Euro) [1,294] [1,326] [1,319] [1,078]
Housing inside quality 7.28 6.66 7.14 6.80
(1 = worst, 9 = best) [1.22] [1.62] [1.21] [1.46]
Housing outside quality 7.31 6.90 7.19 6.98
(1 = worst, 9 = best) [0.91] [1.32] [0.87] [1.17]
Notes: Standard deviation in brackets. Inside and outside quality are ratings performed by NVM on the
condition of the property. Both variables are measured on a scale from 1 = worst to 9 = best. The exter-
nality group is defined by the 150 m cut-off distance. We compare characteristics to observations within 500
m distance. We remove the top and bottom 1% observations in terms of transaction price from the data.
Prices are adjusted for inflation into 2017 values, using the CPI from the Dutch Statistics Office (CBS).
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4.4 Methodology and Results
We use local house prices to assess the external effects of coffeeshops. Following the
hedonic pricing theory, coffeeshop externalities, such as from nuisance, are expected to
be reflected in nearby property prices (Tiebout, 1956; Rosen, 1974). The underlying
theory assumes that people can choose location freely, allowing them to sort into specific
neighborhoods and homes. As people sort according to their preferences, structural and
socio-demographic aspects, location and nearby externalities should be reflected in local
house prices (Rosen, 1974; Tiebout, 1956), allowing us to measure the willingness-to-pay
for external effects of coffeeshops through nearby house prices.
4.4.1 Difference-in-Difference Analysis
Since coffeeshops are unlikely to be randomly distributed, any study into their external
effects faces endogeneity issues. It may well be the case that coffeeshops try to avoid vocal
local opposition, and therefore chose locations where neighbors do not complain much,
e.g. due to social status, education, or simply liberal attitudes. In such locations, house
prices might have been lower ex-ante. In addition, many coffeeshops are suspected to
have connections to organized crime, resulting in a careful decision on their location.20
Coffeeshop closings offer an alternative, but might be endogenous, too. In practice,
coffeeshops close for two reasons: due to violation of the law, or due to regulations such
as the school distance criterion. Since law violations have to be reported by someone, the
resulting closings could be the result by complaining neighbors or of gentrification.21 We
therefore focus solely on exogenous school distance-related closings, so employing a quasi-
experimental setup. As described in section 4.2.3, the school distance criterion is not only
arbitrary in terms of cut-off distance, but does not consider previous coffeeshops´ pop-
ularity in the neighborhood, a prime reason why affected coffeeshops loudly complained
against the legislation. We therefore argue that school distance-related closings create
exogenous variation for proper identification of coffeeshops’ externality removals.
Similar to Muehlenbachs et al. (2015), Pope and Pope (2015), McMillen and Mc-
Donald (2004), and Conklin et al. (2017), we use a spatial difference-in-differences (DID)
framework, grouping transactions based on their spatial distance and transaction date
relative to closings into four different groups: pre-nearby, pre-far, post-nearby, post-far.
Since we do not just employ repeated sales, we cannot rely on the assumption that trans-
actions do not systematically vary over time and we therefore include hedonic control
characteristics, controlling for structural and neighborhood attributes.
The employed model is shown in equation (4.1), where X ′it combines structural,
neighborhood, and maintenance characteristics of property i at time t as well as sales
time. Nearbyit, where d = 1 indicates that property i at time t is located nearby a closing
coffeeshop and Postit, where d = 1 indicates a property transaction after the closing of
the closest closing coffeeshop.22 We test four different distance cut-off points to define
20E.g. coffeeshops need to ensure proper supply-chain, even though it is mostly illegal
https://bit.ly/2EttEYH
21We tried to investigate these closings further, but are not able to determine the exact reasons behind
law related closings.
22For Postit we use the closing date of the closest closing coffeeshop, ensuring that every treatment
area has a respective control area.
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Nearbyit: 150 meters, 100 meters, 50 meters, and 6-digit postcode. Nearbyit ∗ Postit,
measures the interaction of two former terms, where d = 1 indicates a transaction nearby
a closing coffeeshop after closing.
ln(pit) = αit + bX
′
it + γ1Nearbyit + γ2Postit + γ3Nearbyit ∗ Postit + it (4.1)
To account for potential spatial dependence and omitted variables, we include loca-
tion fixed-effects (Anselin & Bera, 1998; Kuminoff et al., 2010), using detailed postcode
information. In Dutch urban areas a 6-digit postcode is shared by 17 households on
average. However, we do not have sufficient observations for this level of location fixed
effects, and it would result in single-observation fixed-effects. Therefore, we use 5-digit
postcode areas instead, for which we have 12 observations per postcode area, on average,
in our sample. We use year dummies as time fixed-effects and cluster standard errors by
municipality and year.23
Since homes located near coffeeshops may systematically differ from those in the
general market, we use homes around remaining coffeeshops as a control group instead
of homes far away. Homes in both treatment and control groups are within the same
cut-off distance of coffeeshops, sharing common attributes and therefore making them
similar as they are initially all near a coffeeshop. Figure 4.3 illustrates the setup. To
increase comparability further, housing transaction around every remaining coffeeshop
are assigned as control group to one nearest closing coffeeshop, using linear distance. So
a control group is always within the same city.
Figure 4.3
Difference-in-Difference Setup
Notes: Illustration of analysis setup. We use homes nearby remaining cof-
feeshops as control group and compare the price changes before and after
coffeeshop closings, testing different cut-off distances d between 150 meters
and 6-digit postcode level.
We consider observations up to four years before and after closings. We verify our
comparability assumption between treatment and control areas, by examining parallel
trends. Considering expectations and adjustments of markets, we create a 90 days holdout
window around coffeeshop closings (30 days before and 60 days after closings), which we
later adjust to examine long-term closing effects. Furthermore, we only include closing
23We also employ Year*City interaction dummies, showing no difference.
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coffeeshops for which there is at least one transaction in every group (pre-treatment,
post-treatment, pre-control, post-control) 24
Examining the similar trend assumption, Figure 4.4 plots the adjusted price per
square meter of homes in treatment (gray) and control group (red) for the different closing
waves, using a 150 m cut-off distance. We also plot trend lines for both groups: solid
lines for the treatment groups and dotted lines for the control groups. Closing waves show
different pre-post patterns, which is related to circumstances such as the financial crisis.
However, except for January 2015, the overall price trends for the treatment and control
groups are similar.
Figure 4.4
DID Similar Trend Graphs (150 m)
Notes: We compare treatment and control group price trends around coffeeshop closings (4 years before and after), esti-
mating non-parametric trend lines, using locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOWESS) with a quadratic polynomial.
Transactions within 30 days before and 60 days after closing are excluded from the analsis. We plot the adjusted price
per square meter of observations over time to illustrate the calculation base of the trend lines. A detailed overview of the
number of observations per closing wave is documented in Appendix Table 4.10. Due to missing post-closing observations,
July 2017 closings are excluded from the analysis.
Table 4.4 shows the first set of regression results, using different cut-off distances.
Rather surprisingly, homes near closed coffeeshops show a price discount after closing of
1.6 to 7.9 percent compared to homes near remaining coffeeshops. The effects increase with
proximity. When we look at the coefficient for Nearbyit = 1, we observe no significant
effects, which implies that there is no significant price difference between homes near
24Appendix Table 4.9 provides more information regarding treatment and control groups, specifically
regarding the observation numbers we have around coffeeshop closings and the effect of different exter-
nality cut-off distances. Appendix Table 4.10 provides this information by closing date and location.
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remaining coffeeshops and homes near closing coffeeshops, showing that homes in both
groups are similar in general. For both groups we document positive price-time trends
between 2.3 and 6.7 percent (Postit = 1).
Table 4.4
Difference-in-difference analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
150 m 100 m 50 m Postcode
Nearby Coffeeshop -0.009 0.006 0.032 -0.005
(1 = yes) [0.008] [0.017] [0.028] [0.068]
Nearby Coffeeshop * Post-closing -0.016* -0.030** -0.074*** -0.076**
(1 = yes) [0.009] [0.013] [0.021] [0.031]
Post-closing 0.029** 0.023* 0.018 0.065***
(1 = yes) [0.013] [0.013] [0.020] [0.018]
Observations 12,412 6,765 1,979 598
Treatment Group 1,838 909 269 118
Adj. R-squared 0.79 0.79 0.81 0.80
Quality & Location controls YES YES YES YES
Time-Fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Nearby Coffeeshop refers to
closing coffeeshop. Treatment group is reported as part of total observations. Homes nearby closing
coffeeshops but within 150 m of a remaining coffeeshop are excluded from the analysis. Standard errors
clustered by municipality-year. Control group cut-off distance is similar to the treatment group cut-off
distance (150 m, 100 m, etc.), as illustrated in Figure 4.3. Location controls are 5-digit postcode level
fixed-effects (around 17 observations per postcode in sample).
It is likely that coffeeshops are located to other forms of entertainment that could lead
to local nuisance, like bars and nightclubs, and their presence could influence our find-
ings. We therefore repeat the analysis, controlling for potential nuisance venues nearby,
distinguishing for bars, pubs, and nightclubs. We download all locations of pubs, bars
and nightclubs via Overpass API using OpenStreetMap data.25 All three entertainment
venues serve alcohol. However, pubs generally also serve food and have a relaxed atmo-
sphere, whereas bars have a more noisy and vibrant atmosphere and nighclubs (discos)
focus on dancing.
Table 4.5 reports the results for the analysis including proximity to bars, pubs and
nightclubs. Coffeeshop closing effects remain negative and are hardly affected, ranging
from -1.6 to -7.5 percent for homes within 150 meters to 50 meters. Baseline treatment
and control group pricing differences (Nearbyit = 1) remain insignificant and general
post-closing time effects diminish. We document a negative proximity effect for bars of
-4.6 percent, but only when houses are located within 50 meters. For nightclubs, we find
an effect of up to -26.3 percent, but no negative proximity effect for pubs, which might
be due to their more social aspect, such as serving food.
25Retrieved 2017 from https://www.openstreetmap.org/#map=12/52.3563/4.8532
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Table 4.5
DID Analysis - Controlling for other nuisance venues
(1) (2) (3)
150 m 100 m 50 m
Nearby Coffeeshop -0.010 0.002 0.021
(1 = yes) [0.008] [0.018] [0.029]
Nearby Coffeeshop * Post-closing -0.016* -0.030** -0.075***
(1 = yes) [0.009] [0.013] [0.021]
Post-closing 0.028** 0.020 0.019
(1 = yes) [0.013] [0.013] [0.020]
D: Bar 0.001 -0.007 -0.045***
(1 = yes) [0.006] [0.014] [0.015]
D: Pub 0.008 -0.003 0.009
(1 = yes) [0.006] [0.008] [0.010]
D: Nightclub -0.013 -0.094*** -0.263***
(1 = yes) [0.012] [0.023] [0.077]
Observations 12,412 6,765 1,979
Adj. R-squared 0.79 0.79 0.81
Quality & Location controls YES YES YES
Time-Fixed effects YES YES YES
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Estimation is
similar to the main DID analysis, with outputs presented in Table 4.4 However, we control
for proximity to bars, pubs, and nightclubs in this specification. Proximity to these venues
is defined by the same cut-off distance as for coffeeshops (150 m, 100 m, etc.).
Since housing markets are sticky in the short run, closing effects might change with
different holdout periods. We therefore test different holdout periods, excluding transac-
tions within 5 to 365 days after coffeeshop closings from the analysis. Estimations of clos-
ing effects (Nearby Coffeeshop * Post-closing) for different holdout periods are presented
in Table 4.6. Closing effects remain robust for different holdout periods (base holdout
period highlighted). However, our results suggest that house prices are indeed somewhat
sticky in the short run, as coffeeshop closing effects become statistically significant and a
bit higher in magnitude for longer holdout periods.
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Table 4.6
DID Analysis - Heterogeneity of holdout period
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nearby Coffeeshop * Post-closing 150 m 100 m 50 m Postcode
post-5 days holdout -0.014 -0.023* -0.063*** -0.073**
[0.010] [0.013] [0.020] [0.029]
post-10 days holdout -0.013 -0.022* -0.060*** -0.073**
[0.010] [0.013] [0.021] [0.029]
post-30 days holdout -0.013 -0.021* -0.062*** -0.073**
[0.010] [0.013] [0.020] [0.029]
post-60 days holdout -0.016* -0.030** -0.074*** -0.076**
[0.009] [0.013] [0.021] [0.031]
post-90 days holdout -0.018* -0.030** -0.067*** -0.067**
[0.009] [0.013] [0.021] [0.029]
post-180 days holdout -0.018* -0.038*** -0.075*** -0.067*
[0.010] [0.014] [0.021] [0.035]
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The same estimation model as
before is used, except that we adjust the holdout period, excluded from the estimation. The base hold-
out period of 60 days is highlighted for comparison reasons. In a different analysis, we also estimate the
model for varying pre-closing holdout periods, but do not observe changes in the effects.
4.4.2 Repeated Sales Model
Even though the presented difference-in-difference setup allows to control for individual
property characteristics, it relies on the assumption that transacted properties before
and after closings are similar. However, this assumption could be violated by systematic
changes in unobserved characteristics. Therefore, we verify our previous findings by ap-
plying a repeated sales approach, using repeated sales pairs at different locations relative
to coffeeshops, one sale taking place before and one after closings. Since we use the same
property before and after coffeeshop closings, we can be more certain that property char-
acteristics stay constant. Furthermore, we control for time-varying characteristics in our
model, such as improvements and decay.
Filtering for repeated sales only and excluding sales pairs selling more than once in
the same year, our dataset consists of 15,289 properties that sold twice during the sample
period, 2,545 properties that sold three times, and 249 properties that sold four times
during the sample period.26 As in the DID approach, we compare homes nearby closing
coffeeshops with homes nearby remaining coffeeshops. We use the same cut-off distances,
the same time window (+/- 4 years), and the same holdout period (30 days before and
60 days after coffeeshop closings). After filtering, the number of repeated sales available
decreases significantly.
As shown in equation (4.2), we use the percentage change in transaction price ∆pi(t+n)
of property i between date t and t+n as the dependent variable. We control for changes in
property characteristics, such as refurbishments, changes in size, maintenance quality and
insulation, as well as changes in the surrounding area, such as distance to (dis)amenities.
2620 properties sell more than 4 times during the sample period and are excluded from the analysis,
considered as outliers.
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We divide all changes into additions and improvements, measured by ∆Q′+i(t+n) and re-
movals and decay, measured by ∆Q′−i(t+n).
We control for time effects using time fixed effects Y ′i(t+n), indicating the sales year
t + n of property i. Additionally, we control for the time period n between two sales,
for location, using the 5-digit neighborhood post-code (Θ′in), and for closing coffeeshops
fixed-effects. The change in coffeeshop distance of property i between t and t + n is
measured by ∆CSi(t+n) ∈ {0, 1}, where ∆CSi(t+n) = 1 indicates a change in coffeeshop
distance due to closings, our variable of interest.
∆pi(t+n) = α+∆Q
′+
i(t+n)γ1 +∆Q
′−
i(t+n)γ2 + Y
′
i(t+n)γ3 +Θ
′
inγ4 + γ5∆CSi(t+n) + i(t+n) (4.2)
Since local housing markets may take time to incorporate closing effects, we also
test for the time difference between the sales of treatment homes and coffeeshop closings,
indicated by Λi(t+n) as shown in equation (4.3).
∆pi(t+n) = α+∆Q
′+
i(t+n)γ1 +∆Q
′−
i(t+n)γ2 + Y
′
i(t+n)γ3
+Θ′inγ4+γ5∆CSi(t+n) + γ6Λi(t+n) + i(t+n)
(4.3)
Where Λi(t+n) is the difference in days between t + n and z, the closing date of the
closest coffeeshop.
Λi(t+n) =
{
(t+ n)− z if ∆CSi(t+n) = 1
0 if ∆CSi(t+n) = 0
Since a linear specification of the time difference might not be fully adequate, we
additionally test a quadratic day difference, Φi(t+n), accounting for diminishing effects
over time.
Applying the analysis setup as described above, there are 57 repeated sales pairs
left within 150 m distance to closing coffeeshops, which experience a coffeeshop closing
between sales. We therefore limit our analysis to the 150 meters cut-off distance. When
we look at the percentage change in price between sales pairs over the coffeeshop closing
time difference for treatment and control groups, we observe no systematic difference
between groups. The majority of homes in both groups generally increases in value over
time.
Table 4.7 first shows the result of the estimation of (4.2) in Column (1). We document
that homes experiencing a coffeeshop closing between the first and second sale fall on
average 10.75 percent in value compared to homes nearby remaining coffeeshops. When
we subsequently estimate (4.3), controlling for the linear and quadratic time differences
in days between coffeeshop closings and second home sales at t+n, we document a general
price drop of 18.7 to 34.9 percent. However, prices seem to recover over time, albeit at a
diminishing rate.
Even though we consider this last analysis as meaningful, there are some important
limitations to consider. The number of repeated sales pairs is limited, leading to a small
treatment group. Furthermore, we are not able to perform any sub-tests and robustness
checks. So even though our DID findings are confirmed, we should interpret the magnitude
of the estimated coefficients in the repeat sales analysis with some caution.
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Table 4.7
Repeated sales analysis
(1) (2) (3)
∆CSi(t+n) -10.754** -18.723** -34.857***
(1 = coffeeshop closing) [4.957] [9.044] [12.170]
Λi(t+n) 0.012 0.071**
(days after closing) [0.008] [0.030]
Φi(t+n) -0.000**
((days after closing)2) [0.000]
Observations 373 373 373
Adj. R-squared 0.53 0.53 0.53
Cut-off distance 150 m 150 m 150 m
Quality & Location controls YES YES YES
Time-fixed effects YES YES YES
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The depen-
dent variable percentage is the change in price. Control group are homes nearby re-
maining coffeeshops at 150 m cut-off distances. We control for sales years and location
fixed-effects are based on 5-digit postcode level.
4.5 Discussion - Channels & Mechanisms
Our results consistently document house price decreases for homes near closing coffeeshops
compared to homes near remaining ones in the same city. In order to understand our
findings, we shift the focus of our analysis to potential causation channels. A first channel
could be related to changes in local nuisance. Two survey studies regarding exogenous
coffeeshop closings in Rotterdam and Amsterdam explore local nuisance effects. Bieleman
et al. (2010) conduct a survey among teenagers and local residents regarding the effects
the forced coffeeshop closings in Rotterdam. They find a significant general reduction of
negative externalities over time for both groups, but no specific effect due to the closing
of coffeeshops. The percentage of teenagers using cannabis does not change after closings,
and neither does their sourcing behavior, as they still receive cannabis from older friends.
In a follow-up study in Amsterdam, Bieleman et al. (2015b) find an increase in cus-
tomers for remaining coffeeshops, but no increase in reported negative externalities. The
majority of neighbors indicate that they like their neighborhood and that perceived safety
does not change after closings. Nuisance complaint reports before and after exogenous cof-
feeshop closings remain constant. Overall, only five to seven percent of neighbors directly
relate coffeeshops to nuisance-related problems in their neighborhood.
Chang and Jacobson (2017) find that cannabis dispensary closings in Los Angeles lead
to higher crime rates nearby, especially in the short run.27 Since the effect also holds for
restaurant closings, they argue that, in general, “retail establishments, when operational,
provide informal security through their customers,” which is in line with the “eyes upon
the street” theory (Jacobs, 1961). This finding is in line with Koster and Rouwendal
(2012), who examine the effects of retail activities on house prices in the Netherlands,
27We also tried to examine the relation between coffeeshop closings and local crime rates, but due to
data limitations we do not have sufficient variation for a convincing analysis.
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finding positive price effects for homes near retail activities. This would suggest that
our documented closing effects are not driven by the disappearance of coffeeshops itself,
but by the circumstances of the post-closing situation (operational retail versus an empty
store).
To test for the influence of the post-closing situation, we examine the developments
of the former coffeeshop locations over time. We visited all closed coffeeshop locations
in Rotterdam and Amsterdam to collect information on post-closing usage as well as the
time it took for the vacant store to be re-used. We did this by interviewing new shop
owners and neighbors. Additionally, we examined all locations on Google Street View,
allowing us to virtually “walk the streets”. Google updates Street View images on an
irregular base, but publishes all previous images, allowing us to go virtually back in time
and track coffeeshop locations over time (at irregular intervals).
It turns out that most former coffeeshop properties are vacant for a significant amount
of time before being re-used. Often, the coffeeshop storefront remains as long as the site
is vacant. Appendix Figure 4.7 presents some images of vacant coffeeshops. On average,
it takes around 781 days until a new business is opened in the former coffeeshop space.
Figure 4.5 shows the first usage of closed coffeeshop locations. We document that most
coffeeshops turn into shisha bars (similar to a pub but focusing on smoking the hookah,
only open at night), cafes (bistro type), restaurants (proper restaurant). However, most
locations change their use at least once afterwards, and quite a number remain vacant.
We test whether vacancy has an effect on our results by distinguishing between
vacant and non-vacant post-closing locations, considering the status at transaction time
t of property i.28 Building on the DID model, equation (4.4) shows the model for our
analysis, where V acantit = 1 indicates that the coffeeshop location is vacant at post-
closing transaction time t. As we only look at post-closing locations, V acantit = 1 implies
that Nearbyit ∗ Postit = 1.
ln(pit) = αit+ bX
′
it+γ1Nearbyit+γ2Postit+γ3Nearbyit ∗Postit+γ4V acantit+ it (4.4)
Table 4.8 shows the result for the estimation of (4.4). Overall, we do not find sig-
nificant price differences for vacant and non-vacant post-closing states. Only at a 150 m
cut-off distance and a 10% significance level do we document a positive effect for homes
nearby vacant places compared to homes nearby non-vacant coffeeshop locations. Our
results regarding the effect of the coffeeshop closings are hardly affected by including the
vacancy information in the analysis. Reasons for our findings could be quality differences
of succeeding businesses, such as Shisha lounges.
28We realize that there are business quality differences for non-vacant locations, but the small number
of observations and examples of exceptions prevent us from distinguishing further by business type.
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Figure 4.5
Post-closing coffeeshop location usage
Notes: Displayed are the usages of closed coffeeshop locations in Rotterdam
and Amsterdam. We group different usage cases together where possible.
One coffeeshop could not be inspected.
Table 4.8
Vacancy analysis
(1) (2) (3)
150 m 100 m 50 m
Nearby Coffeeshop -0.010 0.010 0.012
(1 = yes) [0.008] [0.017] [0.024]
Nearby Coffeeshop * Post-closing -0.030** -0.035** -0.064**
(1 = yes) [0.012] [0.017] [0.025]
Post-closing 0.034*** 0.027** 0.017
(1 = yes) [0.011] [0.011] [0.015]
Vacant 0.025* 0.009 -0.011
(1 = yes) [0.013] [0.014] [0.030]
Observations 9,632 5,344 1,585
Adj. R-squared 0.80 0.81 0.84
Quality & Location controls YES YES YES
Time-Fixed effects YES YES YES
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Vacant controls
for vacant post-closing coffeeshop locations at the time of transactions. Once a busi-
ness sets up in the location, it is no longer considered as vacant. Homes nearby closing
coffeeshops but within 150 m of a remaining coffeeshop are excluded from the analysis.
Standard errors clustered by municipality-year.
4.6 Implications & Conclusion
While considered a dangerous hard drug by some, many governments around the world
have moved to legalize recreational use of cannabis. The Netherlands has over 40 years of
experience in decriminalized cannabis sales. We explore the exogenous closing of Dutch
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coffeeshops due to proximity to schools, and investigate the local external effects on house
prices. Focusing on Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague, we perform difference-in-
difference and repeat sales analyses around these coffeeshop closings, avoiding the endo-
geneity concerns that would hamper a more traditional hedonic setup. By using a dataset
of house prices and characteristics, we can adjust properly for changes in housing quality.
Perhaps surprisingly, we document negative local house price effects when nearby
coffeeshops close. In the difference-in-difference analysis, the effect ranges from -1.6 per-
cent for homes located up to 150 meters away to -7.4 percent for homes up to 50 meters
away, and -7.6 percent for homes within the same 6-digit postal code area, all compared
to homes near the closest coffeeshop that remains open. This result is robust to the
inclusion of other entertainment with possible local nuisance effects, such as bars and
nightclubs, and the effect remains when we consider differently holdout periods, taking
care of potential price stickiness in local housing markets.
The repeat sales analysis tells a similar story in terms of direction and magnitude.
Comparing the prices of the same dwelling before and after the exogenous closing of a
coffeeshop, we observe a 10.8 percent decrease in price. When we control for time since
closing, we observe a larger initial negative effect, but prices subsequently recover, albeit
at a diminishing rate.
We subsequently explore potential causation channels for these effects. Chang and
Jacobson (2017) show that closings of medical cannabis dispensaries in the US leads to
more local crime, and this could also be the case in the three Dutch cities we study,
since the properties in which the closed coffeeshops were housed remain vacant for more
than two years after closing, reducing the informal security that customers of active retail
establishments create. Also, coffeeshop owners have an incentive to reduce nuisance so as
to maintain smooth operations. We therefore empirically investigate whether the vacancy
resulting from coffeeshop closing is associated with the negative house price effects we
find, but we don´t find convincing evidence that vacancy increases the negative effect of
coffeeshop closings.
The findings in this paper have some implications for policymakers and homeowners.
Contrasting expectations, and perhaps intuition, once a coffeeshop is in operation, closing
it may be detrimental to local house prices. While we do not study coffeeshop openings,
our findings suggest some amenity value in cannabis dispensaries, potentially benefiting
some neighborhoods. Of course, further research is needed on the effect of cannabis
dispensary openings.
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4.7 Appendix
Figure 4.6
Street scene impressions of open coffeeshops
Notes: Street scene images of coffeeshops in Amsterdam. Sources: Wikimedia Commons,
www.flickr.com (Terrazzo, Travelmag.com), Google Street View
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Figure 4.7
Impressions of closed and vacant coffeeshops
Notes: Images of coffeeshops in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Images taken by the authors in
March 2018.
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Figure 4.8
Coffeeshop Distribution in Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and The Hague
Notes: Illustrated are the locations of coffeeshops over different neighborhoods in the
three biggest cities. We focus on coffeeshops that are open today (late July 2017)
and coffeeshops that closed due to the distance criterion. We use the percentage of
social benefit recipients (unemployment benefits and long-term benefits), as a proxy
for social status of neighborhoods.
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4.7.1 Difference-in-Difference Analysis
Table 4.9
Difference-in-Difference: Groupings
Treatment Control
Cut-off
Pre-Closing
Post-Closing Pre-Closing Post-Closing
150 m 1,304 534 6,991 3,583
100 m 598 311 3,902 1,954
50 m 169 100 1,170 540
Postcode 80 38 342 138
Notes: Control group: Homes nearby remaining coffeeshops at the same cut-off dis-
tance as the treatment group.
Table 4.10
Observations by closing time and place
(150 m cut-off)
Closing date Amsterdam Rotterdam The Hague
Treatment group
Jan 2009 0 0 51
Jun 2009 0 610 0
Jul 2014 540 0 0
Jan 2015 41 0 0
Apr 2015 59 0 0
Jan 2017 786 0 0
Total 1,426 610 51
Control group
Jan 2009 0 0 1,845
Jun 2009 0 1,397 0
Jul 2014 3,715 0 0
Jan 2015 126 0 0
Apr 2015 132 0 0
Jan 2017 3,510 0 0
Total 7,483 1,397 1,845
Notes: Based on the grouping definitions explained in Section 4.4.1, we docu-
ment the number of transactions im the treatment group (150 m cutoff distance)
and control group, divided by different closing dates and cities (see Section 4.2.3
for details). Closing date is always first day of the month. We document that
closing times are location dependent.
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Table 4.11
Difference-in-difference analysis - excluding The Hague
(1) (2) (3) (4)
150 m 100 m 50 m Postcode
Treatment -0.005 0.009 0.011 0.075
[0.008] [0.017] [0.023] [0.054]
Post Treat -0.015* -0.026** -0.062*** -0.091***
[0.008] [0.012] [0.018] [0.030]
Post 0.031*** 0.023** 0.007 0.059***
[0.011] [0.011] [0.016] [0.020]
Observations 10,537 5,771 1,707 532
Adj. R-squared 0.81 0.81 0.84 0.83
Quality & Location controls YES YES YES YES
Time-Fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Nearby Coffeeshop refers
to closing coffeeshop. Treatment group is reported as part of total observations. Homes nearby
closing coffeeshops but within 150 m of a remaining coffeeshop are excluded from the analysis. Stan-
dard errors clustered by municipality-year. Control group cut-off distance is similar to the treat-
ment group cut-off distance (150 m, 100 m, etc.), as illustrated in Figure 4.3. Location controls are
5-digit postcode level fixed-effects (around 17 observations per postcode in sample).
4.7.2 Repeated Sales Analysis
Figure 4.9
Repeated sales - price difference over post-closing time (<150 m)
Notes: Cut-off distance: 150 m. Plotted is the price difference between repeated sales in
percent over the post-closing time difference. We only consider repeated sales occurring
over coffeeshop closing and measure the change in price between sales. Treatment group are
repeated sales nearby closing coffeeshops, control group are repeated sales nearby remaining
coffeeshops (both within 150 m).
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Table 4.12
Repeated Sales - Control Variables
Variables Variables
Sales date difference 0.001 ∆m2 -0.002
(days) [0.005] [0.120]
∆inside maintenance 3.721** ∆outside maintenance 0.204
(level) [1.460] (level) [1.080]
∆insulation 0.364
(layers) [0.531]
Additions Removals
Room added 0.690 Room removed 3.694
(1 = yes) [2.230] (1 = yes) [4.104]
Roof terrace added 4.812 Roof terrace removed 9.737*
(1 = yes) [4.787] (1 = yes) [5.642]
Attic added -2.755 Attic removed -6.781
(1 = yes) [6.351] (1 = yes) [7.434]
Monument status added 10.045 Monument status removed -22.353***
(1 = yes) [14.625] (1 = yes) [2.444]
Garden added 3.301 Garden removed 3.795
(1 = yes) [3.854] (1 = yes) [5.783]
Garage added 1.431 Garage removed 6.215
(1 = yes) [6.221] (1 = yes) [12.563]
Carport added -0.000 Carport removed 3.440
(1 = yes) [0.000] [1 = yes) [10.717]
Garage & carport added 28.293** Garage & carport removed -0.000
(1 = yes) [13.904] (1 = yes) [0.000]
Multigarage added 23.545*** Multigarage removed 0.000
(1 = yes) [7.975] (1 = yes) [0.000]
Parkinglot added -9.581* Parkinglot removed -2.667
(1 = yes) [5.610] (1 = yes) [7.465]
CV or distance heating added 12.806** CV or distance heating removed -0.187
(1 = yes) [5.614] (1 = yes) [4.879]
AC or solar added -0.000 AC or solar removed -0.000
(1 = yes) [0.000] (1 = yes) [0.000]
Location improvements Location worsen
Forest now nearby 0.000*** Forest not nearby anymore 0.000
(1 = yes) [0.000] (1 = yes) [0.000]
Park now nearby -3.617 Park not nearby anymore 1.508
(1 = yes) [6.090] (1 = yes) [12.296]
Now located next to water 8.621 Not located next to water anymore -9.201*
(1 = yes) [6.996] (1 = yes) [5.029]
Free view 0.597 No free view anymore -3.871
(1 = yes) [3.142] (1 = yes) [3.319]
No busy road nearby anymore 0.990 Busy road now nearby 7.927
(1 = yes) [2.978] (1 = yes) [7.023]
Located on a quiet road 3.464 Not located on a quiet road anymore -1.116
(1 = yes) [3.410] (1 = yes) [3.968]
Time-fixed effects YES Observations 373
Location controls YES Adj. R-squared 0.53
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Dependent variable: per-
centage change in house price. Standard errors are clustered by municipality and year. D = dummy,
location controls by coffeeshop fixed-effects. Time fixed effects by sales year.
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Chapter 5
Deep Learning in Real Estate:
Object Detection in the Built Environment
5.1 Introduction
Real estate markets are an important part of the economy as everyone participates in
them. Houses are often the biggest household asset, and for local governments property
taxes are an important factor to finance public investments. Additionally, the average
transaction volume in real estate is substantial compared to other asset classes, necessi-
tating accurate real estate valuations. However, due to limited available data, real estate
markets inherently suffer from substantial asymmetric information, making them less ef-
ficient than other asset markets (Case & Shiller, 1989). As a result, real estate valuations
are often inaccurate, leading to high search and transaction costs, and a substantial risk
of mispricing (Kok et al., 2017).
There is arguable a need for better valuations, reducing information asymmetries, and
improving appraisals and property tax calculations. By decomposing peoples’ willingness-
to-pay for different property characteristics, the hedonic property pricing theory provides
a solid foundation for proper valuations, modeling real estate prices as a function of
its structural and location characteristics (Rosen, 1974). However, even though hedonic
models are sound in theory they require good property data for unbiased estimations,
which are usually scarce, limiting the practical potential of hedonic models. To improve
property valuations, it is therefore necessary to increase the availability of good property
data, first.1
In this paper, I propose a new method to collect structural property data at a large
scale, using machine learning to extract property characteristics from images. Com-
puter vision, the application of machine learning on images, offers many opportunities
for data mining and is already used in various applications, such as autonomous driving
(Dickmanns & Zapp, 1987), medicine (Obermeyer & Emanuel, 2016), and agriculture
(Costa et al., 2011). With the increasing availability of urban images, such as through
Google Street View, computer vision offers an opportunity to collect visible property char-
acteristics through images. I examine the capabilities of object detection, a technique of
computer vision, to collect structural property characteristics, using Google Street View
images of the underlying properties.
Using a sample of 15,000 Dutch single-family homes, including detailed structural
controls and location, I retrieve Google Street View images through address information. I
train an object detection model (a computer vision technique) based on 5,000 observations
to detect facades, roofs, windows and doors in property images. For testing, I apply the
model to the images of the remaining 10,000 observations to detect the trained objects and
use the relative location and size of objects to estimate simple property characteristics.
First, I count the number of vertically aligned windows within a facade to determine the
1Another approach is to use more advanced valuation approaches, such as automated valuation models
(e.g. Kok et al., 2017). However these techniques require high quality real estate data, too.
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number of floors and compare the estimations to the underlying actual. Second, I measure
the ratio of window to facade surface area, creating a new characteristic as a potential
proxy for interior brightness.
The models shows a good performance at relatively little model training effort. I
document limitations of Google Street View images, such as view-blocking obstacles or
missing addresses, and document an image usability of approximately 70%. Showing two
example applications, the models estimate the number of floors correctly for approxi-
mately 51 percent of the properties, systematically underestimating properties by one
floor. I find the main reason for underestimations are view-blocked floors or floors not
visible from the street. Comparing the floor estimations with results from an image clas-
sification model, I show that accuracy differences are small while object detection models
are less sensitive, making use of more images. Last, I estimate the window-surface ratio
and show that this measure cannot be explained by other structural characteristics.
Previous studies have tested computer vision in the urban environment, using prop-
erty images and image classification, an alternative computer vision technique. Using
image classification, Lindenthal and Johnson (2018) estimate architectural styles of prop-
erties, Zeppelzauer et al. (2018) estimate building age, Koch et al. (2018) estimate build-
ing conditions, and You et al. (2017) predict property prices based on images. Law et al.
(2018) combine aerial and GSV images in a generic approach to predict housing prices,
using different parameters and Glaeser, Kincaid, and Naik (2018) use computer vision to
examine the change in maintenance quality of properties over time. These studies show
that computer vision can help to collect property characteristics from images. However,
the studies apply image classification, a technique with higher image quality requirements
(e.g. close up, homogeneous content), allowing only to classify one aspect at a time only.
Additionally, only a few studies describe the applied image filtering process, giving little
understanding of image quality requirements.
In contrast, this is the first study to propose a model based on object detection instead
of image classification, a technique which allows to gather multiple property characteristics
simultaneously with the same model. Due to the attribute of being more robust to complex
image content, object detection does not require to filter images before applying the model,
making the model more suitable to data mining applications at a large scale (Everingham
et al., 2010). I present two potential applications of the proposed model, but leave it to
the creativity of future researchers to explore different usages of the model.
There are several economic implications of using object detection to extract data
from images. First, building accurate property pricing models requires sufficient data.
The proposed method presents a solution to approximate data on individual structures,
if this data is not available or incomplete. Second, the proposed model can easily be
retrained for other visible aspects, such as solar panels, giving researchers a cost-effective
and effective tool to examine new aspects of housing markets.2 Third, the method could
be used in markets with little or no information, such as developing countries, to remote-
sense property markets and their developments (similar to Henderson et al., 2011).3
2Some visible aspects, such as cars, could be used as proxies for preferences (e.g. Kahn, 2007).
3For example, to proxy economic wealth and developments (https://bit.ly/2XsQA2O).
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5.2 Review: Computer Vision & Urban Applications
5.2.1 Image Classification and Object Detection
Image classification and object detection are computer vision techniques, making comput-
ers recognize digital image content, such as a house, through deep neural networks(Sonka
et al., 2014).4 As illustrated in Appendix Figure 5.9a, deep neural networks are multi-layer
testing frameworks, in which probability estimates of preceding layers are weighted inputs
for subsequent layers. Through the network layers converge into a final test layer, assign-
ing probabilities to the desired outcome, such as house vs. no-house (Haykin, 1994).5 As
image data require special tests compared to other input data, such as text or audio, a
special class of deep neural networks are convolutional neural networks (CNNs), which
include layers (tests) especially designed for image processing.6
To achieve a high prediction accuracy, the weightings of the CNN layers are adjusted
in a trial and error process defined as training and validating, illustrated in Appendix
Figure 5.9b. The process is similar for nearly all CNN models and requires image data
that are labeled upfront, mostly by manual work. Images are randomly split into training
and validation data, and in an iterated sequential process the CNN analyzes training
images, adjusting the layer weightings in every iteration. Every iteration ends with a
prediction test, using the validation data and comparing overall accuracy to the previous
iteration. This process is defined as model training and continues until accuracy between
iterations cannot further be improved (see Ciresan et al., 2011, for more details).
The two major techniques of computer vision are image classification and object
detection.7 Both techniques are similar as they build on CNN architectures and assign
probability scores as an outcome. The main difference between the techniques is in the
intended outcomes. Image classification models classify images based on their content as a
whole, assigning one probability score to the image. In contrast, object detection models
localize and classify objects within an image, assigning individual probability scores to
objects (Everingham et al., 2010; Harzallah et al., 2009). For illustration, Figure 5.1
shows the hypothetical outcomes of image classification (b) and object detection (c), for
image (a). As illustrated, object detection models classify multiple, different objects,
whereas image classification models identify images based on the object with the highest
prediction probability.
4For more general background on computer vision, please see (Hartley & Zisserman, 2003).
5The term “deep” refers to a high number of testing layers, even though there is no general definition
how many layers define a “deep” neural network.
6For more information on CNNs see Krizhevsky et al. (2012) or https://bit.ly/2b0WHmJ.
7Additional approaches are, among other, object tracking, semantic segmentation, and instance seg-
mentation. However most of these techniques focus on video analyses or are unnecessarily complex for
many applications (Drayer & Brox, 2016).
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Figure 5.1
Illustration the difference of Image Classification and Object Detection
(a) Base image (b) Image classification (c) Object detection
Notes: Applying computer vision on image (a) to detected image content results in different outcomes.
Image classification (b) classifies the image content of an image as a whole, whereas object detection (c)
localizes objects of interest within the image and classifies them individually.
Both techniques have advantages and disadvantages and model selection depends
on the underlying application and image data. Image classification models require low
initial effort as image labeling requires only one label per image. Additionally, computing
requirements are low, reducing the model training time. Despite lower requirements,
accuracy can still be high as image classification works well for single-object images,
such as close-ups. However, image classification models do not deal well with complex
images, detecting multiple objects and/or determine the relative location and size of image
content. Image classification works well in A/B testing applications, such as in medicine,
and broader content recognition, such as in reversed image search.
In contrary, object detection models require a higher initial effort as all objects need
to be marked and classified within the image. Additionally, more computing power is
required in the training process, which can be time-consuming and costly. However, due
to the localization and ability to handle multiple objects simultaneously, object detection
models can deal better with complex image content, such as multiple objects of different
size and confounding objects as in urban scenes and satellite images. Object detection
models are used, among others, in autonomous driving, face recognition, and activity
tracking.
5.2.2 Computer Vision in the Urban Environment
Recent studies have tested applications of computer vision techniques in the urban en-
vironment. Naik et al. (2014) combine a survey with street scene images to generate
a perceived safety score for street scenes (“Streetscore”). Using the same images, the
authors build an image classification model, which is able to predict Streetscores auto-
matically. As the Streetscore shows high correlation with population density, household
income, and income inequality, the model can be used to approximate these character-
istics using street scene images only (Naik et al., 2016; Glaeser, Kominers, et al., 2018).
Other studies focus on the measure of physical appearance of street scenes (Naik et al.,
2017) or the detection of green areas (Seiferling et al., 2017).
Focusing on property characteristics, Glaeser, Kincaid, and Naik (2018) and Koch
et al. (2018) develop image classification models to predict outside building conditions,
using Google Street View (GSV) and private images. Measuring changes in the condition
for repeated sales, (Glaeser, Kincaid, & Naik, 2018) show that quality improvements
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detected by these models increase property prices. In a similar manner, Poursaeed et al.
(2018) assign luxury scores to interior and exterior Zillow images and develop a image
classification model to predict luxury scores. Including luxury scores into pricing models
leads to better prediction results, reducing the Median Error Rate (MER) to 5.6%.
Lindenthal and Johnson (2018) explore the value of architectural style, developing an
image classification model based on GSV images to predict styles for residential houses.
Other studies develop models to assess building instances, such as office and retail, (Kang
et al., 2018) and determine building age using high resolution images (Zeppelzauer et
al., 2018). Other studies try to connect property appearance and value directly. You et
al. (2017), as well as Law et al. (2018), train a classification model, labeling property
images with property prices. The developed models are able to predict property prices at
a high accuracy, using images and location only, reducing the mean absolute percentage
error (MAPE) by approximately 10 percentage points (You et al., 2017). However, as the
developed models are unsupervised, it is unclear which image features determine price.
Overall, most existing studies focus on one particular property aspect only, solely
applying image classification models. Even though little information is provided on this
matter, it can be assumed that specific, pre-selected images are used as image classification
models require close-up images of properties. This might limit the general usability of
the proposed techniques and leads to false conclusions on the quality of Google Street
View as an image source.8 Additionally, most studies focus on unobserved or unrecorded
property aspects, such as maintenance quality or style elements. As quality definitions
and architectural styles differ across markets, it can be assumed that models are limited
in their applicability across markets.
This paper extends the existing literature in various dimensions. This is the first
study using object detection instead of image classification, offering new data mining
opportunities. Due to the localization, detection models can help to assess the relative
position and size of image objects. It is therefore possible to collect structural and non-
visible information, such as property size. Furthermore, I compare the performance of
object detection and classification models, documenting that both models show similar
accuracy. However, detection models deal better with unfiltered images, allowing to use
more images, saving time and increasing the generalizability. Additionally, this study
provides insides about the quality of Google Street View as an image data source for
similar exercises.
5.3 Methodology
To demonstrate the potential applications of object detection, I train a model to detect
simple property aspects in images, namely windows, roofs, and facades. Using the position
and relative size of these objects, I show two example applications. I estimate the number
of floors as a structural characteristic, counting the number of vertically aligned windows.
Furthermore, I estimate the window-surface ratio as a measure to create a new structural
characteristic, which can potentially be a proxy for interior brightness of properties.
Figure 5.2 illustrates the model training and application process. First, the object
detection model is trained, as illustrated in Sub-Figure 5.2a. To get property images
8Only Lindenthal and Johnson (2018) discuss the practical limitations of Google Street View.
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for the training process, I use actual housing transactions and request corresponding
images from Google Street View, using the address of the house. The received Google
Street View images are manually labeled, using the RectLabel annotation software. An
example of an annotated image is shown in Appendix Figure 5.10. The annotated image
dataset is split into training and validation data, and the training process is started. Once
accuracy cannot be improved further, the training process is stopped and the model can
be employed.
Illustrated in Sub-Figure 5.2b, the trained model is used for object detection ap-
plications. Again, property transactions are used as the basis to get property images
from Google Street View. The images are then assessed by the objected detection model,
extracting property information. Based on a unique identifier, extracted property infor-
mation can be linked to the initial property transaction data. I present two example ap-
plications in this paper, showing the potential of object detection models for data mining
exercises. In contrast to the training process, the application process is fully automated,
showing the strength of the object detection model.
Figure 5.2
Process diagram: Model training and application
(a) Model training process
(b) Model application process
Notes: Databases are illustrated as cylinders, transmitted information in rectangle boxes and manual input
as trapezoid. Subfigure 5.2a illustrates the model training process, while subfigure 5.2b illustrates the
application of the prepared model to collect property characteristics, such as number of floors.
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5.3.1 Model Selection and Training
Developing object detection models for individual tasks from scratch is a costly task, re-
quiring significant time and labeled image data.9 Even though there are some open-access
image databases, providing labeled images, image labels usually do not fit custom appli-
cations, requiring to relabel images manually.10 Besides, newly developed models might
not reach the performance of existing models, developed with high effort. In an annual
benchmark competition, research teams compete with their newest CNN architectures
on accuracy and some architectures lead the field for consecutive years.11 It is therefore
questionable that a bottom-up developed object detection model outperforms existing
models in efficiency.
To keep development effort reasonable while benefiting from state-of-the-art CNN
research, this study applies transfer learning.12 During transfer learning an existing, pre-
trained model is retrained to detect new object classes, such as detecting houses instead
of cars. Only higher-level CNN layers are retrained for new objects while deep layers,
containing more basic tests, remain unchanged. This process enables to build on efficient,
state-of-the-art CNN architecture with low training effort (Oquab et al., 2014). However,
as transfer learning builds on existing models, initial model selection can significantly
affect the final performance, requiring to test different models for development.
I only consider object detection models pre-trained on the COCO (Common objects
in context) database, as these models generally show a high performance and are trained
to distinguish 91 different object classes, none related to real estate though (Lin et al.,
2014). At the time of writing, there are around 25 pre-trained object detection models for
the COCO data available, differing in the localization approach and CNN architecture.13
Model selection depends on various factors, but boils down to a trade-off between
detection accuracy and speed (Bianco et al., 2018; Huang et al., 2017). Speed generally
varies with model complexity, image data resolution and employed hardware, while accu-
racy is largely dependent on image quality. Benchmarks are provided for image databases,
such as COCO. In object detection, accuracy is two-dimensional and therefore measured
using the mean average precision (mAP) at different Intersection over Union (IoU) cut-
offs, measuring classification accuracy at different localization accuracy cut-offs (He et al.,
2016). Appendix 5.7.1 illustrates the IoU and mAP measures further.
Based on the COCO benchmark accuracy and speed trade-offs, I select two object
detection models for retraining: The Faster Region-based Convolutional Neural Network
(R-CNN) and Single Shot Detection (SSD) (Liu et al., 2016).14 The major difference be-
tween the selected models is the localization technique. Faster R-CNN follows a two-step
approach, first localizing potential objects and then classifying them. For localization,
Faster R-CNN applies a convolution network layer (Regional Proposal Network), “propos-
ing” the most relevant regions for classification. As illustrated in Appendix Figure 5.11,
9A simple model could be trained within 10 days on multiple computers with high-end GPUs.
10In example, the COCO (Common Objects in Context) dataset is open source, providing 330,000
images of which over 200,000 are labeled for 91 different object classes http://cocodataset.org.
11Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge (ILSVRC), http://www.image-net.org/challenges/LSVRC/
12Using existing, publicly available models additionally allows researchers to easily replicate the model
training.
13An up-to-date model overview is available here: https://bit.ly/2EtFjJP.
14I am currently expanding this selection, results will be available in the online Appendix.
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Faster R-CNN uses anchor boxes to capture the best aspects and size, classifying the
proposed regions at three fixed aspect ratios and three sizes(Girshick et al., 2014; Ren et
al., 2015). Due to the ninefold classification, Faster R-CNN is considered as accurate but
relatively slow.
In contrast, SSD performs detection and classification in one step, increasing speed
significantly Liu et al. (2016). Images are passed through CNN layers, classifying image
regions of different size directly. SSD also uses anchor boxes to optimize accuracy. Instead
of using fixed ratios, as in Faster R-CNN, anchor box ratios and size are determined by
objects in the underlying training data. Therefore, SSD models localize objects based on
pre-defined ratios, speeding up the detection process significantly. However, this might
come at a cost of accuracy if training objects differ much from application objects in the
aspect and size.
As object detection models localize and classifying objects, models do not only dif-
fer in the localization approach, but also in the classification architecture. In recent
years, CNN architectures showing the best accuracy results are ResNet, VGGNet, and
GoogleNet/Inception (Bianco et al., 2018). However, as these architectures aim for accu-
racy, some are of limited practical use due to high computational complexity. Therefore,
mobile CNN architectures such as MobileNet are developed to copy high-performing ar-
chitectures in a resource-reduced way. Considering the speed-accuracy trade-off, I select a
Faster R-CNN model with InceptionV2 architecture and an SSD model withMobileNetV2
architecture.
I retrain both models to detect four object classes: roof, facade, and window. These
basic aspects allow to estimate further structural characteristics (see Section 5.3.2). Ad-
ditionally, these aspects are rather homogeneous in appearance for properties in general,
increasing the accuracy of the model for out-of-sample images. All visible objects are
labeled manually within the training images, using RectLabel annotation software. I split
the data into training and validation records at the common ratio of 85:15 (e.g. You
et al., 2017; Zeppelzauer et al., 2018). Lastly, the training process is performed in the
TensorFlow library on Google Cloud.
5.3.2 Estimating Structural Characteristics
Number of Floors
Considering structural factors determining property prices, one structural characteristic
is the number of floors, providing information about building size. I estimate the number
of floors based on the relative location of visible facade and window objects. Assuming
that every floor has at least one window, I approximate the number of floors of properties
by counting the number of vertically aligned windows along a facade. Since all bounding
boxes in the detection process are rectangles, facades and windows can be modeled in
a two-dimensional space as illustrated in Figure 5.3. The coordinates (x1w, y1w) and
(x2w, y2w) determine the corners of the detected property facade and every window i has
corner coordinates (x1i, y1i) and (x2i, y2i) with {(xi, yi) ∈ (Xi, Yi)|(Xi, Yi) ∈ (Xw, Yw)}.
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Figure 5.3
Illustration of floor estimation
Notes: This figure illustrates the estimation of number of
floors, using the coordinates of windows and fasade objects.
Considering all windows within a facade w, I build a simple search algorithm to
determine all possible combinations of vertically aligned windows. The estimated number
of floors is defined as Fˆw, with
Fˆw = max({l1, l2, l3, ...lz}) (5.1)
where ln is the number of windows in path z. The number of windows in path z is
determined by
lz = max(1,
I∑
i
Ci)
subject to: {i 6= j | Yi 6= Yj}, y2i < y1j.
(5.2)
where Ci is the largest corner coordinate of bounding box i, (x2i, y2i). The constraint
in Equation (5.2) states that windows cannot overlap on the y-axis and the y-values of
window j have to be higher than those of window i, forcing the algorithm to search from
low to high. In Figure 5.3 this would result in the possibile combinations {1, 1, 2, 2}, with
Fˆw = 2.
A floor is not necessarily bound to a facade, but could also be under the roof. I
therefore also use detected roofs in the calculation. If a window is detected within a
detected roof, one floor is added to the estimated number of floors Fˆw. The number of
windows is not considered, as houses usually have only one floor below the roof.
Since images might show multiple facades and roofs, such as from neighboring houses,
the facade with the largest surface area is selected. The roof with the biggest surface area,
vertically above the facade is selected. Accuracy is determined by the difference between
estimated and actual number of floors out of the underlying property database.
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Window-Surface Ratio
Object detection models could help to gather new property characteristics that are cur-
rently not considered but might show some price effects. As an example, I estimate the
window-surface ratio of facades. I argue that a higher window-surface ratio leads to a
higher level of interior brightness through natural light, which has been shown to affect
health and well-being.15 However, a higher window-surface ratio also exposes the inte-
rior more to the outside, a potentially unwanted fact. Additionally, large, especially old
windows are less insulating than walls, potentially reducing energy efficiency.16
To estimate the window-surface ratio I calculate the surface area of all windows
within a facade over the surface area of the facade, as indicated in equation (5.3). The
sum of all window surface areas I is estimated over the surface area of facade w. Only
windows within the boundaries of facade w are considered, as indicated by φi = 1.
Bˆw =
∑I
i=1(x2i − x1i)(y2i − y1i)φi
(x2w − x1w)(y2w − y1w) (5.3)
where
{(x, y) ∈ (X, Y )|(X, Y ) ∈ R}
φi =
{
1 for Xi ∈ Xw ∧ Yi ∈ Yw,
0 otherwise.
To control for overestimated and overlapping detected windows, overlapping bound-
ing box areas J are excluded from the surface area, resulting in the final approximation
as shown in equation (5.4).
Bˆw =
(
∑I
i=1(x2i − x1i)(y2i − y1i)φi)− (
∑J
j=1(x2j − x1j)(y2j − y1j))
(x2w − x1w)(y2w − y1w) (5.4)
{(XJ , YJ) ∈ (XI , YI)}
The proposed method has some limitations. Since I am not aware of any studies
assessing a similar measure, it is impossible to verify the potential findings other than in
some random spot-checks. Since Google Street View only provides one image, the measure
can only be applied to one facade. This might underestimate the true window-surface ratio
as especially backsides of houses usually contain larger windows.
5.4 Input Data
To collect property data through the proposed method only two data inputs are required,
addresses and property images. I use Dutch residential property transactions provided by
the Dutch Realtor Association (NVM), covering around 75 percent of all Dutch residential
transactions until 2017. The dataset has been used in numerous studies, including but
not limited to Brounen and Kok (2011); Brounen et al. (2012); Dro¨es and Koster (2016).
The dataset includes a rich panel of structural characteristics, such as size and number of
15For more information on the effects of brightness on human feelings, see Marsden (1969).
16See: https://bit.ly/2ZdhIGS
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floors, and contains address and transaction price. Using this rich dataset enables me to
examine relationships between approximated and actual structural characteristics.
To retrieve property images, I use the Google Street View Application Programming
Interface (API), providing Google Street View images for requested locations. Google
Street View provides street images taken by special cars with mounted panorama cameras,
covering a 360 degree perspective. To receive an image for a specific address, an algorithm
determines the best coverage within the nearest panorama and returns the best image that
shows the property. However, Lindenthal and Johnson (2018) show that the algorithm
often fails to find the best image, especially for densely located addresses, such as for row
houses and apartment buildings. Nevertheless, Google Street View offers a generally wide
coverage, being present on all six continents. It is therefore used in many urban image
studies (e.g. Naik et al., 2014; Glaeser, Kincaid, & Naik, 2018).
Constrained by the availability of Google Street View in the Netherlands, I focus on
transactions between 2011 and 2017. I only consider free-standing houses with less than
five floors, as these are more likely to be captured on a single image and more likely to
be identified by the Google Street View algorithm compared to apartments or attached
houses. The resulting sample consists of 115,490 observations, or 16,499 observations
per year, on average. Since labeling images for the model training involves substantial
manual work, I draw a random sub-sample of 5,000 observations and request Google Street
View images for the model training.17 Additionally, I draw a second, mutually exclusive
sub-sample of 10,000 observations to demonstrate the model applications.
For the model training sample and application test sample, 4,513 and 9,042 images
are received, respectively, demonstrating a Google Street View address coverage of approx-
imately 90 percent. There is no significant difference in geographic sample distribution,
as shown in Appendix Figure 5.12. However, there are small clusters of unsuccessful im-
age downloads in rural areas. Table 5.1 provides descriptive statistics for both samples,
showing that properties in both samples have similar characteristics. Examining missing
observations, I document that properties with Google Street View images are on average
bigger, have more floors, and are more expensive than properties without images.
17I am currently extending the number of model training images/observations.
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Table 5.1
Samples - Descriptive statistics
Sample Model training Application test
GSV images No Yes No Yes
N 487 4,513 958 9,042
Size 150.90 160.61 152.82 160.65
(m2) [58.57] [56.10] [60.54] [54.43]
Number of floors 2.22 2.41 2.23 2.42
(n) [0.66] [0.66] [0.69] [0.65]
D: Attic 0.20 0.26 0.23 0.25
(1 = Yes) [0.40] [0.44] [0.42] [0.44]
Sales year 2014 2014 2014 2015
[2.03] [1.93] [1.93] [1.94]
Price 337,055 359,117 335,501 357,192
(Euro) [150,357] [160,539] [148,334] [156,358]
Notes: Descriptive statistics for properties in the two samples, grouped successful
GSV image retrieval. Documented is the mean with standard deviation in brackets.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Stylized facts and model performance
All 4,513 retrieved images of the model training sample are manually annotated, high-
lighting windows, roofs and walls. As shown in Table 5.2, a total of 28,905 objects are
annotated. On average, there are 4.5 windows, 1.3 facades, and 0.5 roofs per image.
However, only 3,940 images show an object and 3,467 images show a facade, resulting in
a effective usage ratio of 69.3% for Google Street View images. An example of unsuitable
images without objects is shown in Appendix Figure 5.13. For the model training process,
images showing at least one object (e.g. a roof) are considered (N=3,940).18 Appendix
Figure 5.14 shows the final data flow diagram.
Table 5.2
Training sample - Object classes and number of records
Object class Definition Number of records
window A visible window in facade 20,297
wall A house facade 5,888
roof A fully visible roof of a house 2,398
Total records 28,583
Notes: Three object classes are defined for the model: window, facade, and roof. The re-
sults are based on 4,513 Google Street View images. There can be multiple facades per
image due to neighboring houses.
The sample is split at a rate of 85:15 into training and validation records, resulting
18For model training it is not necessary to only consider pictures with a facade as objects are assessed
individually, too.
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in 24,569 training and 4,336 validation records. Both models are trained on the Google
Cloud AI Engine until no further improvement in training accuracy can be observed. The
training process is stopped after 24,791 iterations for the SSD model and 75,684 iterations
for the Faster R-CNN model. Using the same hardware, the SSD model training time
takes approximately three times as long as the Faster R-CNN model. Lastly, both models
are applied to the images of the application test sample.
As illustrated in Figure 5.2b, both models are applied to the application test sample.
Figure 5.4 shows example images for the object detection results, based on the SSD
model. As every image object is localized and classified, the model assigns a classification
probability score to objects. To measure performance, I consider the number of detected
facades at different cut-off scores, as facades are the basic objects for the applications.
The maximum number of facades considered per image is one. Based on the results of the
training sample, approximately 77% (3,467/4,513) of images show houses, which should
result in approximately 6,946 images with detectable facades.
Figure 5.5 shows the number of detected facades at different classification cut-offs.
At a cut-off probability of 0.5, the models detect facades in 7,646 and 6,587 images,
respectively. Given that there should be approximately 6,946 images with visible facades,
the Faster R-CNN model is slightly overestimating the number of facades while the SSD
model underestimates them. For the applications, I only consider cut-off scores between
0.7 and 0.9 as the number of detected facades is reasonable in this range. A higher
minimum cut-off would result in a sharp decrease of number of observations.
99
Figure 5.4
Example images of object detection results
Notes: Examples of visual object detection results based on trainined SSD MobileNetV2 model, with
10,177 steps.
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Figure 5.5
Detected houses - Application test sample
Notes: The figure shows the number of successully detected houses at different probability
cut-off levels. The results are based on the number of detected facades, the base object for
the analysis. Totally, 9,042 images are received from Google Street View.
5.5.2 Floor Estimation
As described in Section 5.3.2, the number of floors is estimated using the relative location
of windows and facades. Appendix Figure 5.15 shows the distribution of actual number
of floor, indicating that the majority of houses have two or three floors. As a accuracy
measure I compare the estimation results to the actual number of floors, testing at different
facade detection cut-off scores.
Figure 5.6 shows the deviations between estimated and actual number of floors at
different detection cut-offs. Between 43.8 and 53.5 percent of floor estimations lead to
correct results, decreasing with cut-off scores. The models generally underestimate the
number of floors by 1. The combined share of correct predictions and predictions under-
estimated by one floor ranges from 90.5 to 86 percent. Appendix Table 5.4 shows the
mean floor deviation and standard deviations for different actual number of floors and
cut-off levels, indicating that four floor houses are underestimated the most while one
floor houses are slightly overestimated.
Overall, the model underestimates the number of floors, especially for higher houses
(as of two floors). I perform random eyeball-checks on images with floor deviations,
documenting two main reasons for deviations as illustrated in Appendix Figure 5.16. In
many cases (Appendix Figure 5.16a), one floor is blocked in view either by a hedge, a tree,
or a car. Similarly, in many cases there is no visible window in the roof, but neighboring
houses indicate the existence of a floor under the roof (Appendix Figure 5.16b). In the
illustrated example, it is obvious from the neighboring house that there are two instead of
one floors. Furthermore, the models fail to constantly detect all windows at high cut-off
levels. As a result, some windows are not considered in the estimations. A solution to
overcome these problems is to use better property images and increase the model training
sample.
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Figure 5.6
Floor estimation accuracy
Notes: Floors are approximated as described in Section 5.3.2, using different classification cut-offs. Presented are the
number of floor deviations (estimated number of floors - actual number of floors) at different cut-off levels.
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5.5.3 Window-Surface Ratio
I estimate the window-surface ratio as described in Section 5.3.2. Figure 5.7 shows the
window-surface ratio distribution at different classification cut-off scores. The distribution
ranges from 0 to approximately 0.35, with 79 properties above 0.35. There is a significant
number of houses with a window surface ratio equal to 0, increasing with cut-off. The
reason are houses with no visible windows in the front and non-detected windows. For
houses with detected windows, average the window-surface ratio ranges between 0.07 and
0.12 for different models and cut-offs.
To examine the distribution of window-surface ratio further, I use the underlying
property data and regress structural variables on the window-surface ratio. Observations
with a estimated window-surface ratio of 0 are excluded. Table 5.3 shows the outcome of
the regression for both models and different cut-offs. Overall, the model shows a poor fit,
with an adjusted R-squared between 0.02 and 0.03. Increasing size in square meter slightly
decreases the window-surface ratio. More floors increases the ratio, which makes intuitive
sense as higher facades usually have more windows. Controlling for different building
periods, houses built between 1981 and 2000 generally show lower window-surface ratio
compared to houses built between 1906 and 1930. Even though some periods show higher
window-surface ratios in general, it can concluded that the measure cannot be explained
properly by existing structural characteristics.
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Figure 5.7
Window-surface ratio distribution
Notes: The graphs show the distribtuion of the estiamted window-surface ratio, using
the two detection models and different classificaiton cut-off probabilities. In case
windows are not detected within a facacde, the estimated window-surface ratio is
equal to zero.
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Table 5.3
Explaining window-surface ratio by structure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6 )
Faster R-CNN SSD
Cut-off: 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.9
m2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000 -0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
N Floors 0.002 0.002 0.003* 0.004*** 0.002* 0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Building period (dummies)
D: 1931 - 1944 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.008*** -0.006** -0.004
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
D: 1945 - 1959 -0.007** -0.007** -0.007** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.007**
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
D: 1960 - 1970 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.006** -0.004 -0.001
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
D: 1971 - 1980 -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.007** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.009***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
D: 1981 - 1990 -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.018***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
D: 1991 - 2000 -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.020***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
D: after 2001 -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.014***
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Constant 0.139*** 0.137*** 0.133*** 0.108*** 0.101*** 0.092***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
Observations 6,253 6,050 5,675 5,410 5,065 4,416
Adj. R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
Notes: Dependent variable: window-surface ratio. Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. D
= dummy. Baseline building period: D: Built 1906 - 1930.
5.5.4 Classification Comparison
To compare the proposed methods with an image classification model used in previous
studies, I estimate the number of floors with a image classification model directly. Using
the same 3,940 images as in the object detection model training, images are labeled by the
actual number of floors of the underlying property and split into training and validation
images at a ratio of 85:15. In 10,000 iterations I retrain a InceptionV3 model pre-trained
on ImageNet data and considered one of the top models in classification accuracy (Bianco
et al., 2018). The CNN architecture is the successor of the InceptionV2 architecture
used in the Faster R-CNN model. During the training the model converges quickly to a
training accuracy of 82%, showing a speed advantage of image classification.
Using the retrained model, 9,042 images of the application sample are classified
based on the number of floors. However, in contrast to object detection models, image
classification models always assign probability scores pc to every class c, with
∑C
c=1 pc = 1.
Considering the highest assigned probability as correct would overstate the accuracy, as
it is already clear from Section 5.5.1 that not all images show properties correctly. I
therefore test the model performance by counting the number of classifications above the
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cut-off at different probability cut-offs, using the highest assigned probability for a single
class:
Classification success =
{
yes if max(pc1, pc2, ...pcn) ≥ cut-off
no, otherwises
Appendix Figure 5.17 shows the number of successfully classified images at different
cut-off levels. At a cut-off probability of 0.5, 6,693 images are classified successfully,
which is in line the approximately 6,946 images showing actual properties. However, the
number of detected properties decrease much faster than for both object detection models.
Between the cut-off level of 0.6 to 0.9 the number of images decreases from 4,341 to 278,
showing a high sensitivity of the model to unfiltered images. Here the object detection
models clearly outperform the classification model.
Figure 5.8 shows the accuracy of floor classifications at different probability cut-offs.
Considering classifications with minimum probabilities between 0.6 and 0.9, the model
correctly predicts floors for 51.6 to 53.5 percent of the sample. This performance is in line
with the estimation of the object detection models ranging between 43.8 to 53.5 percent.
Given the lower effort compared to object detection models, this measure is quite good.
However, the distribution of false classifications is wider, ranging from -3 to 3 with more
overestimations.
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Figure 5.8
Classification model accuracy - Number of floors
Notes: Comparing the outputs of the classification model, classifiying images by number of
floors, with the actual number of floors. Tests at different minimum probability cut-offs.
5.6 Discussion & Conclusion
In this paper, I present a novel data mining approach for real estate markets and urban
economics, using object detection on residential property images. In contrast to previous
studies, using image classification, the proposed object detection model offers more flex-
ibility and robustness by requiring less image filtering. Multiple, different image objects
are detected simultaneously, including information about their relative position and size.
This aspect offers a lot of freedom to researchers, allowing to build custom data mining
algorithms. I present two applications, estimating the number of floors by counting the
number of vertically aligned windows and estimating the window-surface ratio.
Admittedly, the developed models work well, but are far from perfect, showing an
accuracy slightly above average. This problem could be overcome by increasing the in-
vested effort, preparing more training data and run more iterations. Additionally, Google
Street View data is a bottleneck, allowing me to only use approximately 70% of images.
The image resolution is capped to a maximum of 640 x 640 pixels, which does not allow
to examine details and smaller objects. Furthermore, the angle of the image is often not
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optimal, not showing the entire property or the front. For higher accuracy, one should
therefore try to take better images, such as from real estate websites.
The proposed method has some limitations. It only allows to mine characteristics that
are deductible from visible aspects. Images and address information are required input
data even though the model could be used to examine characteristics on a neighborhood
level by using public address databases. Processes within the CNN remain a black box
and might be case sensitive. It is therefore not recommendable to apply deep neural
networks to aggregated measures, such as property prices. Lastly, the required computer
hardware is not to underestimate, forcing the user onto cloud computing services.
This paper shows that it is possible to develop a data mining model for real estate
research at little effort. Using object detection models on urban images enable researchers
and policy makers to remotely collect property information at low cost. The proposed
approach could be used to analyze new property characteristics, such as the spread of solar
panels or building states of properties. Additionally, it could be used to take inventory of
property markets with limited information, such as developing countries. The method is
not restricted to street scenes, but could be combined with aerial images.
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5.7 Appendix
Figure 5.9
Illustration of Neural Network Setup and Training
(a) Neural Network Illustration
(b) Model training process
Notes: Figure 5.9a illustrates a neural network with 2 hidden layers. Figure 5.9b illustrates
the model training process.
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Figure 5.10
Example of annotated image
Notes: This figure shows an example of an annotated image,
highlighting windows, the fascade and roof of a property. An-
notations are performed in the RectLabel software.
Figure 5.11
Illustration of Faster R-CNN anchor boxes
Notes: Faster R-CNN models use nine anchor boxes for classification, fixing three aspect
ratios and three sizes (Ren et al., 2015).
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Figure 5.12
Geographical distribution samples
(a) Model training sample
(b) Application test sample
Notes: The map shows the distribution of the samples across the Netherlands,
divided by observations with and without GSV images.
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Figure 5.13
Examples of bad GSV outputs
Notes: Examples of bad GSV images, failing to show properties for requested locations.
Figure 5.14
Data flow diagram
Notes: This Figure illustrates the data flow.
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Figure 5.15
Distribution number of floors
Notes: This figure shows the distribution of number of floors in the
application test sample based on a total of 9,042 images.
Table 5.4
Mean floor deviation at floor levels
Actual number of floors
Cut-off score 1 2 3 4
Faster R-CNN
0.7 0.35 -0.34 -0.12 -2.20
[0.61] [0.60] [0.67] [0.65]
0.8 0.33 -0.39 -0.17 -2.26
[0.58] [0.58] [0.66] [0.64]
0.9 0.29 -0.45 -0.25 -2.33
[0.54] [0.57] [0.63] [0.62]
SSD
0.7 0.40 -0.36 -0.17 -2.21
[0.64] [0.60] [0.69] [0.70]
0.8 0.39 -0.43 -0.23 -2.28
[0.64] [0.60] [0.67] [0.69]
0.9 0.38 -0.51 -0.36 -2.41
[0.65] [0.56] [0.64] [0.65]
Notes: Shown is the mean deviation of actual and estimated
number of floors at different actual number of floors and cut-
off levels, with standard deviation in brackets.
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Figure 5.16
Examples of floor deviations
(a) Blocked floor level (b) Big roof without window
Notes: Examples of floor deviations. Source: Google Street View
Figure 5.17
Classifications at different cut-off scores
Notes: A classification is considered as successfull if the assigned probability of a
single class is higher than the cut-off. If there is no class with a score higher than the
cut-off the classification is considered as unsuccessfull. There are 4 classes and 9,042
images.
5.7.1 IoU and mAP
Intersection over union (IoU) is a measure to evaluate the localization accuracy of the
model, showing how good predicted localization matches actual localization.19 The IoU
is calculated by
IoU =
Area of Overlap
Area of Union
where Area of Overlap is the area of intersection between the actual location and the
predicted location, and Area of Union is the total area of the actual and predicted location.
19For more details see https://bit.ly/2QWgBoa
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The concept is further illustrated in Figure 5.18, showing the intersecting and union area
of the predicted and actual object location.
Figure 5.18
Illustration Intersection over Union
Notes: Illustrated is the concept of Area of Overlap (left) and
Area of Union (right)
Average precision (AP) is based on two measures, Precision and Recall, which are
negatively correlated to each other. Precision is defined as
Precision =
Correctly observed
(Correctly observed + Wrongly observed)
where Correctly observed measures the number of correctly identified objects (True pos-
itive) and Wrongly observed measures the number of wrongly identified objects (False
positive). A lower Precision indicates low efficiency, as the algorithm detects a lot of
boxes that are correct. Recall is defined as
Recall =
Correctly observed
(Correctly observed + Not observed)
where Correctly observed measures the number of correctly identified objects (True
positive) and Not observed measures the number of objects not detected by the algorithm
(False negative). A low Recall indicates low effectiveness, as the algorithm misses a lot of
boxes that should be detected.
All sample bounding boxes are ranked according to the IoU and for every IoU thresh-
old Precision and Recall are calculated. This allows to plot a Precision-Recall (PR) curve
as illustrated in Figure 5.19. AP is calculated as
AP =
∫ 1
0
Precision(r)dr
where Precision(r) illustrates that Precision is plotted as a function of Recall level r.
However, in practice AP can be approximated by
AP =
1
R
R∑
r=1
Pinterpolate(r)
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where Pinterpolate(r) is the interpolated, maximum precision for a Recall level rˆ.
Pinterpolate(r) = max
rˆ≥r
Precision(rˆ)
Since it is common to use comparable Recall levels, normally 10 equal levels are
chosen for r so r ∈ {0, 0.1, ...1}, resulting in:20
AP =
1
11
1∑
r=0,1
Pinterpolate(r)
Finally, the mean average precision mAP can be defined as the average AP over
different objects classes c:
mAP =
∑C
c=1 AP (c)
C
AP and mAP are usually reported with corresponding IoU threshold level or range,
such as AP@.60 or AP@[.5:.1:.9], reporting the AP at an IoU of 0.6 or at an IoU range
between 0.5 and 0.9 with steps of 0.1.
Figure 5.19
Precision-Recall (PR) curve illustration
Notes: Illustration of PR curve with 170 Precision-
Recall pairs.
20This origins from the challenge to develop superior models for one of the most common open-source
data-sets http://cocodataset.org/#detection-eval.
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Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
6.1 External Effects
This thesis explores the effects of externalities on house prices and it introduces a novel
approach on how to improve price measurements through machine learning. Externali-
ties affect our daily lives and shape location preferences. Positive external effects, such
as a nearby park, increase our willingness-to-pay for locations, while negative external
effects, such as noise, lower it. Residential real estate markets offer a good measure for
this willingness-to-pay, as property prices are strongly affected by location values. By
controlling for other priced characteristics with a hedonic framework, real estate prices
enable us to value external effects on the nearby area.
There is a big advantage in using real estate prices as an externality measure. Namely,
with real estate prices we are able to measure net-external effects, examine the reach of
external effects and monetize them. A traditional cost-benefit assessment of externality
sources is usually problematic, since it is difficult to pin down individual external effects
and their reach. However, locations are usually affected by both positive and negative
external effects and therefore reflect net effects (Nelson, 2004). Hence, real estate prices
offer policy makers an unbiased measure for a cost-benefit analysis, considering the effect
on surrounding houses.
Chapter 2 examines the effect of primary schools and school quality on house prices.
Generally, the willingness-to-pay for living nearby good schools is higher and results in
location premiums (Black, 1999). However, I show that this is not the case in the absence
of school districts, which force parents to live within the district boundaries to let children
attend the respective school. There are no external effects for house prices nearby high
quality schools when school choice is free. However, for houses within 200 m of low quality
schools, I document a price discount of approximately 1.6 percent. These results are in line
with previous findings, showing that schools are a source of relevant externalities (both
positive and negative) in the housing market (Sah et al., 2016). However, comparing the
results to studies exploiting catchment areas, I show that the effect of school quality is
negligible without catchment areas.
Chapter 3 focuses on a more controversial topic: energy production. Energy produc-
tion is a complex topic for cost-benefit assessments as there are long term global effects
but short term local external effects. There is little evidence on the short term external
costs to residents, but this does not stop people from forming strong opinions on it. As
these subjective views are often based on an isolated single effect (instead of taking a
holistic view) and every form of electricity production has some disadvantage, there are
protests against every type of electricity production: coal, wind, nuclear, etc. Chapter 3
takes into account that we will always need some form of electricity production and there-
fore assesses the local external effects of different energy production facilities on property
prices.
The results show the complexity of the problem; I find mixed effects per energy
production type. House prices seem to be negatively affected by wind turbines and gas
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plants, and unaffected by the closing of coal plants. Interestingly, house prices increase
when biomass plants open, and fall when these plants close. Thus, some conventional
power plants do not necessarily show negative price effects - whereas green energy pro-
duced by wind turbines always decreases house prices. However, policymakers in rural
areas tend to be positive about the building of new power plants in their region, since it
not only affects house prices - it can also boost infrastructure and offer employment.
Chapter 4 focuses on cannabis sales and house prices, and I find counterintuitive
results based on a popular policy intervention in the Netherlands. I examine the effect of
nearby coffeeshops (ie. cannabis sales points) on house prices, by exploiting an exogenous
policy intervention which abruptly closed down all coffeeshops within 250 m of secondary
schools. I find that the closing of a nearby coffeeshop actually decreased house prices.
The effect ranges from -7.6 percent for homes close to the shop, to -1.6 percent for homes
located up to 150 meters away. Not only did the policy have an unintended negative house
price effect, it also failed to deliver on its intended effect. Namely, first studies show that
the closing of these coffeeshops, did not significantly change teenager’s cannabis usage.
These three Chapters illustrate the complexity of local external effects, leading to
misconceptions. I show that proximity to high-quality schools does not increase house
prices in itself (Chapter2), energy production facilities are not necessarily depreciating
location values (Chapter 3), and removing coffeeshops lowers location values (Chapter 4).
Clarifications on common misconceptions can help policymakers to make better placement
decisions and improve urban planning.
6.2 Computer Vision
Hedonic property pricing models offer the possibility to assess property prices and examine
externalities. This helps policy makers with more accurate tax assessments and residential
decision making. However, available micro-level data are often the bottleneck. In Chapter
5, I tackle the problem of missing information. I propose to use computer vision, a machine
learning technique, to mine property data from images. This technique offers countless
of opportunities, such as: better structural controls to hedonic property pricing models,
examining new markets, or even examine pricing effects of new measures.
My findings show that Google Street View offers a great coverage but images are of
limited quality. However, even with the available image quality at hand and with limited
effort, it is possible to develop an object detection model that can be employed for data
mining applications. The model offers high flexibility and allows for gathering multiple
characteristics at the same time, which I demonstrate in the two example applications.
Running a horse-race comparison with simpler models, I show that object detection is
more robust to confounding factors in unfiltered images.
In the future, the possibilities of machine learning models should be examined even
further as I am convinced that they will deliver new insights into property markets. This
will help to run better hedonic studies, examine new markets and eventually make real
estate markets more efficient. It allows researchers to remotely examine residential real
estate markets, independent of local policy barriers.
118
Chapter 7
Valorization
The motivation for this thesis origins in the desire to better understand the dynamics
behind real estate markets. Why are some neighborhoods considered as attractive, while
others are not? There are countless discussions how individuals sites are affecting neigh-
borhood values, but often these discussions are not based on scientific evidence. I analyzed
three policy topics out of these discussions, contributing to the understanding of housing
price determinants and the understanding around around individual policy discussions:
the cost of education, energy production and cannabis sales points.
Chapter 2 shows that there is no evidence of average and good schools affecting local
housing markets. Consequentially, placing a school of high quality should not be used as
a tool to increase neighborhood attractiveness. Furthermore, it is shown that external
effects of schools are versatile and in proximity of worst performing schools negative
externalities significantly outweigh positive and consequently decrease residential housing
prices. The previous literature often neglects the distance between properties and schools,
focusing on the position within or outside school district boundaries only.
Chapter 3 adds to the discussion on energy production. In recent years, many studies
exploring the effects of wind turbines emerged. However, due to the heterogeneity in study
areas, times and methods, they were not able to set the findings in relation to other energy
sources. In this study, I cover all energy production facilities of a whole country over nearly
30 years. The results show that some energy production facilities have a positive effect
on house prices, some a negative and some a negligible effect.
Chapter 4 focuses on the external effects of cannabis sales facilities. Due to a trend
in wider acceptance of cannabis use and legalization, policy makers are confronted with a
complex choice: where to locate cannabis sales facilities. Chapter 4 explores the spillover
effects of such facilities in a market with long experience: the Netherlands. I find that
house prices do not increase after cannabis sales facilities are exogenously closed down.
Rather, I find that house prices decrease. Residents thus do not seem to experience
cannabis sales facilities as a nuisance to their neighborhood.
Throughout the chapters I am constantly confronted with potential endogeneity prob-
lems. I therefore explore different methods to measure external effects. This thesis there-
fore also adds to the discussion on valuation model choices. Only by using difference-in-
difference or repeated sales models we are able to establish causal relationships. However,
these models require sufficient available data, which are often scarce.
The aforementioned data scarcity leads to the question how we can collect new data?
Chapter 5 takes a step into the deep - by exploring future ways of using machine learning to
help policymakers reflect on residential housing market decisions. The chapter tackles the
bottlenecks of current housing studies, with methods from computer science. In a novel
approach, I apply machine learning techniques to property images, estimating property
characteristics. I examine the image quality of Google Street View for this purpose and
show two example applications of the proposed method. This method has a wide array of
possible usages, among the most promising is its application to data scarce settings - such
as urbanization in low-income countries, or accurate tax assessments in these countries.
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“Alles Wissen und alles Vermehren unseres Wissens endet nicht mit einem Schlußpunkt,
sondern mit einem Fragezeichen.” - Hermann Hesse
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